Suchergebnisse

The Later Han dynasty, also known as Eastern Han, ruled China for the first two centuries of the Christian era. Comparable in extent and power to the early Roman empire, it dominated east Asia from present-day Vietnam to the Mongolian steppe. Rafe de Crespigny presents here the first full account of this period in Chinese history to be found in a Western language. Commencing with a detailed account of the imperial capital, the history describes the nature of government, the expansion of the Chinese people to the south, the conflicts of scholars and officials with eunuchs at court, and the final collapse which followed the rebellion of the Yellow Turbans and the rise of regional warlords.

Though the imperial bureaucracy of Later Han employed some 150,000 men, the majority held only junior rank, in secretarial and technical posts or low-level positions in the police and the military. High office was reserved for those with an imperial commission, on which basis they could rise to power and authority. Most men who received commissions were recommended by the officials in charge of their local communities, and were then subject to a period of examination or probation at court. The system was remarkably successful in recruiting competent men while maintaining support and acceptance for the government among the leading classes of a widespread and populous empire. I first wrote on this topic in 1966, and in 2008 I published a more detailed discussion in the journal Early Medieval China. This is a revised version of that second essay.

Though denigrated by later generations, Cao Cao was a military and political hero of China, restoring a measure of order from the ruins of Later Han. From historical records and his own writings, this book reinterprets his life and achievements.

Though the imperial service of Later Han employed some 150,000 men, the majority held only junior rank, in secretarial and technical posts or low-level positions in the police and the military. High office was reserved for those with an imperial commission, on which basis they could rise to power and authority. This paper discusses how such commissions were obtained, and the processes which recruited officials and ensured support for the government among the leading classes of the empire. Most men who received commissions were recommended by the officials in charge of their local communities, and were subject to a period of probation at the capital before receiving a substantive post. Few reached high office through the Imperial University.

Like most others, I was first introduced to the story of the Three Kingdoms by means of the novel and the dramas, and it was that splendid fiction which led me to investigate the history behind it all. Repeatedly, however, there is contradiction and confusion between the romantic tradition and the historical one, and the conflict is made all the more confusing by the fact that the tales told to us by Chen Shou and his rivals, collected in the commentary of Pei Songzhi, are themselves a mixture of fact and fiction. In disconcerting fashion, the history presented by Sanguo zhi often differs from the fiction of Sanguo yanyi rather as an alternative form of romance than as a neat contrast of truth with nohood. Pei Songzhi remarked upon the problem, and throughout the present work I have been faced with a kaleidoscope of possible stories. In a concluding chapter I discuss the historiography of the period, and in this respect, unlike the major school of modern criticism, which concentrates largely upon the later version of the stories as expressed in the story cycles, drama and the novel, I give first consideration to the earliest chroniclers of that age. For this viewpoint, the later development of romance is no more than a supplement to the basic question of how it really was. To deal with that basic question, I have largely used a narrative form. The first chapter discusses the situation in south China at the end of Han, and the eighth considers the nature of government, society and economy in the third-century state of Wu. A central part of the work, however, offers an account of the development of the state, with particular attention to time and place, and with concentration upon the chieftains of the Sun family and the men and women who supported and served them. I take this approach quite deliberately, for I strongly believe that if we are to understand any period of Chinese history we must have a clear picture of time and place. There is a general tendency in modern Sinology to present broad judgements on general themes, but such argument can be supported only on a firm basis of fact. As a first step to analysing and assessing the course of events, we need to know what those events were, and in the case of the Three Kingdoms there are many incidents which every schoolboy knows of, but which did not happen in the way they are commonly told. So the purpose of this work is to give a picture of the period which saw the fall of Han and the establishment of an independent state in south China. Such a picture must represent social, political and economic factors of the age, it must also include the time, the place, and the personal perceptions of the people concerned. Moreover, it is important who those people were: it was critical to Sun Jian's career that he came of obscure and distant background in a society which was dominated by gentry landowners and their clients; it is remarkable that Sun Ce achieved so much success before he reached his mid-twenties; it was vital for the fortunes of the family enterprise that Sun Quan was of sufficient age and authority to receive the allegiance of the various commanders who had served his elder brother, and it was significant for the state that he lived to rule it for so long. In such brittle dynasties, personality and individual relations played a very large role, too often neglected in the search for more general themes. And after all, if the achievements of these people set a pattern for the future and caught the imagination of those who came after them, it is only fair to look for the facts which served as basis for the legend. Even after such a length of time and behind such a refraction of romance, however blurred the view of history may be, the "third kingdom" of Wu still presents a heroism of its own.

