A country's democracy improves when it receives democracy aid from a larger number of donor countries. This finding appears surprising from a development perspective, as the presence of a large number of donors, and more generally 'fragmented aid', have been shown to impact negatively on the recipient country. But fragmented aid can be beneficial: Diversity on the donor side provides choice to the local actors involved in the process of democratization. It thus creates a 'marketplace of ideas' which increases the viability of the resulting institutions. In contrast, a highly-concentrated donor community can lead to the imposition of an institutional blueprint, designed in advance and not adapted to the needs of the recipient society. An instrumental variable analysis with panel data for 133 countries from 1994 to 2013, explicit tests of the causal mechanism, and anecdotal evidence from Ghana provide strong support for the benefits of diverse democracy aid.
A country's democracy improves when it receives democracy aid from a larger number of donor countries. This finding appears surprising from a development perspective, as the presence of a large number of donors, and more generally 'fragmented aid', have been shown to impact negatively on the recipient country. But fragmented aid can be beneficial: Diversity on the donor side provides choice to the local actors involved in the process of democratization. It thus creates a 'marketplace of ideas' which increases the viability of the resulting institutions. In contrast, a highly-concentrated donor community can lead to the imposition of an institutional blueprint, designed in advance and not adapted to the needs of the recipient society. An instrumental variable analysis with panel data for 133 countries from 1994 to 2013, explicit tests of the causal mechanism, and anecdotal evidence from Ghana provide strong support for the benefits of diverse democracy aid.
A country's democracy improves when it receives democracy aid from a larger number of donor countries.This finding appears surprising from a development perspective, as the presence of a large number of donors, and more generally 'fragmented aid', have been shown to impact negatively on the recipient country. But fragmented aid can be beneficial: Diversity on the donor side provides choice to the local actors involved in the process of democratization. It thus creates a 'marketplace of ideas' which increases the viability of the resulting institutions. In contraast, a highly-concentrated donor community can lead to the imposition of an institutional blueprint, designed in advance and not adapted to the needs of the recipient society. An instrumental variable analysis with panel data for 133 countries from 1994 to 2013, explicit tests of the causal mechanism, and anecdotal evidence from Ghana provide strong support for the benefits of diverse democracy aid.
Dieser Artikel untersucht neun Fragilitätsindizes. Die Inhaltsvalidität der Indizes wird durch die Überprüfung von Konzeptualisierung, Messung und Aggregationsmethoden bewertet. Die konvergente/diskriminante Validität wird mittels Hauptkomponentenanalyse und multidimensionaler Skalierung bewertet. Diese Verfahren erlauben die Untersuchung von Dimensionalität und statistischer Ähnlichkeit innerhalb der Gruppe von Indizes. Sowohl die konzeptionelle als auch die statistische Analyse stützen die Hypothese, dass es eine Gruppe "holistischer" Fragilitätsindizes gibt, die für die Erforschung der Ursachen und Folgen von Fragilität von geringem Nutzen sind. Die restlichen Indizes befassen sich mit spezifischen Aspekten von Fragilität und produzieren empirisch unterscheidbare Ergebnisse.
Method factors represent variance common to indicators from the same data source. Detecting method factors can help uncover systematic bias in data sources. This article employs confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to detect method factors in 23 democracy indicators from four popular data sources: The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Freedom House, Polity IV, and the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project. Using three different multi-dimensional concepts of democracy as starting points, we find strong evidence for method factors in all sources. Method-specific factors are strongest when yearly changes in the scores are assessed. The sources find it easier to agree on long-term average scores. We discuss the implications for applied researchers.
Weltweit stehen westliche Geber in der Demokratieförderung vor einem Dilemma. Demokratie ist zwar ein wichtiges politisches Ziel, aber sie fürchten, dass der Weg dorthin ein ebenso wertvolles Ziel – politische Stabilität – unterminieren und in den Empfängerstaaten vermehrt Gewalt auslösen könnte. Wir gehen hier der Frage nach, ob es für diese Befürchtungen empirische Belege gibt, und wie Geber bei potenziellen Zielkonflikten zwischen Demokratisierung und Stabilität abwägen können. Jüngste Forschungsarbeiten des Deutschen Instituts für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) zeigen, dass es für die Sorge, Demokratisierung könne destabilisierend wirken, tatsächlich gewisse empirische Belege gibt (Leininger et al. 2012; Ziaja 2013). Diese Befürchtungen sollten allerdings nicht vom größeren Problem ablenken, "auf halber Strecke stehen zu bleiben". Hybride Regime mit autoritären Merkmalen, die sich hinter einer Fassade formal-demokratischer Institutionen verstecken, stellen auf lange Sicht ein größeres Sicherheitsrisiko dar als Versuche, in hybriden Regimen Demokratie zu fördern. Demokratieförderung ist also wünschenswert, aber häufig ein Risiko. Laut einer neuen Studie des DIE, die 47 afrikanische Staaten einbezieht, führt Demokratieförderung zwar kurzfristig zu mehr Demonstrationen und Ausschreitungen, nicht aber zu Bürgerkriegen. Somit deutet stärkere Mobilisierung der Bevölkerung eher auf die Wirksamkeit von Hilfe hin, als dass sie ein Grund zur Besorgnis wäre. Damit Demokratieförderung langfristig