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In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 37, Heft 4, S. 794-809
ISSN: 0165-1889
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In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society
ISSN: 1468-0297
Abstract
This paper studies the optimal design of the Pacific Salmon Treaty, which was signed by the U.S. and Canada in 1999 to share salmon on the Pacific coast. Moral hazard exists because countries may steal from each other. If a country's observed output is suspiciously too high, the treaty either reduces the country's future share, or asks the country to make a monetary transfer to its opponent. A calibrated version of our model shows that it is optimal for the U.S. to pay Canada $328.93 million every 30.78 years. Switching to the optimal contract improves the total welfare by 1.55%.
In: Economic Quarterly, Issue 3Q, pp. 173-200, 2019
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In: FRB Richmond Working Paper No. 15-12R
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Working paper
In: FRB Richmond Working Paper No. 16-14
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Working paper
In: FRB Economic Quarterly, Vol. 99, No. 1, First Quarter 2013, pp. 45-81
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In: FRB of St. Louis Working Paper Series No. 2011-020A
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Working paper
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Working paper
In: International Economic Review, Band 56, Heft 1, S. 95-132
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In: Economic Quarterly, Issue 1Q, pp. 1-33, 2018
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In: FRB St. Louis Working Paper No. 2022-13
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In: Environmental science and pollution research: ESPR, Band 31, Heft 10, S. 15716-15732
ISSN: 1614-7499
In: Environmental science and pollution research: ESPR, Band 30, Heft 19, S. 55699-55715
ISSN: 1614-7499
In: STOTEN-D-22-04213
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