Suchergebnisse

Just how rapid is China's rise? A global comparison -- Explaining China's rise: some popular views -- Do institutions rule? -- Savings and China's investment-led growth -- The role of education: quantity and quality -- Technological progress and innovation -- Confucian culture as the key differentiating factor -- Why is China slowing down? -- Catching up to America in a post-COVID-19 world.

This paper evaluates China's corporatization drive based on an assessment of the state sector's current problems. It shows that the worsening agency problem and excessive welfare burdens, as well as increasing competition, have contributed to the increasing losses experienced by Chinese state‐owned enterprises (SOEs). While socialization of welfare burdens may improve SOEs' financial health, the mass corporatization drive by itself without institutional underpinnings, is unlikely to solve the more fundamental agency problem. The paper then argues that the key to a successful restructuring of the state sector lies in the fundamental transformation of state ownership and the creation of effective governance mechanisms, which, in turn, requires the development of the country's market‐oriented institutions, in particular, financial markets and the rule of law. (JEL P20, P31)

AbstractWe have developed a self‐enforcing contract model to show that better economic fundamentals can help an area or a region under a weak rule of law – but with order – to attract foreign direct investments (FDIs), whereas lowering taxes does not necessarily help. Using a cross‐region Chinese dataset, we find evidence consistent with our theoretical analysis. Regional variations in tax rates and the perceived quality of formal contracting institutions are not correlated with regional FDI inflows, but leadership characteristics are. Most conventional economic factors have the predicted effects on FDIs. The finding that FDI is lower in locations where domestic private firms have better access to finance and where the air quality is poor is also new to the literature.

AbstractPublic listing is a key reform measure for large state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) in China. We find evidence that public listing lowers state ownership significantly, lessens firms' reliance on debt finance, and allows firms to increase capital expenditure, at least temporarily. We also find that ownership structure affects post‐listing performance. However, we find no statistical evidence of a positive effect of public listing on firms' profitability. We suggest alternative interpretations of the last finding.