This book examines the role of public opinion in the European integration process, and provides a systematic insight into how people's European integration attitudes are structured, how they vary, and how they have very different determinants and behavioural implications.
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AbstractIn this article, I distinguish between four foundational narratives about the EU and outline how they continue to shape EU politics of the present day. The foundational narratives are (1) the EU as a peace project, (2) the notion that the EU is forged in crisis, (3) the sense that deeper economic interdependence fosters political change and (4) the idea that law can replace power politics in the EU. In order for the European project to address current challenges, such as climate change, economic instability, political polarization or the rule of law crisis, I argue that Europeans need to confront their past. History is not only the recollection of events; it represents the connections that the public and elites wish to make. So, in order to develop policy solutions to cross‐border issues, European contemporaries need to critically revisit past connections and to uncover blind spots. If Europeans revisit the EU's foundational narratives, they might also figure out what should change in the EU today.
The COVID-19 pandemic proved the latest stress test for the European Union, after Brexit, the Eurozone crisis and the large influx of refugees. This highly relevant and well-timed special issue examines how past crises have left an imprint on the opinions and behaviour of ordinary citizens and political elites regarding the European Union. This Forum article reviews the special issue contributions by spelling out which lessons we can learn from each of them and which paths for future research they have opened up. In terms of a path forward, I argue that scholars ought to pay more attention to (a) the role of political elites, (b) political opportunity structures, and (c) heterogeneity both between and within member states.
AbstractThe notion that through increased state cooperation and dependency, national divisions can be overcome and peace can be secured, is at the core of European integration. Political elites often refer to the devastations of the Second World War (WWII) as a way to convey the added value of European cooperation today. Do references to the devastations of WWII enhance public support for European cooperation today? By presenting evidence from survey experiments conducted in the six largest member states (France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and the Great Britain) in July 2017, this study suggest that they do, albeit only when it comes to financial assistance for other member states in dire economic need. References to the devastations of WWII do not make respondents more willing to support free movement of people or the establishment of a European army. These findings suggest that reminding people of the devastations of WWII triggers a largely transactional response among the public: a willingness to provide financial support, but nothing more. This evidence suggests that securing public support for free movement of people or European security cooperation through historical rhetoric might be difficult to achieve.
In the midst of the economic crisis sweeping across the European continent, popular support for European integration has become a common theme in political discourse. This article revisits the debate regarding popular support for European integration. Although many journalists, politicians and pundits currently argue that the public is becoming increasingly sceptical of further steps towards integration, this study qualifies that claim and suggests that public opinion towards Europe is best described as ambivalent. Also, it shows that ambivalence regarding European integration is higher in Western than in Central and Eastern Europe. This is probably due to the fact that as citizens in Western Europe have gained more experience with the positive and negative consequences of integration over the years, they have also become more ambivalent about the European project. Rather than suggesting that citizens are by and large turning their backs on Europe, I put forward the view that we seem to be witnessing growing uncertainty about the future scope and depth of the integration process. This, I argue, could be viewed as a natural by-product of experiencing both the virtues and the vices association with membership. Consequently, attitude ambivalence as such may be demonstrative of a maturation of public opinion concerning European integration.