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Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. Animal Treatment as a Matter of Reasonable Disagreement -- Chapter 3. Public Justification and the Disagreement on Animals -- Chapter 4. Views on the Moral Status of Animals -- Chapter 5. Applying Public Justification: Interests, Principles, and Competing Reasons -- Chapter 6. Addressing Unlawfulness: Admissible and Non-Admissible Forms of Protest -- Chapter 7. Conclusion.

This paper investigates Tom Regan's attitude towards violence as a litmus test to understand the justifiability of the use of violence in animal rights activists (ARAs). Although Regan's take seems uncontroversially against a recourse to violence, there is an ambiguity in his position. By comparing Regan's conditions for the legitimate use of violence for the sake of animal liberation with the standard conditions for jus ad bellum, I show that Regan construed the conditions for the former in a specular manner as the conditions for the latter. However, since he was not an absolute pacifist, there is some contradiction, and he should have been more willing to justify some recourse to violence than he in fact does. I conclude by gesturing towards some possible changes that his thought should undergo in order to adjust this incoherence.

The myth of the age of Kronos and Zeus in Plato's Statesman is very ambiguous. In this article, I propose a new set of grounds for upholding the traditional interpretation of the myth against some recent interpretations -- by Luc Brisson, Gabriela Carone and Charles Kahn--that seek to view the age of Kronos as a positive condition. To do so I argue that this myth should be understood as a constitutive myth. To explain what a constitutive myth is I propose a set of five categories (genetic myth, constitutive myth, epistemic myth, eschatological myth, psychagogic myth). In particular, the myth of Kronos and Zeus in the Statesman is a constitutive myth because, by sharply distinguishing the two ages, it highlights the need for politics and techniques in the age of Zeus.

The 'agents' of toleration can be divided into three categories: public institutions, groups and individuals. If it is mostly accepted that both public institutions and individuals are capable of toleration, it is not clear that such a capacity can be attributed to groups, although in daily discourse we seem ready to say that a certain social group is (in)tolerant. This article aims to address this issue by investigating the relationship between collective agency and social groups. Formal groups (e.g. corporations) have internal rules and collectively recognized decision-making procedures that constitute a collective behaviour. However, it is not clear if and in what sense such a capacity is also upheld by informal groups. This article discusses some competing criteria to define informal groups and proposes the shared convictions criterion. In conclusion, this criterion is applied to toleration-related issues, so as to reconcile our ordinary understanding of groups' toleration with a more technical analysis.