Suchergebnisse

Acknowledgements -- Contents -- List of Figures -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- 1 A Glimpse of Today's Laowaitan in Ningbo -- 2 The Local Entrepreneurial State and Urban Redevelopment in China -- 2.1 Research Questions -- 2.2 Theoretical Overview -- 3 Research Design and Methodology -- Notes -- Chapter 2: The "City Operator" and the Tianyi Square Redevelopment Project -- 1 Planning the Tianyi Square Redevelopment -- 1.1 The No. 1 Landmark -- 1.2 Laoqiangmen of the "Village in City" -- 1.3 From "CBD" to "CCD" -- 2 Building the Tianyi Square -- 2.1 The NBUCI as "City Operator

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) needs to recruit and incentivize two categories of grassroots party workers, namely, grassroots party secretaries and full-time party workers, to take on party work for the non-public sector of the economy. Three general strategies of recruitment have been developed: adaptation, reactivation and cooptation. Using these strategies, the CCP sets in motion the flow of human resources between the public and the non-public sectors. The CCP provides three general incentives to its grassroots party workers: material incentives, status incentives and the incentives of identity. Full-time party workers are careerists who 'live off' the Party and expect material incentives, while part-time grassroots party secretaries are believers who 'live for' the Party and expect status incentives and the incentives of identity. (J Contemp China/GIGA)

Using data from the 2017 Hong Kong Panel Study of Social Dynamics, this article investigates the political attitudes and national identity of Chinese migrants in Hong Kong. The study reveals a negative association between refugee experiences and support for pro-government parties, a negative association between refugee experiences and national identity, and a positive association between premigration socialisation and support for pro-government parties. Adult undocumented migrants reported lower levels of support for pro-government parties and weaker national identity compared to adult documented migrants. Documented migrants who arrived in Hong Kong at age 16 or older reported higher levels of support for pro-government parties than those who arrived at younger ages. (China/GIGA)

Abstract
The rising level of automation has increasingly attracted scholars' attention. On the other hand, there are many studies of the consequences of social movements, but relatively fewer studies focus on their economic consequences, and even fewer studies have examined their consequences on automation. This article bridges the gap between the two literatures by hypothesizing that a rising number of labor protests will lead to a higher level of automation. We argue that political economy factors influence the adoption of more automation. Protests anticipate higher wages and labor costs; contest for social power with employers and the state, and, in extreme cases, pose a public relations challenge to employers, which will likely push employers to replace human workers with robots. We empirically test the relationship by using two protest event datasets in China, the China Labor Bulletin and Collective Action from Social Media and robot data from the International Federation of Robotics. Statistical analysis shows that provinces and industries that have more protests also tend to concentrate more robots, and the results are robust to most specifications and placebo tests. The findings have implications for both understanding the mechanism explaining rising automation and the consequences of social protests.

The globalization development of the world allows the economic development presenting knowledge. Talent cultivation is similar to long-term investment that the importance cannot be neglected. Moreover, low birth rate in current society has each child being the treasure of the parents, who spoil the children with permissive parenting and do not realize the immaturity and low self-control of children in the preschool stage to result in children's deviant behaviors and teachers' increasing workload and pressure. Aiming at kindergarten teachers in Jiangsu as the research objects, total 380 copies of questionnaire are distributed, and 277 valid copies are retrieved, with the retrieval rate 72%. The research results are summarized as below: Kindergarten teachers are general people who have emotion and cannot exercise forbearance for everything. For this reason, school organizations should be considerate of kindergarten teachers' emotional labor problems, parents and the mass society should treat teachers' work with objective perspective and putting themselves in the place. Using individual emotional intelligence to achieve personal emotional accommodation in the process is an important strategy for kindergarten teachers; In the cultivation process, kindergarten teachers stress on evaluating children's level, strength, and weakness for individualized instruction. Step-by-step design of learning content aims to emphasize the importance of rational evaluation. In this case, special education teachers with better emotional intelligence performance could well apply rational evaluation and emotional accommodation strategies, reduce working pressure, and enhance subjective well-being; Kindergarten organizations could properly support teachers with time flexibility to reduce kindergarten teachers dealing with class affairs or other problems with extra time. Cooperation among people would help deal with problems and promote individual positive affect. According to the research results, suggestions are eventually proposed, expecting to help kindergarten teachers present higher commitment and better effectiveness on the teaching performance to promote the overall education quality.