To a remarkable degree, the forms of local administration under Han were unified throughout the empire. Though the problems of the frontier on the north were clearly different from those of the settled areas within the empire or the expanding colonisation of the lands to the south, the pattern of government was the same, and the administrative units of commanderies (jun) and counties (xian) provided the essential structure.

For more than three hundred years after the great Shanyu Modun [or Maodun], at the end of the third century BC, the Xiongnu dominated the steppe-lands north of China, and contended for influence in central Asia. Other contributors consider the earlier history of the state, and its rivalry with the Chinese dynasty of Former Han; the present paper deals with the decline and fall of the Xiongnu during the first two centuries AD, at the time of the Later Han dynasty. The overwhelming amount of information on the people and their rulers comes from Chinese sources, which are for the most part predictably hostile. Few words are recorded of the Xiongnu language, and small confidence can be placed on transcription from their alien speech through ancient Chinese to the present day. The Chinese term "Xiongnu" presumably reflects the sound of the foreign tongue; though identification has often been suggested the name need not be related to that of the later Huns who afflicted Europe centuries later. Like other steppe regimes, the Xiongnu government was a family affair, with authority in the hands of the royal house and a limited number of clans related by marriage. The name of the state came from the royal tribe, while outside clans and tribes of the steppe were held in submission by the threat of force and by largesse from the leadership, frequently acquired by trade or warfare with the settled people of China As Lattimore argued in 1940, the development of the Xiongnu state reflected tensions on the frontier as the Qin and Han dynasties of China consolidated their power. On the one hand, the people of the steppe were threatened by the expansion of the Chinese empire in the north, but at the same time the products of China offered opportunities of wealth and luxury far beyond those available in the grasslands. Much of the history of the Xiongnu state can be seen as a reaction to Chinese encroachment, combined with the desire to obtain goods either by trade or by war. For their part, the emperors of China sought to dominate the northern regions by controlling the trading outlets and, of comparable importance, ensuring that the peoples either side of the limes were kept apart. Besides its obvious function of military defence and warning, the Great Wall of Qin and Former Han was an excellent instrument for these purposes, and though much of the fortification was left unmanned by Later Han the policies of separation of people and restriction of trade were sought by other means. A major concern of the Xiongnu rulers was to gain access to the wealth of China and thus maintain their authority over other peoples of the steppe; and they pursued this policy through regular trade, through the exchange of official gifts often a disguised tribute or by actual or threatened warfare. Their power depended very largely upon the relationship with China, and the structure of their state was not sophisticated. At the same time, it was to Chinese advantage that this foreign state should be maintained in control of peoples and regions beyond the reach of imperial arms and government. During the first century AD, however, division among the Xiongnu leadership and over-ambition at the court of Han destroyed the balance and brought disorder and disintegration.

