Résumé Dans cet article, je présenterai les récentes opinions et thèses qui concernent non seulement l'état des infrastructures de transport aux Pays-Bas, mais aussi leur développement au cours du XIXe siècle. L'étude analyse quelques aspects de la concurrence et de la complémentarité existant entre les divers modes de transport qui étaient présents avant l'apparition des chemins de fer, c'est-à-dire la situation des transports avant le rail, l'héritage des infrastructures plus anciennes, avant d'examiner le développement du réseau ferroviaire qui n'a pas joué un rôle prépondérant pour le transport des marchandises.
This paper studies the importance of establishment size for the German/US labour‐productivity gap in manufacturing at the start of the twentieth century. First, we show that the left tail of the employment distribution by establishment size was larger in Germany than in the USA. Second, using US state data for 1909, we find a positive correlation between establishment size and labour productivity. Third, imposing the coefficients of these estimates on establishment‐size differences between Germany and the USA, we calculate that a redistribution of German employment to larger establishments, as in the USA, reduces the labour‐productivity gap by about 25 per cent.
AbstractThis article examines the evolution of English living standards during the early phase of industrialization (1760–1850). We take a multi-dimensional perspective and apply an indicator that combines four key dimensions of well-being: material living standards, health, working time, and inequality. Contrary to other composite measures of well-being, our welfare metric draws on standard economic theory to aggregate its underlying components. We find decreasing welfare during the late eighteenth century due to rising working time and income inequality, despite improving health. After 1800, workers' conditions improved when real wages started to rise, although the cumulative effect was not substantial by 1850.
AbstractUsing social tables, this article provides new data on inequality in Germany and Britain on an annual basis for the first half of the twentieth century. Inequality trends in these two countries tended to follow opposite patterns. The decline in inequality in Germany was interrupted during the First World War and the Nazi period, while in Britain the reversal took place between the end of the First World War and the Great Depression. Results show that the drop in inequality during the twentieth century in Europe did not follow secular trends, thus supporting the notion of inequality cycles.
The role of technology shocks as a driver of the Great Depression is the topic of our own earlier work and the paper by Watanabe in this issue. While the two studies differ in their data and assumptions, they complement each other and strengthen the conclusion of both papers: technology shocks were not the driving force of the Great Depression.
Technology shocks and declining productivity have been advanced as important factors driving the Great Depression in the United States, based on real business cycle theory. We estimate an improved measure of technology for interwar manufacturing, using data from the U.S. census reports. There is clear evidence of increasing returns to scale and we find no statistical proof that technology shocks led to changes in hours worked or other inputs. This contradicts a key prediction of real business cycle theory. We find that increasing returns to scale are not due to market power but to labor and capital hoarding.
The evolution of city growth is usually studied for relatively short time periods. The rise and decline of cities is, however, typically a process that takes many decades or even centuries. In this paper we study the evolution of Italian cities over the period 1300-1861. The first contribution of our paper is that we use various descriptive statistics on individual city sizes and the city-size distribution as a whole to highlight the main characteristics of Italy's urban system such as the differences between northern and southern Italy. Our second, and main, contribution is that our data allow for panel estimation where city-size is regressed on various geographical, political and other determinants of city size for the period 1300-1861. We show that, although large shocks such as the plague epidemics are clearly visible in the data, the main determinants of Italy's city growth invariably are physical geography and political predominance. Also the North-South difference turns out to be important.