Suchergebnisse

AbstractIn recent years, the topic of differentiated integration in the European Union has become increasingly discussed in both political science research and politics in general. Whereas differentiated integration is viewed as necessary for deeper cooperation, recent findings suggest that it increases the gulf between participants and non‐participants, making it difficult for non‐participating countries to join in later negotiations. However, there is a lack of theoretical and empirical work regarding the relationship between different levels of participation in the EU and national policy outcomes. This article addresses this question by comparing the policy outcomes in fully participating, selectively participating (opting‐in) and non‐participating (opting‐out) EU Member States relative to EU legislation. The findings show that selective participation (opting‐in) increases state conformity with EU laws relative to no integration at all (opting‐out), but it does not completely bridge the gap between fully integrated Member States and non‐participants. The results suggest that countries with flexible arrangements are generally less likely to implement EU laws than full participants, even when they choose to legally commit to the EU requirements. This finding raises some further questions about the rationale behind selective participation and its consequences for policy conformity, if its application expands to other policy areas and more Member States in the future.

Abstract
When does the delegation of legislative powers to the executive endanger policy compliance? The European Union (EU) Lisbon Treaty introduced quasi-legislative tertiary legislation – delegated acts – which empowers the European Commission to amend secondary legislation. Formally, member states control delegated acts only ex post via a veto power in the Council, while they have both ex ante amendment powers and ex post veto over the alternative Commission legislation: implementing acts. However, as member states determine the choice of legislative instrument, we argue that they would consent to the Commission adopting delegated acts only on non-controversial issues. Such selection should result in their lower compliance with implementing than with delegated acts. Our analyses of member states' transposition delays and infringement cases related to EU tertiary directives support this argument. The results suggest that the delegation of legislative powers to the executive does not increase non-compliance when the legislators have the means to moderate it ex ante.

By tackling shared problems through concerted policies, the European Union (EU) is thought to have a superior output legitimacy. However, EU policies change as they are being 'customised' during the implementation process. How do such patterns of 'differentiated implementation' affect EU governance in practice? While some studies highlight the danger of 'watering down' the objectives of EU law, others emphasise the role of decentralised problem-solving. We analyse how customisation affects states' practical compliance with EU anti-discrimination, environmental, and justice and home affairs directives in 27 member states (excluding Croatia) between 2007 and 2013. The findings show that customised density (higher number of rules than prescribed by the EU directives) reduces practical compliance. Conversely, customised restrictiveness (stricter requirements than the EU directives) improves practical compliance. In contrast to earlier implementation research, we conclude that literal implementation is not the best form to ensure practical implementation.

AbstractNational governments have increasingly transferred enforcement powers to EU agencies that monitor and penalize non‐compliance by private actors. How do EU agencies apply enforcement competences in practice? Based on the Eurolegalism thesis, pressures for deeper integration have led to the emergence of a more adversarial enforcement style in Europe. Consequently, supranational regulators are expected to employ formal and coercive enforcement instruments. Conversely, studies of EU enforcement suggest that EU agencies may be reluctant to antagonize national governments by prosecuting private actors. In this study, we analyze the enforcement practices of supranational agencies with direct enforcement powers: the EU Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and European Medicines Agency (EMA). We find that EU agencies apply a legalistic approach, but they vary in coerciveness of enforcement. Whereas EU agencies tend to apply more coercive measures against non‐conform products, they are generally not adversarial toward non‐compliant organizations.