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This paper examines the lessons of the interwar period to place current concerns regarding a return to protectionism in historical context, highlighting the unique and one-time changes in voting rights that took place during the period and their relationship with trade policy. A particularly novel finding is the impact of women voters on the politics of protectionism. Public opinion survey evidence from the interwar years indicates that women were more likely to hold protectionist attitudes than men, while panel data analysis of average tariff rates during the interwar period shows that when women were entitled to vote tariffs were, on average, higher. This result is supported by an instrumental variables approach using Protestantism as an instrument for female voting rights.

We explore the relationship between Nazi membership and social advancement using a unique and highly detailed dataset of the German military during the Third Reich. We find that membership of a Nazi organisation is positively related to social advancement when measured by the difference between fathers' and sons' occupations. However, we find that this observed difference is mainly driven by individuals with different characteristics self-selecting into these organisations, rather than from a direct reward to membership. This result is supported by an instrumental variable approach that uses the location of Catholic priests sympathetic to the Nazis as an instrument for Nazi membership. In addition, we explore the determinants of Nazi membership. We find that NS membership is associated with higher socio-economic background and human capital levels, in line with occupational choice models of radicalisation.

This paper explores the relationship between Nazi membership and social mobility using a unique and highly detailed dataset of military conscripts and volunteers during the Third Reich. We find that membership of a Nazi organisation is positively related to social mobility when measured by the difference between fathers' and sons' occupations. This relationship is stronger for the more 'elite' NS organisations, the NSDAP and the SS. However, we find that this observed difference in upward mobility is driven by individuals with different characteristics self-selecting into these organisations, rather than from a direct reward to membership. These results are confirmed by a series of robustness tests. In addition, we employ our highly-detailed dataset to explore the determinants of Nazi membership. We find that NS membership is associated with higher socio-economic background and human capital levels.

This paper explores the relationship between Nazi membership and social mobility using a unique and highly detailed dataset of military conscripts and volunteers during the Third Reich. We find that membership of a Nazi organisation is positively related to social mobility when measured by the difference between fathers' and sons' occupations. This relationship is stronger for the more 'elite' NS organisations, the NSDAP and the SS. However, we find that this observed difference in upward mobility is driven by individuals with different characteristics self-selecting into these organisations, rather than from a direct reward to membership. These results are confirmed by a series of robustness tests. In addition, we employ our highly-detailed dataset to explore the determinants of Nazi membership. We find that NS membership is associated with higher socio-economic background and human capital levels.

AbstractThis paper asks whether history should change the way in which economists and economic historians think about populism. We use Müller's definition, according to which populism is 'an exclusionary form of identity politics, which is why it poses a threat to democracy'. We make three historical arguments. First, late‐nineteenth‐century US Populists were not populist. Second, there is no necessary relationship between populism and anti‐globalization sentiment. Third, economists have sometimes been on the wrong side of important policy debates involving opponents rightly or wrongly described as populist. History encourages us to avoid an overly simplistic view of populism and its correlates.

Do large franchise extensions bring about dramatic electoral changes? Electoral reforms in 1918 nearly tripled the number of people eligible to vote in Ireland. Following the reforms—the largest franchise extension in U.K. history—the previously obscure Sinn Féin party secured 73 of Ireland's 105 seats, an outcome that precipitated a guerrilla war and ultimately independence from the United Kingdom. However, our analysis finds little evidence that the franchise reforms benefited Sinn Féin. New female electors appear less likely to have supported Sinn Féin while new male electors were no more likely to vote for Sinn Féin than the existing electorate. Women also appear less likely to have cast a vote at all. Economic and social factors did matter when it came to voting, however, as did public opinion in relation to armed rebellion. These results remind us that dramatic political changes, such as those that took place in Ireland 1918, do not require dramatic changes in political participation. Sinn Féin's electoral success was more likely driven by a change of heart on behalf of the Irish electorate, rather than a change in its composition.

Do large franchise extensions bring about dramatic electoral changes? Electoral reforms in 1918 nearly tripled the number of people eligible to vote in Ireland. Following the reforms—the largest franchise extension in U.K. history—the previously obscure Sinn Féin party secured 73 of Ireland's 105 seats, an outcome that precipitated a guerrilla war and ultimately independence from the United Kingdom. However, our analysis finds little evidence that the franchise reforms benefited Sinn Féin. New female electors appear less likely to have supported Sinn Féin while new male electors were no more likely to vote for Sinn Féin than the existing electorate. Women also appear less likely to have cast a vote at all. Economic and social factors did matter when it came to voting, however, as did public opinion in relation to armed rebellion. These results remind us that dramatic political changes, such as those that took place in Ireland 1918, do not require dramatic changes in political participation. Sinn Féin's electoral success was more likely driven by a change of heart on behalf of the Irish electorate, rather than a change in its composition.

We examine the impact of the Great Depression on the share of votes for right-wing extremists in elections in the 1920s and 1930s. We confirm the existence of a link between political extremism and economic hard times as captured by growth or contraction of the economy. What mattered was not simply growth at the time of the election, but cumulative growth performance. The impact was greatest in countries with relatively short histories of democracy, with electoral systems that created low hurdles to parliamentary representation, and which had been on the losing side in World War I.

AbstractWhen and why did Sterling Area countries stop holding sterling as the majority of their foreign exchange reserves? This paper takes a comparative approach to examine the relative importance of various determinants of adherence to sterling in its declining years as an international currency. Using an original cross‐national panel dataset covering the period 1965–79, we conduct survival analysis which systematically evaluates a comprehensive set of economic and political factors, at the country level as well as in international relations, about when and why countries chose to diversify their reserves away from sterling. Our results highlight the significance of international transactional factors in influencing adherence to sterling, while the effects of British geopolitical retrenchment, Commonwealth cultural ties, and distributional issues were more ambiguous and sensitive to local conditions. We also find that domestic political and historical factors, such as democracy and imperial legacy, played a role in sterling's international unravelling. Finally, we use our results to examine the experience of individual sterling countries and their decisions to diversify.

How does international monetary leadership end? This paper examines the decline of the Sterling Area between 1945 and 1979 to understand the process of international economic disintegration. Using an original cross-national panel dataset, we conduct survival analysis which systematically evaluates a comprehensive set of economic and political factors about when and why countries chose to leave the Sterling Area. We find that membership of the Sterling Area was determined by multidimensional aspects. Our results highlight the significance of international economic and geopolitical factors, such as trade and diplomatic alignment, on the decision to leave. However we also find that domestic political and historical factors, such as democracy and imperial legacy, played a role in the Sterling Area's unravelling. Finally, we use our results to examine the experience of individual countries and their decisions to leave the Sterling Area. Revisiting this history of a gradually dissolving economic order, played out in the shadow of Britain's waning imperial and economic power, has cautionary implications for the future of the US dollar order.