Suchergebnisse

The research on naïve realism suggests that people have a tendency of impugning opponents' cognitive biases and interacting with them in conflict-escalating approaches. Taking this to be a basic intrapersonal process in interpersonal deliberation, an experiment was conducted to examine potential rectifying effects of the epistemic motive of the need for openness on such perceptions of bias so as to improve individuals' deliberation preparedness. Results show that the tendency of imputing greater bias to others based upon self-other opinion incongruence is mitigated by the induced need for openness. This study also finds that participants are better prepared to partake in a group discussion with another person whose opinion is congruent rather than incongruent with theirs, and this relationship is through perceptions of bias in the opinion incongruent other. But this indirect path is weakened when participants are induced to have an elevated epistemic motive of the need for openness.