The article discusses some aspects of continuity and change in Croatian society. The first part, entitled "A Synoptic View of the Croatian Society Today", gives a bird's-eye-view of the Croatian society -- its social structure, dominant values, main repetitive processes: cooperation, competition, conflict, and main processes of social change: modernization and re-traditionalization. It shows the simultaneous effect of forces of continuity and tendencies to change. The second part, entitled "Dominant Values of Croatian Society", presents dominant values on three levels of centeredness: individual (individualism and utilitarianism), national (the "heroic codex") and societal (radical egalitarianism, authoritarianism and solidarity). The war has not introduced significant changes into the value system, apart from a more prominent and generalized "heroic codex" and solidarity. Adapted from the source document.
The article discusses some aspects of continuity and change in Croatian society. The first part, entitled "A Synoptic View of the Croatian Society Today", gives a bird's-eye-view of the Croatian society -- its social structure, dominant values, main repetitive processes: cooperation, competition, conflict, and main processes of social change: modernization and re-traditionalization. It shows the simultaneous effect of forces of continuity and tendencies to change. The second part, entitled "Dominant Values of Croatian Society", presents dominant values on three levels of centeredness: individual (individualism and utilitarianism), national (the "heroic codex") and societal (radical egalitarianism, authoritarianism and solidarity). The war has not introduced significant changes into the value system, apart from a more prominent and generalized "heroic codex" and solidarity. Adapted from the source document.
The policy of pressure on Croatia as an illustrative -- although not isolated -- example has not inspired empirical & theoretical studies of this phenomenon. The discussion has remained at the level of everyday political discourse, even "coffee-house politics." Due to its extreme topicality, as well as its theoretical "solvency," the author has attempted with this essay to come up with a theoretical definition of the concept of pressure & to demonstrate on the Croatian example its goals, scope, dynamics, & future prospects & outcomes. Among the existing approaches, the author has chosen the "politico-economic approach" which defines the policy of pressure as a specific form of political communication between the "center" & the "periphery" in Wallerstein's "world system." The example of Croatia serves the author as an ideal-type model of such communication through a combination of political science & sociological analysis. In his opinion, & due to certain favorable contingencies, Croatia is the nearest to the ideal type of such communication. Due to a lack of systematic empirical data, the discussion naturally remains at the theoretical-hypothetical level, & should be understood as an invitation to further discussion & as an incentive for more extensive empirical research. However, since this is a very dynamic phenomenon, the question is: is the author's argumentation still valid today as it was at the time when the essay was written? There have been two changes: (1) the war on Kosovo which proves the author's hypotheses; & (2) a certain "thaw" in the relations between the international community (particularly USA) & Croatia (it is still unclear whether this change concerns the fundamental strategic trends or is solely a "politico-meteorological" phenomenon (the alteration of colder & warmer periods). This is why the author did not deem any alterations in the text necessary; one should wait & in the meantime expose the (hypo)theses to some critical scrutiny. 12 References. Adapted from the source document.
Following the military defeat of the secular strategic orientation (Drang nach Westen) in Croatia of Serbian political & intellectual elite, a question arises: which are the feasible strategic options of Serbian nationalist elites? Theoretically, three options are possible: (1) radical strategic reorientation: giving up entirely on the existing orientation & setting up new strategic priorities; (2) a respite & mustering of strength for a new round (a reprise of the tactical variant of 1991); or (3) hatching a novel, long-term tactical variation that would enable the achievement of strategic objectives step by step, by "peaceful means." The author finds the third option most viable, though there are no hints that such a choice has actually been made. However, supposing this option might eventually be acted upon, the author goes on to envisage the quandaries & dilemmas that political & intellectual elites in Serbia might be faced with. Adapted from the source document.
The author elaborates on two central assumptions. The first (based on comparative survey results from ten postcommunist countries) is that there is a marked positive correlation between the residue of "communist legacy" in people's & the electoral success of leftist parties. Since that legacy in Croatia (& the Czech Republic) has been weakest, this is going to be an aggravating circumstance for SDP in their struggle for power. The second assumption is that the politics of leftist parties that could come to power is to shuttle between two extremes: the restoration of real-socialism in a modified form & the social-democratic model of Sweden or at least Germany. According to the author, the key agents of such politics are "neotraditionalism" & "political capitalism", both from the former system. Adapted from the source document.
