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In recent years, the problematic relationship between conflicts of interest and corruption has been a sensitive one to democracy. Although conflicts of interest have not always resulted in corruption, they do constitute an important opportunity structure for such illicit behaviour. The Portuguese attempt at regulating conflicts of interest in parliament has been paradigmatic: eight legislative interventions to the first Statute of MPs in less than two decades and parliament was still unable to create an appropriate ethical framework to prevent financial impropriety deriving from the accumulation of the representative mandate with other outside jobs and activities. The incremental nature of adjustments, the peculiar "tailor made" nature of legislation and the importation of regulatory models "in place" abroad, raise important aspects in regard both to the scope and efficacy of the instruments adopted as well as the legislators' intentions and willingness to move on with the necessary reforms. This paper attempts to assess the regulatory performance and reform efforts of the Portuguese Assembleia da República in addressing MPs' conflicts of interest through the analysis of the control framework adopted, namely, rules of disclosure and legal constraints to accumulation.

The post-Cold War political map displays three major developments, which deserve close attention: the global expansion of democracy; the growth and changing nature of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs); and the evolution of corruption and anticorruption from a non-issue into a global concern at all levels of decision-making. Linking all three developments is the birth of a new anticorruption actor in May 1993: Transparency International (TI), a nongovernmental organisation (NGO) based in Berlin whose mission was recently redefined as 'to work to create change towards a world free of corruption'. Although the global anticorruption movement is wider than TI, this NGO has gained the reputation of the most prominent civil society "corruption fighter" at the global level. Despite frequent references to its local constituencies and bottom-up approach to internal governance, TI is not a typical grass-root NGO. It was founded by a group of high profile people, "grey suits", from international organisations. In less than a decade, TI has moved from being a tiny "briefcase" NGO to become a franchised and complex organisation: it comprises approximately 90 National Chapters of a variable size and nature. TI had to look downwards in search of national constituencies where most of the anticorruption instruments it battled for at the international level need to be ratified, implemented and evaluated. The purpose of this paper is to assess the process of franchising of Transparency International, the implications it had upon its internal governance and the variations that can be found across its constituent parts, the National Chapters.

In recent years, the problematic relationship between conflicts of interest and corruption has been a sensitive one to democracy. Although conflicts of interest have not always resulted in corruption, they do constitute an important opportunity structure for such illicit behaviour. The Portuguese attempt at regulating conflicts of interest in parliament has been paradigmatic: eight legislative interventions to the first Statute of MPs in less than two decades and parliament was still unable to create an appropriate ethical framework to prevent financial impropriety deriving from the accumulation of the representative mandate with other outside jobs and activities. The incremental nature of adjustments, the peculiar "tailor made" nature of legislation and the importation of regulatory models "in place" abroad, raise important aspects in regard both to the scope and efficacy of the instruments adopted as well as the legislators' intentions and willingness to move on with the necessary reforms. This paper attempts to assess the regulatory performance and reform efforts of the Portuguese Assembleia da República in addressing MPs' conflicts of interest through the analysis of the control framework adopted, namely, rules of disclosure and legal constraints to accumulation.

This set of three interviews with professors from the European University Institute investigates the proposed European constitution from the perspective of academic thought. The interview with Yves Meny, political science professor & president of the European University Institute, covers the extent to which a political crisis exists in Europe, the controversy over admitting Turkey to the EU, and a variety of issues relating to the proposed constitution. The interview with Philippe Schmitter, professor emeritus, covers the question of political crisis in Europe, the ideal qualities of a constitution, & issues relating to establishing a single government for Europe. The interview with Bruno de Witte, professor of European Rights at European University Institute, covers the issue of political crisis, the nature of constitutions, & the processes by which constitutions are adopted. R. Young

Portugal is often considered an example of successful democratic consolidation. Yet it has not been exempt from corruption scandals. By the mid-1990s, transparency & the moralization of political life had come to dominate parliamentary debates & reforms. The illegality surrounding party life must be seen against the background of dominant ethical standards in society. Voters appear tolerant of the unethical behavior of political leaders, while parties are gradually becoming less responsive to their electorate. Representation & delegation rely more on tacit consent than on voice, thus encouraging complacency over corruption. Adapted from the source document.

In this article, we compared and tried to explain deputies' and voters' perceptions about various dimensions of European integration. The general assertion that the political elite's perceptions tend to be more pro-integration finds some support in our analysis, but
the results indicate this difference − in the Portuguese case − is smaller than has been suggested in the mainstream literature. The data also showed citizens are more in favour of enlargement than their representatives are. We also observe these assertions hold true only for the
deputies of the three parties with experience of government. Finally, we try to explain the divide between a voter and their deputy's position on European integration, and we observed that the main explanatory variable for a narrow divide is political interest and information (which
also explains the voters' probability of having an opinion).

First published online: 16 September 2020 ; This article seeks to assess whether populist incumbents affect their country's perceived political stability and business climate. Existing evidence contends that populist governments in European democracies produce more moderate policy outcomes than their agendas would suggest. However, populist parties are still regarded as disruptive, as they are perceived to not conforming to the politics of negotiation and compromise that are central to liberal democracies. Therefore, their presence in government may generate political uncertainty and negatively affect the business climate. Drawing on a sample of 26 European democracies between 1996 and 2016, we find that populist incumbency initially generates market uncertainty, but after about two years in office, the negative effect on the business climate vanishes.

International economic crises are critical periods for any political regime. The 2008 global financial crisis brought to the surface several weak spots in the institutional performance of various southern European democracies. Portugal was no exception. Government attempts to tackle its negative externalities through a series of austerity measures did not prove successful on various grounds. Poor scoring in the economy generated social unrest. This article tries to assess the reaction of the Portuguese citizenry to the symptoms of failure in economic governance, particularly in what concerns their attitudes vis-à-vis the political realm by using different survey data sets. The analysis reveals that the decline in economic performance and in quality of governance is clearly reflected in citizens' rising discontent with the performance of democracy and suggests even negative spillover effects for regime support. The available data also suggest that any expectations that the economic crisis might have ignited in citizens' engagement in political issues seem only partially fulfilled.

This article introduces a discussion on defining, measuring, and assessing the quality of democracy. Providing a short overview of the papers of the Symposium, it places them within a broader context of current academic debate on various methodological, theoretical, and policy outreach dimensions of the topic. Adapted from the source document.