The production of China's new urban spaces is an important articulation of China's local state transformation and evolving state-society relations. Previous studies have utilized theories of the entrepreneurial state and corporatism to examine the role of the Chinese state and China's state-society relations. The entrepreneurial characteristic and direct involvement in productive and profitable activities of the Chinese state are widely analyzed. And state corporatism helps explain how the Chinese Party-state deals with new social strata, such as private entrepreneurs, through state imposition, sponsorship and co-optation. In both fields, the organizational adaptation of the Communist Party of China (CPC) per se to the changing social stratification structure, industrial structure and urban spatial structure plays a key role in undertaking entrepreneurial local governance and imposing control over China's new social spaces. This thesis is based on an in-depth case study of Ningbo's state-led urban redevelopment from 2000 to 2011, the two representative projects of which are Tianyi Square and the Laowaitan. Ethnographic fieldwork and documentary research were conducted as the major methods of data collection. The two urban redevelopment projects were undertaken by the Ningbo Urban Construction Investment Holdings Co., Ltd. (NBUCI), a local state-owned enterprise group specifically committed to strategic urban development projects and provision of municipal public utilities designated by the Ningbo Municipal Government. The Ningbo government significantly facilitated the two projects through high-profile promotional campaigns in an entrepreneurial manner. These phenomena represent state entrepreneurship of Ningbo's Party-state agencies in Ningbo's urban redevelopment. In the governance of Tianyi Square and the Laowaitan, "territorialized Party-building" is undertaken in office buildings and business districts, and within private enterprises and new societal organizations. Organizational adaptation helps the CPC to consolidate its membership basis and expand its organizational control over the economic resources and talents in the non-state sector. The concept of "entrepreneurial Party-state" is thus proposed to highlight the "Party dimension" in China's entrepreneurial urban governance. And in the context of inter-district competition, territoriality has become central to authoritarian corporatist state-business intermediations and policy concertation, which is committed to forging the identity and promoting the interests of certain urban territories, and the subtle power struggle between the NBUCI on behalf of the Ningbo municipal authority and the district-level authority governing the territory of the Laowaitan area. The concept of "territorial corporatism" is thus proposed to articulate the territorial dimension in China's changing state-business relations in China's entrepreneurial urban governance. This research provides new cases of state entrepreneurship, Party-state adaptation and state corporatism taking place in the domain of urban redevelopment and urban governance, which in turn lead to new theorization of the Chinese Party-state and China's state-society relations at the local level in urban China. The directions for future research on Party-state adaptation and territorial corporatism in relation to urban governance in urban business districts are also identified, which necessitates comparative studies of more cases in different localities in urban China. ; published_or_final_version ; Sociology ; Doctoral ; Doctor of Philosophy

Extensive research in Western societies has demonstrated that media reports of protests have succumbed to selection and description biases, but such tendencies have not yet been tested in the Chinese context. This article investigates the Chinese government and news media's selection and description bias in domestic protest events reporting. Using a large protest event data set from Weibo (CASM-China), we found that government accounts on Weibo covered only 0.4 per cent of protests while news media accounts covered 6.3 per cent of them. In selecting events for coverage, the news media accounts tacitly struck a balance between newsworthiness and political sensitivity; this led them to gravitate towards protests by underprivileged social groups and shy away from protests targeting the government. Government accounts on Weibo, on the other hand, eschewed reporting on violent protests and those organized by the urban middle class and veterans. In reporting selected protest events, both government and news media accounts tended to depoliticize protest events and to frame them in a more positive tone. This description bias was more pronounced for the government than the news media accounts. The government coverage of protest events also had a more thematic (as opposed to episodic) orientation than the news media. (China Q / GIGA)

AbstractRecently, environmental, social, and governance (ESG) has been the subject of extensive research and publication. Researchers have pointed out that corporate ESG performance is not only determined by the demographic and personality characteristics of current executives, but also by early‐life experiences. Recent research has illuminated the influence that early‐life experiences of executives have on corporate social performance. However, there is still a lack of research on how executive poverty experiences affects corporate ESG performance. To fill this void, our study investigates the potential influence of CEOs' childhood poverty experiences on corporate ESG performance, employing the upper echelon theory and imprinting theory. Specifically, we gathered data for publicly traded Chinese companies from 2011 to 2020, and discovered that companies helmed by CEOs who grew up in underprivileged neighborhoods demonstrated superior ESG performance. We also scrutinized the moderating mechanisms that impacted the strength and attenuation of poverty imprinting. Our findings reveal that CEO expected tenure and green investors augment the favorable impact of poverty imprinting on corporate ESG performance, while CEOs who receive higher compensation exhibit a weaker imprint. Our study contributes significantly to the imprinting field and the literature on corporate ESG performance, while also providing valuable insights into strategies that facilitate pro‐social conduct among firms.