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Credit default swaps (CDSs) can create empty creditors who potentially force borrowers into inefficient bankruptcy but also reduce shareholders' incentives to default strategically. We show theoretically and empirically that the presence and the effects of empty creditors on firm outcomes depend on the distribution of bargaining power among claimholders. Firms are more likely to have empty creditors if these would face powerful shareholders in debt renegotiation. The empirical evidence confirms that more CDS insurance is written on firms with strong shareholders and that CDSs increase the bankruptcy risk of these same firms. The ensuing effect on firm value is negative.

Credit derivatives allow creditors to transfer debt cash flow rights to other market participants while retaining control rights. Theory predicts that this transfer can create empty creditors that do not fully internalize liquidation costs and liquidate borrowers excessively often. This empty creditor problem is concentrated in firms whose creditors would face powerful shareholders in distressed debt renegotiations. Consistent with this prediction, we show that (1) creditors buy more CDS protection when facing strong shareholders, and that (2) CDS trading reduces the distance-to-default, investment, and value of firms with powerful shareholders.

Creditors are increasingly transferring debt cash flow rights to other market participants while retaining control rights. We use the market for credit default swaps (CDSs) as a laboratory to show that such debt decoupling causes large adverse effects on firms whose shareholders have high bargaining power. After the start of CDS trading, the distance-to-default, investment, and market value of firms with powerful shareholders drop by 7.9%, 7%, and 8.8% compared to other firms. These findings are consistent with an "empty creditor problem" where creditors overinsure to strengthen their position in negotiations with powerful shareholders.