Provides comprehensive coverage of the major players in the Chinese economy since the reform era, which began in 1978. This work includes 200 entries briefly summarizing each individual's life and career, with a central focus on his or her accomplishments and the key roles played in the economic development of China
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China hosts over half of global coal-fired power generation capacity and has the world's largest coal reserves. Its 2060 carbon neutrality goal will require coal-fired electricity generation to shrink dramatically, with or without carbon capture and storage technology. Two macroeconomic areas in which the socioeconomic impact of this decline is felt are losses in jobs and tax revenues supported by thermal coal mining, transport and power generation. At the national level, under a 'baseline' (B) scenario consistent with China's carbon neutrality goal, labour productivity growth in coal mining implies that significant job losses will occur nationally in the medium term, even if all coal plants continue operating as planned. Jobs supported by the coal power industry would decline from an estimated 2.7 million in 2021, to 1.44 million in 2035 and 94,000 in 2050, with jobs losses from mining alone expected to exceed 1.1 million by 2035. Tax revenues from thermal coal would total approximately CNY 300 billion annually from 2021–2030, peaking in 2023 at CNY 340 billion. This is significantly less than estimated subsidies of at least CNY 480 billion, suggesting coal is likely a net fiscal drain on China's public finances, even without accounting for the costs of local pollution and the social cost of carbon. As coal plant retirements accelerate, from 2034 onwards, fiscal revenues begin to fall more rapidly, with rates of decline rising from 1% in the 2020s to over 10% a year by the 2040s. More aggressive climate policy and technology scenarios bring job and tax losses forward in time, while a No Transition policy, in which all currently planned coal plants are built, delays but does not ultimately prevent these losses. At the provincial level, China's major coal-producing provinces will likely face challenges in managing the localised effects of expected job losses and finding productive alternative uses for this labour. Governments of coal-producing provinces like Inner Mongolia, with an industry highly dependent on exports to other provinces, are more exposed than others to declining tax revenues from coal, and more insulated from job losses, given their high current degree of labour efficiency. Although their provincial revenues are likely to remain stable until the early 2030s under the B scenario, the possibility of increasing policy stringency underlines the need for revenue and skill base diversification. At the firm level, China's 'Big Five' state-owned power companies were responsible for over 40% of both jobs and tax revenues in 2021. The number of jobs supported by the activities of each of the largest ten firms, with one exception, will decline by 71–84% by the early 2040s, with the tax contribution of each declining by 43–69% in the same period.
China hosts over half of global coal-fired power generation capacity and has the world's largest coal reserves. Its 2060 carbon neutrality goal will require coal-fired electricity generation to shrink dramatically, with or without carbon capture and storage technology. Two macroeconomic areas in which the socioeconomic impact of this decline is felt are losses in jobs and tax revenues supported by thermal coal mining, transport and power generation. At the national level, under a 'baseline' (B) scenario consistent with China's carbon neutrality goal, labour productivity growth in coal mining implies that significant job losses will occur nationally in the medium term, even if all coal plants continue operating as planned. Jobs supported by the coal power industry would decline from an estimated 2.7 million in 2021, to 1.44 million in 2035 and 94,000 in 2050, with jobs losses from mining alone expected to exceed 1.1 million by 2035. Tax revenues from thermal coal would total approximately CNY 300 billion annually from 2021–2030, peaking in 2023 at CNY 340 billion. This is significantly less than estimated subsidies of at least CNY 480 billion, suggesting coal is likely a net fiscal drain on China's public finances, even without accounting for the costs of local pollution and the social cost of carbon. As coal plant retirements accelerate, from 2034 onwards, fiscal revenues begin to fall more rapidly, with rates of decline rising from 1% in the 2020s to over 10% a year by the 2040s. More aggressive climate policy and technology scenarios bring job and tax losses forward in time, while a No Transition policy, in which all currently planned coal plants are built, delays but does not ultimately prevent these losses. At the provincial level, China's major coal-producing provinces will likely face challenges in managing the localised effects of expected job losses and finding productive alternative uses for this labour. Governments of coal-producing provinces like Inner Mongolia, with an industry highly dependent on exports to other provinces, are more exposed than others to declining tax revenues from coal, and more insulated from job losses, given their high current degree of labour efficiency. Although their provincial revenues are likely to remain stable until the early 2030s under the B scenario, the possibility of increasing policy stringency underlines the need for revenue and skill base diversification. At the firm level, China's 'Big Five' state-owned power companies were responsible for over 40% of both jobs and tax revenues in 2021. The number of jobs supported by the activities of each of the largest ten firms, with one exception, will decline by 71–84% by the early 2040s, with the tax contribution of each declining by 43–69% in the same period.
In this paper a dynamic model of urban pattern formation with endogenous knowledge and capital accumulation is proposed. The Alonso model is extended to include two of the most important dynamic forces for urban development—capital accumulatin and technological progress. The standard assumption of the existence of the central business district (CBD) is still accepted in this approach. It is assumed that two production sectors (industry and service) and one knowledge production sector (research institutions and university) are located at the CBD. First, a compact framework for analysing dynamic interactions of the three sectors and urban pattern formation is suggested. Then, the existence of stationary urban patterns is guaranteed and the stability conditions provided. Last, the effects of changes in government's research policy and some other parameters upon the system are examined.
Lessons in Sustainable Development from Japan and South Korea provides a concise overview of sustainable development in Japan and South Korea. Hsu, Naoi, and Zhang focus on environment, energy, health, technology, biodiversity, production, governance, well-being, livelihood, regulation, property rights, and minerals as indicators of sustainable development. Japan has greatly improved its environment since the industrialization process ended in the 1970s. The nation also has excellent health care and transportation systems. However, Japan continues to struggle with gender inequality and traffic congestion. Poverty and inequality have remained challenges since the 1990s. Similarly, South Korea is continuing to improve its environment, as well as its health care system, but struggles with gender inequality, poverty, and inequality. The countries can benefit from better social policies, as well as from a partnership in improving energy self-sufficiency, including enhancement of renewable energy technologies.
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Shanghai, China, has been a member of the World Health Organization's Global Network of Age-Friendly Cities since it was founded in 2006. Although the initiative has inspired government proclamations and some policy reforms over the years, much of the age-friendly action remains at the early stages of exploration. As part of continuing to develop plans for potentially new programs, we conducted fieldwork research and surveys with organizations that provide services to older adults in the greater Shanghai area. A central finding of our research is the availability of older adult mutual assistance programs in many parts of the region, although not all. Moreover, the programs that do exist are operating independently from the city's age-friendly community initiative. Additional research to understand why these programs have developed in particular locations is necessary to identify place-based leverage points for age-friendly actions, as well as place-based variation in the outcomes such initiatives.