Suchergebnisse

Innovation serves as the first impetus for high-quality development. The role of government in promoting high-quality innovation development has become a chief driving force. Therefore, based on role theory, this paper will discuss the effect of different government roles on high-quality innovation development and regional alienation, providing policy recommendations for China. In this paper, firstly, a super-efficiency DEA model is introduced to measure the high-quality innovation development level among 30 provinces and municipalities in mainland China from 2010 to 2017. Secondly, a Tobit model is used to analyze the impact of different government roles on high-quality innovation development. The following conclusions are drawn through a super-efficiency DEA model: (1) From the holistic perspective, the high-quality innovation development in mainland China shows a fluctuating growth trend, but its level still needs improvement. (2) From the regional perspective, there is a patchwork pattern of &lsquo ; the eastern region ranks highest, followed by the western region and the middle region that stays at the lowest&rsquo ; . In addition, the three regions&rsquo ; average of total factor productivity of high-quality innovation development has shown a smooth upward trend over the years. Then, the results of Tobit regression analysis are as follows: (1) Apart from the role in supporting talent, roles in constructing innovation platforms, cultivating the innovation environment, and coordinating social resources all pass the significance test. (2) Demands of different government roles vary significantly in different regions from the regional perspective. For the betterment of an innovation society, this paper puts forward suggestions according to different regional development statuses, such as shifting our focus from quantity to quality, strengthening cooperation among provinces and municipalities, and formulating appropriate governance role strategies.

Transboundary water pollution is a long-standing problem in China, although the Chinese government has been committed to the protection of water resources. Due to the different interests of multilevel governments and the regionalization of management, there is still no unified plan to solve the transboundary water pollution in China. Watershed ecological compensation as a holistic plan to deal with transboundary water pollution is being promoted currently. Taking the South-to-North Water Transfer Project&rsquo ; eastern route as an example, this paper firstly analyses stakeholders&rsquo ; strategies and establishes a tripartite game model based on evolutionary game theory. Secondly, by introducing Cobb Douglas production function creatively, the supervision level of the central government is refined into supervisory attitude and supervisory skills. Thirdly, the numerical simulation is used to analyze the sensitivity of influencing factors. The results show that: (1) whether the central government supervises the local governments mainly depends on the benefits of water environment improvement and supervision costs ; (2) the initial negotiation plan of the stakeholders has a significant impact on their optimum strategies ; (3) the fines imposed by the central government on the local governments have a small impact on the stable state of the system ; (4) the higher the eco-compensation fee, the lower their likelihood of cooperation ; (5) the central government&rsquo ; s supervisory attitude and supervisory skills have significant effect on the sustainability of the optimum arrangement, even when willingness of upstream and downstream governments to cooperate is low ; (6) the initial ecological benefits of downstream governments have no effect on the optimum strategy. Therefore, considering these insights is helpful to improve the watershed ecological compensation mechanism in order to solve transboundary water pollution and achieve the sustainability of water resources.

The sustainable development of socioeconomic and environmental systems are highly dependent on water capital and water utilization efficiency. Nowadays, a significant portion of the world is facing water security issues due to a combination of various factors. As a result, socioeconomic and environmental systems are threatened. China is also currently experiencing problems. Water security assessment helps to identify key determining factors for optimal water utilization, so the authors present the Driving Forces-Pressures-Carrying Capacity-State-Impacts-Responses (DPSCIR) water security assessment framework. Unlike previous methods, the proposed framework incorporates the carrying capacity of the environment, and as a result, yields assessment results that are more realistic. As a case study, the proposed framework coupled with the entropy method is applied to assess the water security status of the One Belt and One Road (B& ; R) region in China. In addition, the water security level of the provinces and municipalities in this region are simulated for the time period from 2017 to 2022 using the Grey Prediction Model. The results show that Responses, State, Pressures, and Carrying Capacity Subsystems greatly influence water security of the region. According to the assessment, water security of the area improved from 2011 to 2016. The results portray the following trend among the three subregions of the study area, the water security of the 21st Maritime Silk Road (One Road) area is better than Silk Road Economic Belt (One Belt) and the Strategy Support and Pivotal Gateway (SSPG) of B& ; R areas. Generally, from the evaluation results it can be concluded that only focusing on the subsystem of Responses cannot entirely address the water security problems within the B& ; R area. Therefore, to ensure sustainable water security in the region and in the country, the government needs to design water resource management mechanisms that take all the subsystems into account.

To reduce groundwater overexploitation and alleviate water shortages, market mechanisms are introduced to allocate water rights. Scientific and reasonable pricing of groundwater rights is key to ensuring the effectiveness of the groundwater market. Because of the complexity and uncertainty of water resources, this study calculates the price of groundwater rights based on the value of water resources with an evaluation indicator system. The system includes 14 indicators developed with a fuzzy mathematics model addressing three dimensions: environment, society, and economy. The weights of the indicators are determined through the analytic network process (ANP) and the entropy method. The results show that the price of groundwater rights in Ningxia, China increased from 5.11 yuan/m(3) to 5.73 yuan/m(3) between 2013 and 2017; this means the price was basically stable, with a slight increase. The ratio of residents' water fee expenditures to real disposable income also remained essentially stable, fluctuating around 0.37%, far below the normal level. These data demonstrated that the current regional water price policy does not reflect the true value of groundwater resources; there is room to increase urban water prices. Local governments need speed up water price system reforms and adopt water rights systems to optimize water resource allocations.

Water, in most of the transboundary river basins, is a bone of contention among their riparian states. Taking this into account, this article assessed the monthly impact of upstream water withdrawal on the water security of middle stream and downstream sub-basins at a country-basin mesh spatial resolution. Roughly 2.18 billion people in 442 sub-basin areas experience water stress intensification by less than 1% throughout the year. In addition, 2.12 billion people in 336 sub-basin areas experience water stress level change, from no water stress to one of the water stress categories, for at least one month as the result of upstream withdrawal. Even though there is a clear upstream impact in many of the basins, water disputes with severe social, economic, political, and environmental consequences are nonexistent. This might be an indication that grave water disputes are the result of complex socio-economic and political interactions, not merely because of water deficits due to upstream water withdrawal. Therefore, understanding this relationship is crucial in identifying inflection points for water conflicts within transboundary river basins.