Suchergebnisse

The predicament of political reform that China faces today is that while people are increasingly aware of its importance, they lack a basic consensus on what to reform and how. This article argues that political reform cannot be achieved by utopianism but must be based on Chinese political practice. The practice in Chinese politics in the era of reform and opening demonstrates that political reform has three main dimensions, namely, open party, meritocratic competition and public participation. First, the ruling party, the Chinese Communist Party (CPC), tends to become increasingly open, which is leading to an open political system. Second, an open political system is gradually leading to limited political competition among political elites, based on the traditional notion of meritocracy. And third, with political competition, social participation is gradually being materialised. Overall, openness, competition and participation are the essential characteristics of the so-called Chinese political model. This article also argues that while China's political system is developing these characteristics, there are enormous challenges ahead for the realisation of these political values. But, if the intra-Party democracy cannot be substantiated, the future of the CPC is uncertain. (China/GIGA)

This paper examines China's transformation from different perspectives, including economic, social and political, and discusses how these transformations are linked to the country's open-door policy. The paper argues that the most powerful driving force behind China's rapid transformation is its openness. At the domestic level, openness creates an institutional environment in which different existing factors reorganize themselves, thus providing new dynamics for change. At the international level, openness links China and the world together, and the interplay between China and the world produces an external dynamism for China's internal changes. Openness, however, has led to social injustice. Society often becomes the weakest link in the process of globalization and opening up; therefore, it must be defended by all means and in all major policy areas. (J Contemp China/GIGA)

It is increasingly clear that so far Hu has become the candidate to succeed Jiang Zemin as the core of the fourth generation of the CCP leadership in the next party congress in 2002. The appointment has aroused the interest of Zhongnanhai (China's White House) watchers both inside and outside China. Why is Jiang Zemin willing to pass his power to Hu Jintao? Will it be a smooth transition of power from the third to the fourth generation of leadership? Is the CCP becoming mature in dealing with the power succession issue? Given the fact that power succession has troubled the CCP leadership since 1949, such questions are not entirely baseless. The appointment of Hu Jintao gives us an opportunity to examine what the Jiang Zemin-centred new leadership has learned from past experience, to what degree power succession has been institutionalised, and what challenges are ahead for the leadership. (Asian J of Polit Sci/DÜI-Sch)

The Fifteenth Chinese Communist Party Congress, convened in September 1997 in Beijing proposed for the first time since reforms began at the end of 1970s that the Party would give its highest priority to the rule of law. The author provides an explanation of the development of law and the legal system in post-Mao China by placing it in the context of China's transitional socio-economic and political order. (DÜI-Sen)

Die Wirtschaftsreformen in China haben zwar zu einer gewissen Liberalisierung im Verhältnis von Staat und Gesellschaft und zum Übergang von einem totalitären zu einem autoritären System geführt, noch nicht jedoch zu Demokratie. Grund dafür ist, daß sowohl der Imperativ der ökonomischen Entwicklung wie die politische Kultur des Landes dem Staat einen dominanten Platz zuweisen. Langfristig jedoch ist die Demokratie in China nicht ohne Chance. (SWP-Whr)

China has been regarded as a totalitarian or authoritarian country in which the part-state controls every aspect of political, economic and social activity. The article shows that with the implementation of administrative decentralization in post-Mao China, the central party-state is no longer monolithic in all aspects of China's foreign affairs. Instead, provincial governments have become increasingly paradiplomatic actors in China's foreign trade. (DÜI-Sen)

Some major changes in economic as well as political ideology and their implications for political development in China are explored in this essay. After a look at the major ideologies of nationalism, neo-authoritarianism and political liberalism, it is noted that the old ideology of the planned economy is being reassessed in China in the light of a new philosophy, nationalism. (DÜI-Sen)

The massive worldwide protests initiated by China's angry youths (Fen Qings) over biased reports on the Tibet issue in the West in 2008 and perceived unfriendly actions toward China's Beijing Olympic Games shocked the world. Although scholars and the media have shown great interest in China's Fen Qing phenomenon, there is no serious scholarly research. Based on interviews, investigative field trips, and an exhaustive web search, this paper explores the Fen Qing phenomenon. Through an analysis of three cases, namely, the anti-CNN Web, the Han Han phenomenon, and the '69 Holy War', it distinguishes three types of Fen Qings: nationalistic, China-critical, and resentment-venting. These Fen Qings vary in the people who constitute them, the causes of their anger, and their targets. The paper places the Fen Qing phenomenon in the broader context of China's socio-economic transformation and its relations with other countries. (J Contemp China/GIGA)

The way in which China is selecting its top leaders is perhaps changing, reflecting some new socio-cultural trends in current Chinese elite politics. Xi Jinping has at least three things going for him: his princeling background, his clean reputation and his pro-business performance. However, before 2012 he has yet to pass several other tests before possibly stepping into Hu Jintao's shoes, especially those concerned with diplomatic affairs. (CIJ/GIGA)