Suchergebnisse

chapter 1 Introduction -- chapter 2 The role of ideas in great transformations -- chapter 3 The legacy of the Brezhnev period: 1971–1986 -- chapter 4 Cracking the protective belt: 1987–1992 -- chapter 5 Towards a precarious consensus: 1993–1998 -- chapter 6 In search of a "Russian Way": 1999–2006 -- chapter 7 A new transition debate: 2007–2012 -- chapter 8 Conclusion: from zastoi to zastoi?.

This article is a continuation of two essays by the same author on Soviet/Russian economic debates between 1987 and 2002 published in Europe-Asia Studies in 2006 and 2007, so now the series of articles covers 20 years of Soviet/Russian discussions on economic reforms. Should Russia strive to become a "Western" country marked by democracy and a market economy serving the individual interests of its citizens, or was it more important to become a great power again? Are Western patterns of political and economic life suitable for Russia or is the attempt to import foreign institutional structures doomed for failure, making it necessary for Russia to find her own way? This type of question, going far beyond the realm of economics, was and still is at the heart of the debate among Russian economists, which shall be discussed here, on the basis of a qualitative content analysis of the most important economic journals and selected monographs.

Seit den gescheiterten EU-Verfassungsreferenden in Frankreich und in den Niederlanden 2005 hat sich die Diskussion um ein Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Sozialmodell intensiviert. Nur selten wird indes die Frage nach den tieferen Gründen für das Aufkommen der Debatte gestellt. Die These des vorliegenden Beitrages lautet, es sei lohnend, sich dem Thema einmal nicht von der Real- sondern von der Metaebene her zu nähern: Eine kritische Analyse der Diskussion um Europa als Wirtschafts- und Sozialmodell führt zu dem Ergebnis, dass es hier letztlich um die Forderung geht, die sozialen Errungenschaften der 1970er und 1980er Jahre gegen die Herausforderungen der Globalisierung zu verteidigen. Es wird argumentiert, dass ein solch reaktiver Versuch, die Mitgliedsländer auf ein gemeinsames wirtschaftliches und soziales Modell festzulegen, gegen den Geist Europas wäre und sich zudem höchst negativ auf die internationale Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der EU auswirken würde. -- Europäische Integration ; Wirtschafts- und Sozialmodell

The article analyzes the reception of the idea of convergence in Soviet economics from the 1960s to the end of the 1980s. It is predominantly concerned with convergence theory as a policy idea that inspired perestroika. Its central question is: Under the conditions of an authoritarian regime, how could an imported policy idea that bluntly contradicted official ideology reach a degree of dissemination and (among a specific stratum of the elite) popularity that would later turn it into a central pillar of reform policy? An important finding is that the idea of convergence united the Soviet "people of the sixties" and some Western "progressive" intellectuals who together formed a transregional epistemic community that only for a short period of time, at the end of the 1980s, gained political influence.

Twenty years after the fall of the Iron Curtain, there is again a debate on shock therapy versus gradualism, this time with regard to developing and emerging societies. This debate was mainly triggered by Dani Rodrik (2007), who argues that reform programmes in poor countries should not be implemented according to a one fits all development blueprint (such as the Washington Consensus) but should try to relate to the specific conditions of time and space - a strategy calling for gradualism and the participation of local actors. Daron Acemoglu et al. (2009) have recently undertaken a forceful attempt to refute this view. In their paper The Consequences of Radical Reform: The French Revolution the authors provide empirical evidence of the lasting growth-stimulating impact of the implementation of the Napoleonic Code and other post-revolutionary institutional innovations in other European countries and in particular in those parts of Germany that were occupied by France. As these changes were introduced at high speed and followed a radical top-down approach, the authors regard them as proof that it is certainly not always necessary to adapt reforms to local circumstances and that shock therapy in certain institutional contexts is often the only means to break the hold on land and people exercised by the ancient regime (Acemoglu et al. 2009, p. 6). The present paper was originally intended as an extended comment on Acemoglu et al. Its aim, however, was never to refute their thesis but, rather, to complement their analysis.