Suchergebnisse

This paper studies periods of prolonged contractions in output per capita in a sample of 145 countries from 1950 to 2014. Economic slumps are defined as abrupt interruptions of a period of growth by several regime switches. Slumps start with a sharp contraction along with a trend break, which is followed by another switch when growth stabilizes again. The paper then analyzes the correlates of these slumps, focusing on the length and depth of the contraction, from the beginning of the slump to its trough. The results establish three new stylized facts: (i) weak political institutions predate crises whereas political reforms tend to follow them, (ii) the length and depth of economic declines are robustly correlated with executive constraints and ethnic heterogeneity, and (iii) there is a robust interaction between these two variables, suggesting that institutions constraining leaders are important for stabilizing growth. This is particularly relevant for Sub-Saharan Africa, where politics are often ethnic and decision makers are comparatively unconstrained.

This paper analyzes periods of economic stagnation in a panel of countries. We test whether stagnation can be predicted by institutional characteristics and political shocks and compare the impacts of such variables with those of traditional macroeconomic variables. We examine the determinants of stagnation episodes using dynamic linear and nonlinear models. In addition, we analyze whether the effects of the included variables on the onset of stagnation differ from their effects on the continuation of stagnation. We find that inflation, negative regime changes, real exchange rate undervaluation, financial openness, and trade openness have significant effects on both the onset and the continuation of stagnation. Only for trade openness is there robust evidence of a differential impact. Open economies have a significantly lower probability of falling into stagnation, but once in stagnation they do not recover faster.