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The study aimed to investigate the relationship between smoking, Sugar-Sweetened Beverage (SSB) consumption and tooth brushing among adolescents in China. A valid sample of 6084 middle school students from the Zhejiang province was included. Participants were questioned about smoking status, SSB consumption, tooth brushing, and oral health-related quality of life (OHRQoL). Among the participants, smoking prevalence was 1.9% and nearly half of the students consumed SSBs. The demographic factors associated with smoking were gender, place of residence, and parental level of education. There are co-variations between smoking status, SSB consumption, and tooth brushing. Logistic regression showed that smoking adolescents were more likely to brush their teeth less than once per day (OR = 1.74, p < 0.05), consume soft drinks once or more per day (OR = 2.18, p < 0.01) and have a higher score on the Child Oral Health Impact Profile (OR = 1.05, p < 0.05) after adjusting for demographic factors. The findings provide compelling evidence for governments and related stakeholders to intervene in the lifestyle of adolescents. Future studies are needed to understand the interaction effects of such behaviors, and should help to inform appropriate interventions.

AbstractWe study firms' product reliability and extended warranty (EW) pricing decisions in different supply chains. Using a game‐theoretic model, we analyze three supply chains: a centralized supply chain in which the manufacturer sells products and optional EWs directly to consumers (Model C), and two decentralized models in which products and EWs are sold through a retailer with the EW offered by the manufacturer (Model M) or a third‐party insurer (Model I). We also study cases where consumers cannot observe product reliability and investigate the impact of unobservable quality. We find that the manufacturer generates most profits by directly selling both products and EWs, irrespective of whether reliability is observable or not; whereas the retailer prefers selling EWs offered by an insurer when consumers can observe product reliability but prefers sourcing EWs from the manufacturer when product reliability is unobservable. In addition, when the reliability is unobservable to consumers, the manufacturer always chooses a lower reliability than that when consumers can observe the reliability. Such information advantage (over consumers) on product reliability hurts the manufacturer and consumers, and the retailer. With the existence of a third‐party insurer, the manufacturer may be indifferent or prefer to provide EWs. But having the manufacturer competing with the insurer benefits consumers and the retailer under certain conditions. This study offers guidelines on how firms should determine product reliability and EW prices in different supply chains, and sheds light on where a retailer should source EWs based on whether reliability is observable to consumers or not. Finally, our results highlight the importance of establishing a mechanism to credibly disclose product reliability information to consumers.

Remanufacturing plays an important role in a circular economy, by shifting supply chains from linear to closed loop. However, the development of the remanufacturing industry faces many challenges. Consumers' uncertainty about the quality of remanufactured products can hamper their decision to make a purchase (i.e., uncertainty behavior). Such uncertainty can be reduced when they learn that more consumers are purchasing remanufactured products (i.e., network externality behavior). Considering the aforementioned behaviors, this paper investigates how a government could set the optimal subsidy level to maximize the sales quantity of remanufactured products with a limited budget. We modeled a Stackelberg game between the government and an original equipment manufacturer, under two settings, over two periods. Setting 1 only considers an original equipment manufacturer that produces remanufactured products, and Setting 2 considers an original equipment manufacturer that produces both new and remanufactured products. We show that the original equipment manufacturer should adjust its pricing strategy (i.e., markup vs. markdown) according to the subsidy levels. Our analysis on the government budget constraint shows that an original equipment manufacturer earns more profits in Setting 1 than Setting 2, only when the budget constraint is high, and less profits when budget constraint is low.