Suchergebnisse

The creation of the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank (AIIB) understandably grabbed attention throughout the world. The initial response in the US, Japan and some other countries was to view it as a challenge to the post-World War II Bretton Woods order. Many saw it as an attempt by the Chinese to create an alternative institution after having failed to gain greater traction for reform of the existing system of international financial institutions. At the same time, many others see the AIIB as a major event in the history of international financial development with many positive implications for promoting global financial governance. As a Multilateral Development Bank (MDB), AIIB focuses on infrastructure investment in Asia and attempts to construct new mechanisms for international cooperation. It will undoubtedly push for reforms in global financial governance in terms of financial rule-making and loan allocations, and enhance regional financial integration in East Asia.

The ASEAN Community was officially launched at the end of 2015, together with the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint 2025. The latter envisions ASEAN as a competitive and globally-connected region, which also has a voice in global economic fora. But given the wide development gaps within ASEAN, combined with its extremely weak institutional base and its weakening leadership role in East Asian economic cooperation, there is much uncertainty about whether ASEAN can realize its ambitious target of becoming a single market and maintaining its centrality. As trading partners, China has since 2009 been ASEAN's largest, while ASEAN has since 2010 been China's third largest. China further vowed to deepen China-ASEAN relations at the 13th China-ASEAN Expo and China-ASEAN Business and Investment Summit held in Guangxi on 11 September 2016. Chinese Vice-Premier Zhang Gaoli pledged that "China will firmly support the building of ASEAN Community, support ASEAN's central role in regional cooperation, and support ASEAN to play a greater role in international and regional affairs". But for ASEAN, the most pressing question is how China and its initiatives can assist ASEAN member countries achieve their development priorities. In other words, to what extent can the OBOR initiative synergize with the AEC Blueprint 2025, provide new momentum for AEC and strengthen ASEAN's central position within the new wave of regional economic integration in Asia Pacific?

ASEAN-China relations have improved dramatically since the inking of their strategic partnership in 2003. Bilateral trade increased more than six-fold from US$60 billion in 2003 to over $500 billion in 2014, and Chinese investment in Southeast Asia increased from US$0.12 billion in 2003 to US$7.3 billion in 2013. While the degree and nature of China's economic importance vary among individual ASEAN countries, China is a critical economic partner for all ten of them. It is the most important export market for Malaysia, Singapore, Laos, and Cambodia and the largest foreign investor in Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. However, greater economic cooperation with Beijing since 1990s seems to have failed to spill over into the political security realm, and Southeast Asian states continue to be concerned to varying degrees about China's growing military capabilities and the lack of transparency about its intentions. Although the past few years have witnessed increasing economic ties between China and Southeast Asia, Beijing has found that its growing geo-economic strength does not necessarily translate into concomitant geopolitical influence and mutual trust. Thus it is believed that China needs to ease up on its "economy-oriented" policy, and to take into consideration the political and security demands of its southerly neighbours. Chinese analysts have indeed opined that the best way for China to build its "international reputation" is by "taking on more responsibilities in international security" which means "providing the entire world and all regions with more public security goods".2 It would seem therefore that Beijing, through policies such as the promotion of free trade agreements, infrastructure investment and the development of maritime cooperation, hopes to mend and improve its security relations with Southeast Asian countries. It was against such a background that it the New Maritime Silk Road initiative was proposed.

As international pressure on China's policy concerning its increasing investments in Iran grows, the Chinese leadership has to painfully balance its impulse toward energy and economic cooperation with Iran against other important interests, including enhancing its image as a responsible big country. After analyzing the evolution of China-Iran energy relations, this paper tries to answer the question of how China has responded to the intensification of US-led sanctions against Iran, what merits and shortcomings China's attempts to balance or reconcile its interests in Iran might create, and what options China can take to deal with a possible oil crisis. (J Contemp China/GIGA)

Chinese public perceptions of India are generally benign, while a larger stream of Indian opinion tends to be cautious about China's rise. Looking ahead, China-India relations are likely to remain complex and difficult, with marked cooperation in some areas, but competition in other areas. (East Asian Pol/GIGA)

The last two decades have witnessed a significant rise and expansion in outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) from China and India. This paper discusses the development process of China's and India's OFDI since the early 1980s, analysing the major driving factors and determinants behind their enterprises' "going out" strategies, and comparing the different structures of their OFDI. The main conclusion is that the OFDI from China and India is likely to expand further in the future as the two giants aspire to become significant regional and global players in their respective industries. (CIJ/GIGA)

In the immediate post-World War II era following independence, India as the second largest country in Asia played an active role as promoter of Asian regionalism. However, India's decision to pursue a policy of non-alignment in international relations was not well received by the West and also some ASEAN countries as that policy evidenced a pro-Soviet orientation during the Cold War (1947-91). In Southeast Asia, India's support for North Vietnam and its recognition of the Khmer Rouge regime of Heng Samrin in Cambodia did little to promote good relations between New Delhi and ASEAN. However, as the Cold War ended in the early 1990s and China's influence increased in Southeast Asia, India again realized ASEAN's importance in terms of politics, economy, and diplomacy, and consequently launched its "Look East" policy, the focus of which was how to become actively engaged in Southeast Asian affairs in the post-Cold War era. This article attempts to analyse India's Look East policy and its new strategies towards ASEAN. It examines the factors affecting India's post-Cold War policies towards ASEAN, the China factor in the changing relationship between India and ASEAN, and the India factor in Sino-ASEAN relations. It concludes with the suggestion that both these simultaneously rising powers, despite being rivals, can also become stakeholders or partners in ASEAN-led Southeast Asian regionalism. (Contemp Southeast Asia/GIGA)

The debate over China's One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative has been lively and at times heated, both in China and internationally. In many ways, this is a reflection of the vagueness of the concept, and of its exceptionality. OBOR does not prioritize trade and investment concessions, which makes it essentially different from traditional regional economic cooperation models such as FTAs, the TPP and the RCEP. Instead, it emphasizes regional infrastructure connectivity. After China proposed the initiative, countries within the New Silk Road Economic Belt, especially the five Central Asian countries, responded enthusiastically and positively, while Southeast and South Asian countries, on the other hand, expressed more concerns and reservations about the initiative. In response to these countries' concerns, China has tried to adjust its approaches to convince Southeast Asian countries that the OBOR initiative holds potential synergy with ASEAN's development strategies and can play a complementary role in the building of the ASEAN community. Beijing has also adjusted its India strategy. From previously "inviting" India to join OBOR, it is now stressing "strategy connectivity" and "policy coordination" between the two countries. Nevertheless, OBOR is viewed by some as an expression of China's grand ambitions to lead Asian economic growth, and by others as a grand strategy to build a "China-dominated Asia". While it may be mainly an economic and trade initiative, its broader consequences have a strong political and security dimension. Hence, China badly needs to cultivate political trust with neighbouring countries if it wishes to convince them that the initiative is a "public" strategy, and not a "conspiratorial" one.

Indonesia-China energy and mineral ties broaden -- Foreword -- Executive Summary -- I. Introduction -- II. Overview of the Energy Sector -- III. China's Interest in the Indonesia Energy Sector -- IV. Mineral Resource Nationalism on the Rise? -- V. Concerns Over Cooperation With China -- VI. Can Sino-Indonesian Energy Cooperation Become a Broader Bilateral Relationship? -- VII. Conclusion.