Suchergebnisse

Over the last three decades, the Israeli missile defense concept has evolved significantly along with the emerging threats. As a result of long-term strategy, implemented in the 1990s, contemporary missile defense of Israel has been developed into a complex, multi-tier system aimed to match the country's unique security needs. The purpose of this study is to determine the main directions of the development of the Israeli missile defense concept that have led to its current form. The study identifies key elements of the multi-layered missile defense architecture as well as their role in overall defense strategy of Israel. With the use of theoretical research methods, the period of 1991-2020 was examined in order to trace the development of new missile defense systems and the evolution of Israeli posture on the subject in relation to changing international situation. The author concludes that comprehensive anti-missile shield, consisting of Arrow-3, Arrow-2, David's Sling and Iron Dome systems, provides Israel with solid defense against short, medium and long range missile threats and presents potential to be developed into one of the most advanced missile defense systems in the world.

The aim of the article is to answer the question: What role does nuclear weapon play in Israeli strategy of deterrence? The main hypothesis of the paper is based on the assumption, that the deterrence potential of the Israeli nuclear arsenal is strictly determined by deliberate ambiguity (so-called amimut). The author also assumes that nuclear deterrence plays a significant role in the general Israeli deterrence strategy. However, due to the changing nature of threats, it is not its core element. The author used the following theoretical research methods: critical analysis and comparative analysis of sources, scientific studies, strategic documents as well as selected speeches of the Israeli authorities. This article can be seen as an attempt to capture the specifics of the Israeli nuclear deterrence strategy and the features that distinguish it from deterrence of other nuclear states.

Objectives<i>The aim of this paper is to analyse the use of weaponised incendiary kites
and helium balloons in the Israeli-Palestinian hostilities between March and December 2018.
The paper argues that arson started with incendiary kites and balloons can easily be exploited
for terrorist purposes and poses a serious challenge for regular armed forces and for civilian
emergency services.</i>Methods<i>The paper examines the Palestinian 'Great March of Return' as a background for
the development of a new Hamas' tactic and briefly describes the chronology of arson terrorism in
the context of other hostilities at the Gaza-Israeli border. The study focuses on the two following
questions: why are the kites and balloons useful for the current goals of Hamas and how do the
Israelis respond to this new threat? The study uses comparative scientific literature and document
analysis, the analysis of statements released by the Israeli authorities and the Israeli media reports
related to the arson attacks.</i>Results<i>The main findings include the role of simple, non-lethal weapons in spreading fear
for terrorist purposes and the advantages of turning everyday-use materials into weapons in
a situation where there is limited access to regular arms. The second part of the study deals with
the effects of arson attacks on the Israeli side of the conflict and the countermeasures undertaken
in the Gaza Periphery. The author concludes that airborne arson attacks pose a serious threat to
advanced Israeli defence systems, solely because of their primitive and unpredictable character.</i>Conclusions<i>The overall findings of this paper present the threat of arson terrorism in the
context of an asymmetric conflict.</i>

Autorzy próbują ustalić kierunki modernizacji Sił Obronnych Izraela (IDF) na podstawie analizy programów przyjętych po 2015 roku i ujęcia ich w szerszym aspekcie uwarunkowań bezpieczeństwa państwa. Przeanalizowali dwa najnowsze programy modernizacji – "Gideon" i "Momentum", przyjęte na lata 2016–2019 i 2020–2024, a także wdrażany w tym samym czasie plan rozwoju wojsk lądowych. Ocenili poziom zaawansowania realizacji wymienionych programów oraz perspektywy ich wdrażania w kontekście pandemii COVID-19 i dynamicznie zmieniającego się środowiska bezpieczeństwa na Bliskim Wschodzie. Wnioski z analizy pozwoliły na ustalenie, że proces modernizacji IDF jest ukierunkowany na dostosowanie ich struktur i liczebności oraz metod i środków walki do zagrożeń o charakterze asymetrycznym