Suchergebnisse

Abstract
Deciding how to relate to the Soviet past is a key question in the politics of memory for the societies and political elites of the post-Soviet countries. Throughout the post-Soviet decades Armenian political and intellectual elites tried to form a complex attitude to the Soviet past, neither rejecting, nor appropriating the Soviet legacy completely, but assimilating it within the paradigm of national history. Within this paradigm Soviet Armenia is viewed as a stage in the development of Armenian nationhood, as "the second republic", which links the first "attempt" at building a nation-state, "the first republic" of 1918–1920, to the "3rd republic", i.e. the post-Soviet state of Armenia. This paradigm, in which the Soviet past is neither completely rejected, or accepted, but certain elements of it are integrated into the national history narrative, is optimal for post-Soviet Armenia, given both the peculiarity of Armenia's historical experience (particularly the role played by Russia/USSR in the context of Armenian-Turkish relations), as well as the current geopolitical setting, in which Armenia and Russia are formal allies. This attitude, which can be described as "mnemonic ambiguity", allows the assertion of an independent and sovereign Armenian state as legitimate, while at the same time avoiding a confrontation with an ally in the realm of memory politics.

While revolutions are difficult to predict, the Armenian revolution was particularly unexpected, as it happened
at a time when the political regime seemed highly stable. However, in hindsight, it has become clear
that the political regime that had been built in Armenia had exhausted itself, with the pre-conditions for
the revolution building up in recent years. Armenia's political system had gravitated from a hybrid regime
to a consolidated authoritarian regime, albeit a soft one. However, this consolidation actually deprived the
Armenian regime of the flexibility that is often key to the survival of authoritarian regimes. In the absence
of other factors that can boost authoritarian regimes (e.g., foreign policy successes, charismatic appeal of
leaders, strong ideology, or high profits from exporting natural resources), the Armenian regime had few
resources to ensure its survival.

The article explores the current stalemate in the Nagorny Karabakh conflict, and perspectives for conflict transformation. As the conflict has remained dormant for more than 20 years, the political systems of the countries engaged in the conflict have adjusted to the conflict situation. The conflict is often used by the political elites in order to legitimize their power, consolidate support, marginalize opponents, and neutralize democratizing pressures. Since the status quo serves the interests of the authorities, the ruling regimes do not have strong incentives to seek conflict resolution. In these conditions, conflict transformation approaches are considered a necessary means to deal with the conflict. Given that political elites have little incentive to implement such transformation, civil society actors come increasingly to the fore. Only through multitrack initiatives supported by civil society actors, we argue, can conflict transformation practices advance and subsequently bring peace to the region.

Iskandaryan, A.: Armenian elections : techonology vs. ideology. - S. 2-4