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This article suggests that regulations targeting the U.S. public sector may influence racial inequality in the private sector. Since the 1990s, nine states have banned affirmative action practice in public universities and state governments. I theorize that although these bans have no legal jurisdiction over private-sector firms, they could influence such firms normatively. After such a ban, executives who have been skeptical of Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) policies may feel more normative license to reduce commitment to EEO practices. Using a difference-in-differences estimation on 11,311 firms from 1985 to 2015, I find that the bans are indeed associated with slower racial progress in private-sector firms: after a state adopts the affirmative action ban, growth in the proportion of Black managers in establishments with corporate headquarters in that state slows by more than 50 percent, and this slowdown is mostly concentrated in firms with politically conservative CEOs. These findings suggest a mechanism for the persistence of racial inequality and show that regulations can influence actors well beyond legal jurisdictions.

This study examines data from 35 countries and 24 industries to understand the relationship between gender diversity and firm performance. Previous studies report conflicting evidence: some find that gender-diverse firms experience more positive performance, and others find the opposite. However, most research to date has focused on a single country or industry and has not accounted for possible variation across social contexts. This paper advances an institutional framework and predicts that gender diversity's relationship with performance depends on both its normative and regulatory acceptance in the broader institutional environment. Using a unique longitudinal sample of 1,069 leading public firms around the world, I find that the relationship between gender diversity and firm performance varies significantly across countries and industries owing to differences in institutional context. The more that gender diversity has been normatively accepted in a country or industry, the more that gender-diverse firms experience positive market valuation and increased revenue. These findings underscore the importance of the broader social context when considering the relationship between gender diversity and firm performance.

Although it is well known that team performance influences strategic decision making, little is known about its impact on ascriptive inequality. This study proposes a performance effect on racial bias: higher team performance reduces managers' performance pressure and therefore, leads to more managerial bias in the subsequent decisions. I find strong evidence for this proposition using a fine-grained data set from the National Basketball Association. In this highly competitive industry, team performance is positively associated with coaches' subsequent exercise of racial bias: players experience more favorable treatment from same-race coaches after their teams win games. This study shows an important relationship between performance feedback and racial bias and suggests that, even in highly competitive industries, managerial bias may persist in high-performing teams and organizations. The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2018.1232 .

There is strong evidence of racial bias in organizations but little understanding of how it changes with repeated interaction. This study proposes that repeated interaction has the potential to reduce racial bias, but its moderating effects may be limited to the treatment of individuals rather than of entire racial groups. Using data from 2,360 National Basketball Association (NBA) players and 163 coaches from 1955 to 2000, I find that players receive more playing time under coaches of the same race, even though there is no difference in their performance. This racial bias is greatly reduced, however, as the player and the coach spend more time on the same team, suggesting that repeated interaction minimizes coaches' biases toward their players. But it does not reduce coaches' racial biases in general. Even after years of coaching other-race players, coaches still exhibit the same levels of racial bias as they did upon first entering the league. These results suggest that repeated workplace interaction is effective in reducing racial bias toward individuals but not toward groups, making an important contribution to the literature on organizational inequality.

This article argues that a society's level of social trust influences employers' hiring strategies. Employers can focus either on applicants' potential and select on foundational skills (e.g., social skills, math skills) or on their readiness and select on more-advanced skills (e.g., pricing a derivative). The higher (lower) the social trust—people's trust in their fellow members of society—the more (less) employers are willing to invest in employees and grant them role flexibility. Employers in higher-trust societies are therefore more attentive to applicants' potential, focusing more on foundational skills than on advanced skills. We empirically test this theory by using a novel dataset of more than 50 million job postings from the 28 European Union countries. We find that the higher a country's social trust, the more its employers require foundational skills instead of advanced skills. Our identification strategy takes advantage of multinational firms in our sample and uses measures of bilateral (country-to-country) trust to predict job requirements, while including an instrumental variable and fixed effects on country, year, employer, and occupation. These findings suggest a novel pathway by which social trust shapes employment practices and organizational strategies.

Social evaluations proceed in stages. First, judges filter a broad pool of candidates and pick a subset for detailed assessment. Then, the chosen group undergoes a closer examination, during which winners are selected. At both stages of the process, judges are susceptible to bias. Bias is especially commonplace when contenders work in teams because each team member's merit can be hard to distinguish from that of others. Our paper investigates evaluation bias originating in intrateam status asymmetries. Using the National Basketball Association's data, we explore how high-status teammates are associated with their colleagues' chances of winning awards. We find that bias stemming from high-status teammates' presence is beneficial to their colleagues in the first stage of evaluations because high-status actors increase their team members 'visibility to judges. However, our results also show that in the second stage of evaluations, the presence of high-status teammates could decrease their colleagues' chances of winning awards because lower-status actors might seem less worthy of awards when evaluated alongside high-status individuals. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2020.13917 .