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AbstractAt the dawn of the new millennium, international development agencies and governments have "discovered" the potential of migration and remittances to stimulate development in poor countries. However, migration and development is anything but a new topic. The debate about migration and development has swung back and forth like a pendulum, from optimism in the postwar period to deep "brain drain" pessimism since the 1970s towards neo‐optimistic "brain gain" since 2000. Influenced by growing policy disappointment, we might now be at the beginning of a backswing towards more pessimistic views. While these shifts are rooted in deeper ideological and paradigmatic shifts, a review of empirical evidence yields a much more nuanced picture. Despite the often considerable benefits of migration and remittances for individuals and communities involved, migrants alone can generally not remove more structural development constraints and migration may actually contribute to development stagnation and reinforce the political status quo. Despite their development potential, migrants and remittances can therefore neither be blamed for a lack of development nor be expected to trigger take‐off development in generally unattractive investment environments. Recent views celebrating migration as self‐help development "from below" are partly driven by neoliberal ideologies that shift the attention away from structural development constraints and, hence, the responsibility of migrant‐sending states to pursue political and economic reform. Immigrant‐receiving countries can increase the development potential of migration by creating legal channels for high‐ and lower‐skilled migration and integration policies that favour socio‐economic mobility of migrants and avoid their marginalization.

The debate on migration and development has swung back and forth like a pendulum, from developmentalist optimism in the 1950s and 1960s, to neo-Marxist pessimism over the 1970s and 1980s, towards more optimistic views in the 1990s and 2000s. This paper argues how such discursive shifts in the migration and development debate should be primarily seen as part of more general paradigm shifts in social and development theory. However, the classical opposition between pessimistic and optimistic views is challenged by empirical evidence pointing to the heterogeneity of migration impacts. By integrating and amending insights from the new economics of labor migration, livelihood perspectives in development studies and transnational perspectives in migration studies – which share several though as yet unobserved conceptual parallels – this paper elaborates the contours of a conceptual framework that simultaneously integrates agency and structure perspectives and is therefore able to account for the heterogeneous nature of migration-development interactions. The resulting perspective reveals the naivety of recent views celebrating migration as self-help development "from below". These views are largely ideologically driven and shift the attention away from structural constraints and the vital role of states in shaping favorable conditions for positive development impacts of migration to occur.

ABSTRACTRestrictive immigration policies and the militarization of external border controls by the US and the EU have failed to significantly curb immigration from Latin America and Africa. Rather, they have led to greater reliance on increasingly risky and costly irregular migration and have paradoxically encouraged permanent settlement. A commonly presented 'smart solution' to curb immigration is to address the perceived root causes of migration through increasing aid or liberalizing trade with origin countries. Recently, policies to stimulate remittances and to promote temporary and circular migration have also been advocated as enhancing home country development, so that these forms of migration become a medicine against illegal and permanent migration. However, besides the limited scope and credibility of such policies, empirical and theoretical evidence strongly suggests that economic and human development increases people's capabilities and aspirations and therefore tends to coincide with an increase rather than a decrease in emigration, at least in the short to medium term. Under unfavourable conditions, trade, aid and remittances can be complements to, rather than substitutes for, migration also in the longer term. At the same time, demand for both skilled and unskilled migrant labour is likely to persist. Trade, aid, return migration and remittances are no short‐cut 'solutions' to migration, and sustained immigration therefore seems likely.

ABSTRACTUsing a 'transitional' perspective on migration, which combines three theoretical approaches on dynamic development‐migration linkages, this paper interprets the evolution of migration within, from, and to Morocco over the twentieth century. Colonization and the incorporation of rural areas, along with a certain level of socio‐economic development, have spurred internal and international wage labour migration both within Morocco and from Morocco to Europe. Migration seems to be the result of development rather than the lack of development. Populations from highly marginalized regions were less likely to participate in migration than populations from the three, moderately enclosed "migration belts" which had established traditions of pre‐modern, largely circular migration. At the onset of large‐scale emigration in the 1960s, the spatial patterns of labour migration were significantly infuenced by colonial bonds with Spain and France, selective labour recruitment, and Moroccan selective passport issuance policies.However, the influence of such policies rapidly decreased due to the effects of migration‐facilitating networks. Increasingly restrictive policies coincided with a growing reliance on family migration, permanent settlement, undocumented migration, and the exploration of new migration itineraries, and had no success in reducing migration levels.Alongside patterns of decentralizing internal migration, a spatial diffusion of international out‐migration has expanded beyond the historical migration belts in response to new labour opportunities in southern Europe. Persistent demand for migrant labour, along with demographic factors and increasing aspirations, suggest that migration over formally closed borders is likely to remain high in the near future. However, in the longer term, out‐migration might decrease and Morocco could increasingly develop into a migration destination for migrants from sub‐Saharan Africa, a transition process which may already have een set in motion.