According to the regularly conducted polls by "Globus," political rating of HDZ significantly increased after the military actions "Flash" & "Storm" while those of liberals & other parties decreased. On the basis of certain assumptions, the author concludes that this does not indicate a radical change in political attitudes & orientations of the electoral body; the changes have been caused by political conjuncture. The research has shown that political attitudes are halfway between traditionalism & modernism & that the prospects for the development of democracy in Croatia once peace has been established are notable. Adapted from the source document.
Like other landmark historic events, the war on the territory of the former Yugoslavia has been explained by three types of theories: mythological, scientific, & commonsensical, the latter making use of certain pseudoscientific arguments. The author claims that the theory blaming the media in all six republics of the former Yugoslavia for the outbreak of the war belongs to the latter type. The empirical data gathered on the eve of the war show that ethnic tolerance was highest in the republics later struck by the war: Bosnia & Herzegovina & Croatia. The author provides an alternative explanation of the role of the media in paving the way for the war. Only in Serbia did mass media, in the circumstances of the prevailing authoritarian orientation of the population before the war, aid the aggressive nationalist leadership in political mobilization, which aroused in the Serbian people a feeling of imperilment & a sense of omnipotence. After the outbreak of the war in Croatia & Bosnia & Herzegovina, the media have been only one of the elements in an ever-expanding spiral of hatred & violence. 2 Tables, 10 References. Adapted from the source document.
Like other landmark historic events, the war on the territory of former Yugoslavia has been explained by three types of theories: mythological, scientific, & commonsensical -- the latter making use of certain pseudoscientific arguments. The author claims that the theory blaming the media in all six republics of former Yugoslavia for the outbreak of the war belongs to the latter type. The empirical findings gathered on the eve of the war show that ethnic tolerance was highest in the republics that were later struck by the war: Bosnia & Herzegovina & Croatia. The author provides an alternative explanation of the role of the media in paving the way for the war. Only in Serbia did mass media, in the circumstances of the prevailing authoritarian orientation of the population before the war, serve the aggressive nationalist leadership as a means for political mobilization, which aroused in the Serbian people both a feeling of imperilment & a sense of omnipotence. After the outbreak of the war in Croatia & Bosnia & Herzegovina, the media became only one of several elements in an ever-expanding spiral of hatred & violence. 2 Tables, 10 References. Adapted from the source document.
Like other landmark historic events, the war on the territory of the former Yugoslavia has been explained by three types of theories: mythological, scientific, & commonsensical, the latter making use of certain pseudoscientific arguments. The author claims that the theory blaming the media in all six republics of the former Yugoslavia for the outbreak of the war belongs to the latter type. The empirical data gathered on the eve of the war show that ethnic tolerance was highest in the republics later struck by the war: Bosnia & Herzegovina & Croatia. The author provides an alternative explanation of the role of the media in paving the way for the war. Only in Serbia did mass media, in the circumstances of the prevailing authoritarian orientation of the population before the war, aid the aggressive nationalist leadership in political mobilization, which aroused in the Serbian people a feeling of imperilment & a sense of omnipotence. After the outbreak of the war in Croatia & Bosnia & Herzegovina, the media have been only one of the elements in an ever-expanding spiral of hatred & violence. 2 Tables, 10 References. Adapted from the source document.
Like other landmark historic events, the war on the territory of former Yugoslavia has been explained by three types of theories: mythological, scientific, & commonsensical -- the latter making use of certain pseudoscientific arguments. The author claims that the theory blaming the media in all six republics of former Yugoslavia for the outbreak of the war belongs to the latter type. The empirical findings gathered on the eve of the war show that ethnic tolerance was highest in the republics that were later struck by the war: Bosnia & Herzegovina & Croatia. The author provides an alternative explanation of the role of the media in paving the way for the war. Only in Serbia did mass media, in the circumstances of the prevailing authoritarian orientation of the population before the war, serve the aggressive nationalist leadership as a means for political mobilization, which aroused in the Serbian people both a feeling of imperilment & a sense of omnipotence. After the outbreak of the war in Croatia & Bosnia & Herzegovina, the media became only one of several elements in an ever-expanding spiral of hatred & violence. 2 Tables, 10 References. Adapted from the source document.
