Suchergebnisse

We re-consider the traditional result of zero or negative foreign R&D spillovers or strategic reactions to the USA using accumulated shocks in a vector-error-correction model (VECM) for the period 1963-2017. Foreign private and public R&D stocks have a positive and statistically significant effect on US public R&D and labour-augmenting technical change (LATC). US private R&D reacts positively to foreign private R&D and negatively to foreign public R&D shocks. Foreign public and private R&D react positively to US public R&D. All variables react positively to US private R&D. From the time profile of the simulated VECM, we calculate the sum of discounted (at 4%) net gains for (i) additional private and public US R&D, and (ii) for policies reacting to foreign private and public R&D shocks with additional domestic private and public R&D. Additional private and public US R&D expenditures have very high internal rates of return. R&D investments in reaction to shocks from foreign R&D are profitable. All LATC reactions are transitional suggesting semi-endogenous growth for the USA.

We analyze the dynamic interaction of mission-oriented R&D expenditure stocks with domestic and foreign private and public R&D, total-factor-productivity (TFP) and gross domestic product (GDP) for seven EU countries, for which we have sufficiently long time-series of mission-oriented R&D data. We use the vectorerror-correction (VECM) method. Permanent shocks on mission-oriented R&D increase total-factor-productivity and GDP, mostly because for the UK private R&D is increased or, for Belgium and Italy, public R&D is increased or, for Denmark, France, Germany and the Netherlands, both are increased. France has an initial phase where mission-oriented R&D has to be reduced first and expanded later to get good policy results. On average across periods and countries, a 1 percent increase of mission-oriented R&D leads to an additional 0.485% public R&D, 0.705% private R&D, 0.485% for TFP, and 0.56% GDP. We also show years of positive gains, the sums of discounted net present values, and the average yearly gains/GDP ratio. Mission-oriented R&D has high internal rates of return calculated from comparison of baseline and shock scenario comparison using VECM simulations until 2040. Heterogeneity limits the possibility to find a common model of long-term relations. For most countries we find that in steady states mission R&D reacts to foreign and domestic public R&D and increases TFP. TFP, foreign public and domestic private R&D have two-way causality relations.

AbstractIn an empirical, dynamic simultaneous equation model (DSEM) for Brazil with 22 equations and variables, we show that foreign income is a driver of economic growth besides semi-endogenous technical change. With a balance-of-payments constraint and endogenous terms of trade, the major mechanism is (i) world GDP driving exports, (ii) exports paying for imported capital goods, which (iii) enter a production function increasing output and the foreign-debt/GDP ratio and (iv) increase the endogenous labour force, and (v) slightly reduce human capital growth. The savings gap drives foreign debt and interest rates up and make the model unstable. Permanent increases of human capital increase the R&D/GDP ratio, labour-augmenting productivity, and GDP. A policy to increase the R&D/GDP ratio leads to more human capital, labour productivity and GDP levels. Both knowledge policies reduce the debt/GDP ratio. A lasting shock on the terms of trade reveals that there is no Harberger–Laursen–Metzler effect. The results hold in the presence of endogenous terms of trade, foreign debt, net foreign income, and net current transfers from abroad, and non-Walrasian (dis-)equilibrium variables: inflation and changing inventories for the goods market, and unemployment in the labour market. Policy should strengthen the weak link from R&D (research and development) to technical change and make education more attractive.

We present semi-endogenous growth models with productivity as functions of domestic and foreign private and public R&D. In a small country case with a Cobb–Douglas productivity production function, foreign R&D drives steady-state growth and the production function can be a long-term relation in a vector-error-correction model (VECM). Marginal productivity conditions can be long-term relations for a vector-error-correction model if the functional form is of a VES function generalizing a CES function. Combining the marginal products of VES functions with recent evidence from VECMs for five countries shows that private and public R&D have a positive effect on productivity (except for France), and a negative R&D augmenting technical change. In the case of a VES function, steady states with constant R&D/productivity ratios exist only for special cases of parameter restrictions, which are not supported by the evidence.

