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Using German income distribution in 2009, this paper studies the redistributive and revenue effects of bracket creep under various inflation scenarios. We develop a tax micro-simulation model for the newly available Panel on Household Finance (PHF) data. The simulation yields an inverted U-shaped overall redistributive effect of the income tax and social insurance contribution system with respect to the inflation rate, which contrasts with Immervoll (2005) who finds that fiscal drag always enhances the equalising effect. The nominal income growth as well as the deterioration of tax progression at the middle and top of the income distribution between 1998 and 2009 can be the impetus for this change. This result implies that delaying adjustment might reduce redistribution. We also suggest that these results might not be restricted solely to Germany. Additionally, when we introduce the empirical evidence that capital income grows faster than non-capital income 􀝎 > 􀝃, the dual tax system with a flat capital income tax implemented in 2009 further disequalises the after-tax income substantially. Allowing inflation compensation to lean towards the poor by boosting their share of capital income may not be favourable to redistribution.

This paper analyzes the main uncertainty of college saving - the child's ability - in the context of the saving with learning model. The first section develops a dynamic model combining asset accumulation and learning to explain the parents' forward-looking saving behavior when they are confronted with the real option of college choice due to uncertainty of their child's ability. The model infers that, with enough time spent learning, information can improve parents' welfare. This can be accomplished by improving the allocation of the consumption to accommodate the burden of college cost given both asset status and the child's true ability. Next, I test the implications of the model from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics/Child Development Supplement & Transition into Adulthood (PSID/CDS & TA) (1997-2005) in the second section. This empirical study investigates college saving behavior when learning is present. Data suggest pessimistic and/or rich parents might reduce the level of college saving, which confirms the interaction of wealth and learning effects predicted by this model. The result also supports the state dependence of parents' college expectations and diminishing persistence over time due to learning. Finally, a number of policy improvements on ESA (Education Saving Account) are proposed to encourage parents to learn about their childs ability. -- Education saving ; search ; learning ; intertemporal consumption ; real option ; dynamic panel

Using German income distribution in 2009, this article studies the redistributive and revenue effects of bracket creep under various inflation scenarios. We develop a tax micro-simulation model for the newly available Panel on Household Finance (PHF) data. The simulation yields an inverted U-shaped overall redistributive effect of the income tax and social insurance contribution system with respect to the inflation rate, which contrasts with Immervoll (2005), who finds that fiscal drag always enhances the equalising effect. The nominal income growth as well as the deterioration of tax progression at the middle and top of the income distribution between 1998 and 2009 can be the impetus for this change. This result implies that delaying adjustment might reduce redistribution. We also suggest that these results might not be restricted solely to Germany. Additionally, when we introduce the empirical evidence that capital income grows faster than non-capital income r > g, the dual tax system with a flat capital income tax implemented in 2009 further disequalises the after-tax income substantially. Allowing inflation compensation to lean towards the poor by boosting their share of capital income may not be favourable to redistribution.

We show that unexpected price level movements generate sizable wealth redistribution in the Euro Area (EA), using sectoral accounts and newly available data from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey. The EA as a whole is a net loser of unexpected price level decreases, with Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain losing most in per capita terms, and Belgium and Malta being net winners. Governments are net losers of deflation, while the household (HH) sector is a net winner in the EA as a whole. HHs in Belgium, Ireland, Malta and Germany experience the biggest per capita gains, while HHs in Finland and Spain turn out to be net losers. Considerable heterogeneity exists also within the HH sector: relatively young middle class HHs are net losers of deflation, while older and richer HHs are winners. As a result, wealth inequality in the EA increases with unexpected deflation, although in some countries (Austria, Germany and Malta) inequality decreases due to the presence of relatively few young borrowing HHs. We document that HHs inflation exposure varies systematically across countries, with HHs in high inflation EA countries holding systematically lower nominal exposures.

We document the presence of sizable distributional effects from unexpected price level movements in the Euro Area (EA) using sectoral accounts and newly available data from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey. The EA as a whole is a net winner of unexpected price level increases, with Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain being the biggest beneficiaries, and Belgium and Malta being the largest losers. Governments are net winners of inflation, while the household (HH) sector is a net loser in the EA as a whole. HHs in Belgium, Ireland, Malta and Germany incur the biggest per capita losses, while HHs in Finland and Spain turn out to be net winners of inflation. Considerable heterogeneity exists also within the HH sector: relatively young middle class HHs are net winners of inflation, while older and richer HHs are losers. As a result, wealth inequality in the EA decreases with unexpected inflation, although in some countries (Austria, Germany and Malta) inequality increases due to presence of relatively few young borrowing HHs. We document that HHs inflation exposure varies systematically across countries, with HHs in high inflation EA countries holding systematically lower nominal exposures.

We document the presence of sizable distributional effects from unexpected price level movements in the Euro Area (EA) using sectoral accounts and newly available data from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey. The EA\ as a whole is a net winner of unexpected price level increases, with Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain being the biggest beneficiaries, and Belgium and Malta being the largest losers. Governments are net winners of inflation, while the household (HH) sector is a net loser. HHs in Belgium, Ireland, Malta and Germany incur the biggest per capita losses, while HHs in Finland and Spain turn out to be net winners of inflation. Considerable heterogeneity exists also within the HH sector: relatively young middle class HHs are net winners of inflation, while older and richer HHs are losers. As a result, wealth inequality for the EA as a whole decreases with unexpected inflation, although in some countries (Austria, Germany and Malta) inequality increases due to presence of relatively few young borrowing HHs. We document that HHs inflation exposure varies systematically across countries, with HHs in high inflation EA countries holding systematically lower nominal exposures.

This paper studies the redistributive and revenue effects of bracket creep in Germany under various inflation scenarios and evaluates the feasibility to charge a rich tax to fight bracket creep for the income distribution in 2009. Using a tax micro-simulation model developed for the newly available PHF data, we document an inverted U-shaped overall redistribution effect of the tax system with respect to the inflation rate, which contrasts Immervoll (2005) who finds that the fiscal drag always enhances the equalizing property. Delaying indexation might not be better off in terms of inequality. A politically in-between approach is proposed to raise the marginal tax rate for the top bracket to compensate the government revenue loss due to indexing the tax schedule in Germany. The rich tax required for fully financing the indexation can be sizable. Under our simulation environment, this rate can reach above 75% with four years' inaction on 4% annual inflation. When this rich tax can be fiscally possible, it can totally offset the decrease of global redistribution effect from indexation. Our results echo the inequality indexing proposed by Burman, Shiller, Leiserson, Rohaly and Kennedy (2007) by suggesting institutionalizing a joint adjustment of rich tax and bracket creep / inflation indexing which justifies a pro-growth, risk reducing, revenue-neutral and framing effective policy.