AbstractThis paper studies long‐term trends and patterns in global refugee migration. We explore the intensity, spread, and distance of refugee migration at a global, regional, and country level between 1951 and 2018. The analysis did not detect a long‐term increase in the global intensity of refugee migration. Primarily depending on levels of conflict, refugee numbers have fluctuated at levels of between 0.1 and 0.3 percent of the world population. Apparent increases in numbers of the globally displaced are driven by the inclusion of populations and countries that were previously excluded from the data. While refugee populations continue to be concentrated in countries with low‐to‐medium income levels, the analysis reveals several geographic shifts in refugee migration. Refugees tend to come from a shrinking number of origin countries and move to an increasing variety of destination countries. This trend seems to reflect a concentration of recurrent conflict cycles in a relatively small number of countries and a parallel increase in the number of safe destinations. Although the vast majority of refugees remain near to origin countries, the average distance between origin and destination countries has increased over time, presumably linked to the greater ease of travel and migration‐facilitating networks.

The effectiveness of migration policies has been widely contested. However, because of methodological and conceptual limitations, evidence has remained inconclusive. Moreover, prior studies focus on the effects of policies on inflows and fail to assess the simultaneous effect of policies on outflows. This is essential from a theoretical point of view as immigration restrictions may reduce both inflows and outflows and, hence, overall circulation. This renders the effect of immigration restrictions on net migration theoretically ambiguous. To fill this gap, and using unique migration and visa data from the Determinants of International Migration (DEMIG) project, this paper assesses the short- and long-term effects of travel visa policy regimes on bilateral immigration and emigration dynamics. The results suggest that travel visa policies significantly decrease inflows, but this effect is undermined by decreasing outflows of the same migrant groups. This confirms that migration restrictions decrease circulation and tend to encourage long-term settlement, and thereby sharply reduce the responsiveness of migration to economic fluctuations in destination and origin societies. We also identify asymmetric policy effects with migration flows declining only very gradually after a visa introduction but increasing almost immediately after visa removal.

Although it is commonly believed that the volume, diversity, geographical scope, and overall complexity of international migration have increased as part of globalization processes, this idea has remained largely untested. This article analyzes shifts in global migration patterns between 1960 and 2000 using indices that simultaneously capture changes in the spread, distance, and intensity of migration. While the results challenge the idea that there has been a global increase in volume, diversity, and geographical scope of migration, main migratory shifts have been directional. Migration has globalized from a destination country perspective but hardly from an origin country perspective, with migrants from an increasingly diverse array of non-European-origin countries concentrating in a shrinking pool of prime destination countries. The global migration map has thus become more skewed. Rather than refuting the globalization of migration hypothesis, this seems to reflect the asymmetric nature of globalization processes in general.

This article elaborates a conceptual framework for assessing the character and effectiveness of immigration policies. It argues that, to a considerable extent, the public and academic controversy concerning this issue is spurious because of fuzzy definitions of policy effectiveness, stemming from confusion between (1) policy discourses, (2) policies on paper, (3) policy implementation, and (4) policy impacts. The article distinguishes three policy gaps: the discrepancy between public discourses and policies on paper (discursive gap); the disparity between policies on paper and implemented policies (implementation gap); and the extent to which implemented policies affect migration (efficacy gap). Although implemented policies seem to be the correct yardstick to assess policy effectiveness, in practice the (generally more pronounced) discourses are often used as a benchmark. This can lead to an overestimation of policy failure. Existing empirical studies suggest that policies significantly affect the targeted migration flows, but they crucially fail to assess the relative importance of policies in comparison to other migration determinants, including non‐migration policies, as well as the hypothetical occurrence of unintended categorical, spatial, inter‐temporal, and reverse flow "substitution" effects. Evidence on such effects is still scarce, showing the need for more empirically informed insights about the short‐ and long‐term effects of migration policies.