Suchergebnisse

This paper combines two strains of the literature on the employment effects of deferred compensation. The first strain separates seniority and job matching wage effects on the basis of individual data, but cannot look at employment consequences. The second strain explains the employment structure on the basis of establishment data, but cannot properly calculate seniority wages. This paper uses linked employeremployee data, aggregates individual seniority wages to the establishment level, and correlates them with the establishment employment structure. According to the deferred compensation hypothesis this paper finds that establishments with stronger seniority wages have a higher tenure but hire less older employees.

This paper shows that earnings losses after unemployment increase with age. First, older employees start out with relatively high earnings in comparison to employees without employment interruptions several years before the non-employment spell. This earnings advantage turns into a strong earnings disadvantage shortly before the non-employment spell. Younger unemployed have a relatively stable and small earnings disadvantage before non-employment. Second, while the younger employees quickly enjoy earnings higher than those without employment interruptions after the non-employment spell, earnings for older employees are lower even six years after the unemployment spell. If those with non-employment spells re-enter the labour market at the same employer, the earnings impact is the more positive the younger the employee. This paper uses representative administrative spell data for 1993-2001 that allow us to take into account the precise length of all non-employment spells and calculate the exact dates before and after the spells.

"Weshalb bezahlen Arbeitgeber Löhne, die mit der Betriebszugehörigkeit steigen? Die Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie betont, dass Arbeitgeber ihre Beschäftigten an sich binden und motivieren wollen, indem sie ihnen einen relativ niedrigen Einstiegslohn sowie im Laufe der Betriebszugehörigkeit stärker steigende Löhne bezahlen, als dies deren steigende Produktivität rechtfertigen würde. Dieser Beitrag versucht die empirische Relevanz der Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie zu testen und geht hierbei insbesondere auf die Rolle von Betriebsräten und Gewerkschaften ein. Er bestätigt die theoretischen Vorhersagen, die positive Einflussmöglichkeiten beider Institutionen nahelegen." (Autorenreferat)

The German dual apprenticeship system has come under pressure in recent years because enterprises have not been willing to provide a sufficient number of apprenticeship positions. An argument that is frequently put forward is that the gap could be closed if more firms were willing to incur net costs during the training period. This paper investigates on the basis of representative data whether German enterprises do indeed incur net costs on average during the apprenticeship period, i.e. whether the impact of an increase in the share of apprentices on contemporary profits is negative. The paper uses the representative linked employer-employee panel data of the IAB (LIAB) and takes into account possible endogeneity of training intensity and unobserved heterogeneity in the profit estimation by employing panel system GMM methods. An increase in the share of apprentices has no effect on profits. This can be interpreted as a first indication that most establishments in Germany do not invest more in apprentices than their productivity effects during the apprenticeship period.

"Der Einfluss von Betriebsräten auf die Lohnstruktur in Deutschland ist ein bisher kaum untersuchtes Thema. Betriebsräte haben zwar nur in Ausnahmesituationen - also in tarifvertragslosen Betrieben oder im Falle von tariflichen Öffnungsklauseln - einen direkten Einfluss auf die Lohngestaltung. Gleichwohl aber gibt es indirekte Einflussmöglichkeiten: über die Zuordnung der Beschäftigten zu bestehenden Lohnklassen oder Arbeitsplatzbeschreibungen. Dieser Beitrag zeigt anhand für Deutschland repräsentativer Daten erstmals, dass Betriebe mit Betriebsräten einen über 10% höheren Lohn bezahlen als vergleichbare Betriebe ohne Betriebsräte. Die Existenz einer Interessenvertretung führt zudem zu einem stärkeren Lohnaufschlag für üblicherweise auf dem Arbeitsmarkt finanziell benachteiligte Gruppen wie Frauen oder niedrig Qualifizierte. Somit spielen Betriebsräte eine wichtige Rolle für die Höhe und Struktur der Löhne in Deutschland, die bisher kaum beleuchtet wurde." (Autorenreferat)

This paper finds substantial effects of ICT investments on productivity for a large and representative German establishment panel data set. In contrast to the bulk of the literature also establishments without ICT capital are included and lagged effects of ICT investments are analysed. In addition, a broad range of establishment and employee characteristics are taken account of in order to avoid omitted variable bias. It is shown that taking into account unobserved heterogeneity of the establishments and endogeneity of ICT investments increases the estimated lagged productivity impact of ICT investments.