Introduction -- Knowing and Re-forming Place -- Research Design -- Australia's Supply of International Landscape Architectural Services -- China as a Site of Demand for International Landscape Architectural Services -- The Li Lake Area and the Proposed Development -- The Practice of Australian Landscape Architects -- The Identified Local Characteristics.
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Acknowledgements -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- Puzzling China-Japan Relations -- The Intellectual Deficits in China-Japan Relations -- Normalizing the Intellectual Dimension of Sino-Japanese Relations -- The Structure of the Book -- Notes -- Chapter 2: The Theoretical Basis and Analysis Framework: The Mechanism of Formation and Replication of Misperception in the China-Japan-US Trilateral Dynamics -- Whose Perception? -- Preference-Based or Strategic Setting-Based Perception -- Notes
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Summary In most of the scholarship on diplomacy, whether historical or contemporary, the governmental elite-based perspective has consistently dominated. The societisation of diplomacy is the process of legitimisation of foreign policy deliberations between state and society, both domestically and internationally. This article argues that there are two types of societisation: internal and external. It defines the former as a dynamic political communication process comprising diplomatic policy deliberation and legitimisation between state and society in a domestic context. The internal dimension is yet to receive sufficient academic and practical attention. This article fills the gap in the literature on the internal societisation of diplomacy through an empirical case study of Japan's diplomacy towards China. It shows that the unsuccessful internal societisation of diplomacy has had moderating effects on Japan's diplomacy towards China.
Although Sino–Japanese relations have been on a recovery course, the deterioration of ties in the first one and a half decades since 2000 should not be forgotten. This article aims to unpack China's perception formation mechanism toward Japan during these turbulent fifteen years by introducing the perspective of strategic perception. Because China's strategic perception toward Japan is largely derived from its overall perceptions of the international system, this article focuses on China's strategic elites to systemically trace the evolution of China's perception of Japan and its policy implications, and to provide a new perception equilibrium that reduced the US factor in the formation of a mutual Sino–Japanese perception. (J Contemp China/GIGA)
North Korea's missile and nuclear tests conducted unilaterally have put China's North Korea policy under intense internal and external pressures. The dramatic developments since 2018 like the détente of the two Koreas and the unprecedented US–North Korea summits are not to be seen as signs that China has played an effective role through its North Korea policy. Why does North Korea always seem to have the upper hand in its relationship with China despite its obvious unilateral economic dependence on China? How did Sino–North Korean relations evolve into their current contradictory state? What is the nature of their relationship? This article considers these questions by analysing China's North Korea policy over the past three decades, since the end of the Cold War. Current research mainly focuses on analyses of specific periods and the interpretation of specific events. By systemically investigating the policy evolution in the past 30 years, this article argues that the US-centric mentality is the primary variable for informing China's perception and policy towards North Korea after the Cold War. (China/GIGA)
The Abe cabinet enjoys rich tangible political resources particularly in the aftermath of the overwhelming victory in the Upper House election in July 2016. However, Abe is also constrained by the less visible intangible uncertainties of his intangible political resources. From the perspective of Japanese internal dynamics, Sino-Japanese relations tend to be on a track of new normal of continued tension with low intensity and sustained dialogue of low quality.
The conventional understanding of Japan's approach to East Asian regionalism is that of a primacy struggle with China, using both hard and soft balancing. However, Japan's strategic priority remains extending and managing the alliance with the US in the post-Cold War era. The increasing trilateral dynamics among China, Japan and the US have largely influenced Japan's perception of its position in the alliance, which frames the basic thinking of Japan's attitudes toward regionalism. Japan's policy and diplomacy toward regionalism have been subordinate to alliance management rather than to a strategic policy shift. Meanwhile, Japan's perception of its regional influence vis-à-vis China also affects Japan's calculation in regionalism. (Pac Rev/GIGA)
The conventional understanding of Japan's approach to East Asian regionalism is that of a primacy struggle with China, using both hard and soft balancing. However, Japan's strategic priority remains extending and managing the alliance with the US in the post-Cold War era. The increasing trilateral dynamics among China, Japan and the US have largely influenced Japan's perception of its position in the alliance, which frames the basic thinking of Japan's attitudes toward regionalism. Japan's policy and diplomacy toward regionalism have been subordinate to alliance management rather than to a strategic policy shift. Meanwhile, Japan's perception of its regional influence vis-a-vis China also affects Japan's calculation in regionalism. Adapted from the source document.
America's new security strategy in the Asia-Pacific region is on the Southwest Pacific and Indian Ocean and realigning them to a combined new theatre. Will this lead to a US-China conflict or a more peaceful region? The author argues that the future of security in the Asia-Pacific region will be more dependent on intellectual competition than a raw military power rivalry. Overestimation of the threat, miscalculation and misjudgement are likely to be the most dangerous challenges.