For more than three hundred years after the great Shanyu Modun [or Maodun], at the end of the third century BC, the Xiongnu dominated the steppe-lands north of China, and contended for influence in central Asia. Other contributors consider the earlier history of the state, and its rivalry with the Chinese dynasty of Former Han; the present paper deals with the decline and fall of the Xiongnu during the first two centuries AD, at the time of the Later Han dynasty. The overwhelming amount of information on the people and their rulers comes from Chinese sources, which are for the most part predictably hostile. Few words are recorded of the Xiongnu language, and small confidence can be placed on transcription from their alien speech through ancient Chinese to the present day. The Chinese term "Xiongnu" presumably reflects the sound of the foreign tongue; though identification has often been suggested the name need not be related to that of the later Huns who afflicted Europe centuries later. Like other steppe regimes, the Xiongnu government was a family affair, with authority in the hands of the royal house and a limited number of clans related by marriage. The name of the state came from the royal tribe, while outside clans and tribes of the steppe were held in submission by the threat of force and by largesse from the leadership, frequently acquired by trade or warfare with the settled people of China As Lattimore argued in 1940, the development of the Xiongnu state reflected tensions on the frontier as the Qin and Han dynasties of China consolidated their power. On the one hand, the people of the steppe were threatened by the expansion of the Chinese empire in the north, but at the same time the products of China offered opportunities of wealth and luxury far beyond those available in the grasslands. Much of the history of the Xiongnu state can be seen as a reaction to Chinese encroachment, combined with the desire to obtain goods either by trade or by war. For their part, the emperors of China sought to dominate the northern regions by controlling the trading outlets and, of comparable importance, ensuring that the peoples either side of the limes were kept apart. Besides its obvious function of military defence and warning, the Great Wall of Qin and Former Han was an excellent instrument for these purposes, and though much of the fortification was left unmanned by Later Han the policies of separation of people and restriction of trade were sought by other means. A major concern of the Xiongnu rulers was to gain access to the wealth of China and thus maintain their authority over other peoples of the steppe; and they pursued this policy through regular trade, through the exchange of official gifts often a disguised tribute or by actual or threatened warfare. Their power depended very largely upon the relationship with China, and the structure of their state was not sophisticated. At the same time, it was to Chinese advantage that this foreign state should be maintained in control of peoples and regions beyond the reach of imperial arms and government. During the first century AD, however, division among the Xiongnu leadership and over-ambition at the court of Han destroyed the balance and brought disorder and disintegration.

In the Introduction to Emperor Huan and Emperor Ling, I gave a summary account of the civil administration of Later Han. As the imperial government, however, became all but irrelevant in the years of war which began in 189, I present below a survey of the military structure of the dynasty as it entered its final years. At the end of the reign of Emperor Ling, the facade of civil government remained intact. In formal terms, immediately below the ruler, the Three Excellencies (san gong), with rank expressed by a nominal salary of Ten Thousand shi of Grain (wan shi), and the Nine Ministers (jiu qing), rank/salary of Fully Two Thousand shi (zhong erqian shi), headed the administration, while the office of the Masters of Writing (shangshu), the imperial secretariat, drew up and circulated the edicts and orders with which government was carried out. Outside the capital, provinces (zhou) were headed by Governors (mu) or Inspectors (cishi), and these were divided into subordinate commanderies (jun) under Grand Administrators (tai shou) or states (guo), nominal fiefs of kings (wang) which were in practice ruled by Chancellors (xiang). Commanderies and states were in turn divided into counties (xian), the basic level of Han government, ruled by Prefects (ling), Chiefs (zhang) and equivalent officers. All local units were responsible for police work and basic control of banditry and other minor troubles, but there was also a military establishment to guard the person of the emperor, to maintain the frontiers, and to quell disturbance within the empire.

In the Introduction to Emperor Huan and Emperor Ling, I gave a summary account of the civil administration of Later Han. As the imperial government, however, became all but irrelevant in the years of war which began in 189, I present below a survey of the military structure of the dynasty as it entered its final years. At the end of the reign of Emperor Ling, the facade of civil government remained intact. In formal terms, immediately below the ruler, the Three Excellencies (san gong), with rank expressed by a nominal salary of Ten Thousand shi of Grain (wan shi), and the Nine Ministers (jiu qing), rank/salary of Fully Two Thousand shi (zhong erqian shi), headed the administration, while the office of the Masters of Writing (shangshu), the imperial secretariat, drew up and circulated the edicts and orders with which government was carried out. Outside the capital, provinces (zhou) were headed by Governors (mu) or Inspectors (cishi), and these were divided into subordinate commanderies (jun) under Grand Administrators (tai shou) or states (guo), nominal fiefs of kings (wang) which were in practice ruled by Chancellors (xiang). Commanderies and states were in turn divided into counties (xian), the basic level of Han government, ruled by Prefects (ling), Chiefs (zhang) and equivalent officers. All local units were responsible for police work and basic control of banditry and other minor troubles, but there was also a military establishment to guard the person of the emperor, to maintain the frontiers, and to quell disturbance within the empire.

The situation in East Timor is unstable, and may easily develop into a local tragedy with wide consequences for the region. Australia has no direct connection with East Timor, and no Australian government or political grouping has any interest but peaceful prosperity for its people. We have been closely involved, however, for the last twenty-five years, it is a factor in both foreign policy and domestic politics, and we are now seriously concerned.