wirken und die Forderungen der Bevölkerung kanalisieren kann, muss sie lokalen Akteuren beim Aufbau von bedarfsgerechten Institutionen helfen. Häufig ließen sich Eliten aus Angst vor möglichen destabilisierenden Folgen von Bürgerbeteiligung zur Beschneidung des Wettbewerbs in jungen Demokratien verleiten. Dies ist keine gute Idee: Elitäre Transitionen führen laut unserer Forschung zu weniger nachhaltigen politischen Konstellationen als offener Wettbewerb. Externe Förderung gelingt am besten, wenn Geber mar¬ginalisierte Gruppen darin unterstützen, sich am Institutionenaufbau zu beteiligen. Das wird am besten durch gleichzeitiges Engagement vieler Geber erreicht. Diversität auf der Geberseite erhöht die Chancen, eine kontextgemäße institutionelle Struktur zu finden, anstatt dem Partnerland eine solche überzustülpen. Daraus ergibt sich, dass es für die Notwendigkeit eines Sequenzierungsansatzes in der Demokratieförderung - d. h. erst Stabilität, dann Demokratie – kaum empirische Belege gibt. Die meisten Länder haben bereits vor über zwei Jahrzehnten (formal) den Weg zur Demokratie einge¬schlagen. Ein gradualistischer Ansatz mit gleichzeitigem Aufbau von staatlichen Institutionen und der Förderung breiter Beteiligung ist darum der vielversprechendere Weg. Unsere Empfehlungen lauten daher in Kürze: Die Demokratieförderung diversifizieren. Endogene, inklusive politische Entwicklung fördern. Beim Aufbau politischer Institutionen durch den Einsatz von Konditionalität auf Konfliktlösungsmechanismen bestehen. Zielkonflikte in Phasen demokratischer Transition abwägen.
Western donors attempting to promote democracy across the globe face a dilemma. Democracy is a highly valued policy goal, but they are fearful that the path to democ¬racy will undermine another highly valued goal – political stability – and potentially cause widespread violence in the recipient countries or beyond. We ask whether these fears have empirical support and how donors can balance the potentially conflicting objectives of democratisation and stability when intervening in governance matters. Recent research at the German Development Institute shows that fears about the destabilising effects of democratisation do indeed have some empirical support (Leininger et al 2012; Ziaja 2013). But these fears deflect attention from the bigger problem of "getting stuck in the middle". Hybrid regimes that exhibit authoritarian traits under a façade of formal democratic institutions constitute, in the long run, a larger security risk than attempts to make these countries more democratic. Hybrid regimes also hamper economic development, thus constituting an additional, indirect, risk of violent conflict. The promotion of democracy is hence a laudable effort, but it may itself carry risks. A recent DIE study of 47 African countries suggests that support for democracy increases popular mobilisation in the short run, leading to increased demonstrations and riots. However, the same study produced no evidence that democracy support is likely to spark civil wars. Increased mobilisation is thus rather a sign of aid effectiveness than a reason to worry. Yet, to be effective in the long run and to help steer popular demands into peaceful channels, democracy support must assist domestic actors in building institutions that fit the needs of their society. In the past, the potentially de¬stabilising consequences of popular participation have seduced would-be engineers of social change into re¬stricting competition in young democracies. This is a bad idea, as our recent research shows: narrow, elite pacts have, on average, led to worse political outcomes than open competition. The best contribution that donors can make from the out¬side is to enable marginalised groups to participate in crea¬ting the institutional setup. This is best achieved when many donors promote democracy simultaneously. Only then can they avoid the "blueprint trap", which snaps shut when donors try to impose – advertently or inadvertently – an institutional setup on the partner country that does not fit its society's needs. Diversity on the donor side increases the chances of finding a context-adequate institutional design. These findings suggest that an overly cautious sequencing approach to democracy promotion – stability first, only then democracy – has little empirical support. Most countries in the world embarked on a (formally) democratic path more than two decades ago. A gradualist approach that builds institutions while at the same time encouraging mobilisation is thus the more viable approach. Recommendations in brief: Promote democracy now Keep democracy aid diverse Encourage endogenous, inclusive polity design Enforce conditionality on conflict resolution mechanisms in institutional design Balance trade-offs of democratic transitions.
This paper examines official country selection and resource allocation of German aid after the end of the Cold War and embeds the analysis into the broader debate about German foreign policy. Based on new data, we take into account several peculiarities of the German aid system. Overall, we find that neediness and democracy levels of recipients have been guiding principles in both, country selection and resource allocation. Nevertheless, geo-strategic considerations and the avoidance of conflict-affected countries also impacted on country selection but less on resource allocation. Moreover, non-linear estimation techniques identify a relatively high threshold of income levels below which the poverty orientation disappears; a finding that refines previous studies identifying a middle-income-country bias of German aid allocation. Finally, official selection decisions to concentrate aid on a reduced number of countries did not have the intended concentration effect. This strong path dependency and development-orientation is compatible with research that sees German foreign policy after re-unification as being subject only to very gradual changes and led by the role model of a Civilian power.
