Power Politics. By Martin Wight. Edited by Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad. (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978. Pp. viii + 317. $22.50.)
In: American political science review, Band 73, Heft 4, S. 1206-1207
ISSN: 1537-5943
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In: American political science review, Band 73, Heft 4, S. 1206-1207
ISSN: 1537-5943
In: Affari esteri: rivista trimestrale, Band 11, S. 73-87
ISSN: 0001-964X
In: Terrorism: an internat. journal, Band 2, Heft 3-4, S. 271-281
ISSN: 0149-0389
A recent study of terrorism by A. Silj (Mai piu senza il fucile! alle origini dei NAP e delle BR [Never Again without a Rifle! Toward the Origins of the NAP & the BR], Florence: Vallechi, 1977) offers a penetrating analysis of the Red Brigades & the Armed Proletarian Nuclei. This work is based on interviews with those who had meaningful contact with members of these groups. Silj reveals that governmental neglect of the young can only lead to the politics of despair by the young. Terrorists display high intellectual capabilities, motivated strongly by ideological concerns. Their hypothesis is that political violence will increase state authoritarianism to the point at which the working class will join them in revolt. While this conclusion appears incorrect, & the terrorism of these groups is being brought under control by technical & legal means, fundamental reforms in Italian government are needed to end the conditions which motivated terrorism in the first place. W. H. Stoddard.
In: Terrorism, Band 2, Heft 3-4, S. 271-281
In: Affari esteri: rivista trimestrale, Band 11, S. 446-465
ISSN: 0001-964X
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 18, Heft 4, S. 579-606
ISSN: 1086-3338
Traditional theory of international politics maintains that, other things being equal, a multipolar balance-of-power system. Arms-control theory, on the other hand, generally contends that an increase in independent nuclear powers is a direct threat to the stability of the international system. is more stable than a bipolar system. A bipolar nuclear deterrent relationship is believed to be inherently more stable than one in which equilibrium is maintained among several nuclear powers in independent or alliance relationships. Though the relatively greater stability of a bipolar system may be preferred, its stability is, nevertheless, contingent. Maintaining the stability of mutual nuclear deterrence while restraining aggression is the primary goal of arms control.
In: NATO ASI series
In: Series D, Behavioural and social sciences 20
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