Suchergebnisse

In this book the author gives his views on the workings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), where he served as a judge for 18 years. The book deals with the author's subsequent successes, defeats and tribulations while attempting to introduce into the case law of the ECtHR his previously well thought-out theoretical convictions. These convictions can be found in his essays published in 'The Owl of Minerva: Essays on Human Rights' (2007) and his dissenting opinions which were published in 'The Owlets of Minerva' (2011). Based on his many years of experience in the field, the author examines the dialectic relationship between the rule of law and law and order; between state and individual; judicial power of logic vs executive logic of power. These dynamic contradictions are never resolved. On the contrary, they are the motor of development and inspire judicial reasoning and the balancing of justice vis-à-vis power and arbitrariness. In its almost 60 years of existence, the Court has been at the crossroads of two disparate modes of legal reasoning, the common law and the continental legal formalism. The author argues that the cause of the decline of the Court is its inability to adapt and to adopt reasoning by analogy. This thought-provoking book is of interest to academics in the field of law, human rights and constitutionalism

La 4e de couverture indique : "La Convention européenne des droits de l'homme (avec ses protocoles), prétendant expliciter ce que sont les « droits de l'homme », est un texte abstrait de quelques centaines de mots. Quatre-vingt-dix-neuf pour cent de ces droits abstraits seront concrétisés par les précédents prononcés en flux continu, et sur un mode de plus et plus autoréférentiel, par la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme (CEDH) à Strasbourg. En somme, les droits de l'homme sont simplement ce que la CEDH déclare qu'ils sont ou ne sont pas. La signification, la portée, l'impact de la jurisprudence de Strasbourg, qui lie quarante-sept Etats signataires s'étendant de la péninsule Ibérique à la Sibérie, sont tributaires de la manière dont la CEDH a été ou est actuellement fonctionnelle - ou dysfonctionnelle. Or, l'approche jurisprudentielle du stare decisis (à travers le raisonnement par analogie), est complètement étrangère au formalisme juridique européen, fondé sur le raisonnement syllogistique. À l'autre extrême, l'auteur apporte une explication métaphysique du sens de la justice, de l'idéal grec du spoudaios. Ce dernier présuppose le plus haut niveau d'autonomie morale et donc de raisonnement juridique autonome."

The title of this book is taken from G.W.F. Hegel and refers to the idea that philosophy cannot be prescriptive because it understands only in hindsight. The same holds true for conceptions of human rights. In these thought-provoking essays, the author examines the dialectic relationship between 'rule of law' and 'law and order,' between 'state' and 'individual,' and between 'judicial power of logic' vs. 'executive logic of power'. These dynamic contradictions are never resolved. On the contrary, they are the motor of development and they inspire judicial reasoning and the balancing of justice