Strategic environmental policy games are usually based on simultaneous decision making and reach the conclusion that the policy choices are strategic substitutes. Empirical evidence, however, shows that the introduction of a regulatory instrument usually follows a consecutive pattern that is best described as policy diffusion. To introduce policy diffusion into to a strategic environmental policy game we transform the typical model setup into a Stackelberg game in which we analyze the policy decisions of two governments when one can commit to its choice. We find that the well-known trade-off between rent-seeking and the internalisation of negative externalities from pollution is mitigated when policy diffusion takes place.

We incorporate the process of policy diffusion (i.e. the uncoordinated dissemination of policies among countries) into a probabilistic two-country-model of strategic environmental policy. Contrary to the usual setting with simultaneous decision making we consider the impact of sequential decision making: In the first step the domestic government introduces an emission tax, in the second step policy diffusion occurs with a certain probability and in the third step the firms decide on output quantities. Within this framework we analyze how the prospect of policy diffusion, motivated by a higher damage parameter in the domestic country, influences the optimal domestic emission tax. We show that if the damage parameter in the foreign country is sufficiently high policy diffusion will occur which leads to higher tax rates and higher welfare compared to the equilibrium resulting from simultaneous decision making. Moreover, we show that an increase in the domestic tax rate also increases the probability that the foreign country adopts the tax policy.

Recent political discussions about the possible advantages of first-mover behaviour in terms of environmental policy again called attention to the well-established controversy about the effects of environmental regulation on international competitiveness. Conventional theory claims that the trade-off between regulation and competitiveness will be negative while the revisionist view, also known as the Porter Hypothesis, argues for the opposite. Several previous attempts that analysed this quarrel by means of strategic trade game settings indeed support the former claim and conclude that, to increase a firm's competitiveness, ecological dumping is the most likely outcome in a Cournot duopoly configuration. However, these results were derived from one period games in which so-called innovation offsets are unlikely to occur. The present paper considers a two-period model that includes an intertemporally growing firm-level knowledge capital. In doing so the accumulation of knowledge is modelled in a unilateral and a bilateral variant. It is shown that for both scenarios in period 1 the domestic government will set a higher emission tax rate compared to its foreign counterpart. Furthermore, we identify conditions for which the domestic tax rate will be set above the Pigouvian level in period 1 in both model variants.

Policy diffusion refers to the process by which a political innovation – like the introduction of a novel emission tax – disseminates over time among countries. In order to analyze this issue from an economic point of view we develop a simple two-country-model of the taxation of emissions in presence of (possible) policy diffusion. Contrary to the usual Nash setting of simultaneous decision making we consider a Stackelberg game: In the first step the domestic government introduces an emission tax td thus acting as Stackelberg-leader, in the second step the foreign government decides whether or not to introduce an emission tax tf and in the third step the firms decide on their output quantities to be sold on a third country's market. For the case of an exogenous given probability of policy diffusion we show that the optimal domestic tax rate is c.p. the higher, the higher the probability of policy diffusion is. Moreover, we explore under which conditions first-mover behaviour by the domestic government leads to a higher tax rate compared to the Nash solution In the next step we introduce an endogenous probability of policy diffusion by combining our model with a strategic lobbying approach. As a result, the probability of policy diffusion is c.p. the smaller, the higher domestic tax rate td is. Consequently, in fixing the optimal tax rate the domestic government has to account for the foreign firm's lobbying activities otherwise it will choose a tax rate too high.

We examine the impact of electricity price variation on net FDI (%GDP) inflows in countries of the European Union. We use panel data of 27 EU countries for a period of 2003 - 2013. We show that electricity prices of south-western and north-eastern EU countries did not converge to one price until now. Dynamic panel data analysis using system GMM shows that besides unit labour costs, tax rates and competitive disadvantage in secondary education, also higher electricity prices reduce countries' ability to attract FDI. The immediate effects are statistically significant across both sub-regions analysed: in the short run, a 10% increase in electricity prices leads to a decrease in net FDI inflows as a share of GDP by 0.4 percentage points for the south-western and 0.33 for the north-eastern region. In the long run, the response is 0.60 percentage points for south-western and 0.48 for north-eastern regions. Policies should aim at reducing electricity market price differences on the European level through investment in transborder transmission capacity; reductions in FDI, when environmental policy increases after-tax electricity prices, should be countered by other tax reductions as well as harmonization of property rights, absence of corruption and labour market regulations at best-practice level.