Suchergebnisse

Following the initial COVID-19 outbreak in Hubei Province in late 2019, starting in late January 2020 the Chinese government imposed draconian lockdown measures across the country to control the spread of the disease (Fang, Wang, and Yang 2020). Most small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) suspended operations. Then, as the pandemic eased in April, China began lifting the restrictions. ; Non-PR ; IFPRI4; CRP4; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies ; DSGD; DGO; A4NH ; CGIAR Research Program on Agriculture for Nutrition and Health (A4NH)

It is a daunting task to build institution and infrastructure over a short time period in developing countries. But in the absence of sound institutions and adequate infrastructure, it is difficult for economic transformation to take place. An alternative is to facilitate existing industrial clusters or build industrial parks by creating an enabling environment in a limited place. This paper reviews the commonly used strategies to build effective clusters and industrial parks. Clusters and industrial parks are location specific. Because they have an informational advantage, local governments are in a better position than the central government to identify and solve the bottlenecks that affect clusters and industrial parks. As clusters and industrial parks evolve, new bottlenecks emerge, thereby requiring new solutions. This in turns calls for continuous tinkering by local governments. It is important to place local governments and business communities in the driver's seat of local economic growth so that they can watch out for and adjust to the bumps in the road ahead. ; Non-PR ; IFPRI1; CRP2; C Improving markets and trade ; PIM; DSGD ; CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM)

China's current fiscal system is largely decentralized while its governance structure is rather centralized with strong top-down mandates and a homogenous governance structure. Due to large differences in initial economic structures and revenue bases, the implicit tax rate and fiscal burdens to support the functioning of local government vary significantly across jurisdictions. Regions initially endowed with a broader nonfarm tax base do not need to rely heavily on preexisting or new firms to finance public goods provision, thereby creating a healthy investment environment for the nonfarm sector to grow. In contrast, regions with agriculture as the major economic activity have little resources left for public investment after paying the expenses of bureaucracy. Consequently, differences in economic structures and fiscal burdens may translate into a widening regional gap.

"This paper highlights the difference between secure investor property rights and loosely defined individual property rights. Globalization and fiscal decentralization have intensified this difference. On the one hand, in the presence of mobile foreign direct investments and under the arrangement of fiscal decentralization, local governments compete vigorously to offer various protections on the property rights of investors; on the other hand, local governments and developers attempt to acquire land at as low price as possible by taking advantage of the loopholes inherent in the Chinese law. Secure investor property rights together with weak protections on individuals' land property rights is argued to be one of the major drivers of China's rapid economic growth. But the same factor can veer those individuals being deprived of land into violence and social unrest, which may undermine China's social stability and long-term sustainable growth." -- from Authors' Abstract ; Non-PR ; IFPRI1; Governance ; DSGD

IFPRI3; GRP32; Theme 9; ISI; Subtheme 9.2; Country and regional food, nutrition, and agricultural strategies; Public Policy and Investment ; DSGD ; PR

While, politically speaking, China has a centralized government structure with strong top-down mandates, under the country's current fiscal system, local governments are responsible for providing most local public goods and services. Large differences in economic structures and revenue bases exist, however, causing the implicit tax rate and fiscal burdens in support of local government functions to vary significantly across jurisdictions. Regions initially endowed with a broader nonfarm tax base do not need to rely heavily on new and existing firms to finance public goods provision, which creates a healthy investment environment in support of nonfarm sector growth. In contrast, local governments in regions where agriculture is the major economic activity spend the majority of their resources on their own operating costs, leaving little for public investment. Because of the relatively high transaction costs associated with collecting taxes from the agricultural sector, local governments tend to levy the existing nonfarm sector heavily, thereby greatly inhibiting its growth. As a result, regional differences in economic structures and fiscal dependent burdens may translate into widening gaps in equality. ; Non-PR ; IFPRI1; GRP32; Theme 9;Public Policy and Investment ; DSGD

IFPRI4; DCA; CRP2; F Strengthening Institutions and Governance ; DSGD; PIM ; PR ; CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM)

Using data from 144 village-level governments in India's Tamil Nadu state, we investigate political reservations for women and whether the gender of village government leaders influences the provision of village public goods. A knowledge test of village government presidents and a survey about the interaction between village presidents and higher-level officials reveal that female village government presidents have much lower knowledge of the village government system than do their male counterparts and have significantly less contact with higher-level government officials. Although male and female presidents provide similar amounts of some public goods, we find strong evidence that village governments led by a woman built fewer schools and roads—two public goods that require relatively more contact and coordination with higher-level officials.

IFPRI3; ISI; GRP32; F Strengthening institutions and governance ; DSGD ; PR