Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- List of illustrations -- Abbreviations -- Other abbreviations -- Foreword by Álvaro de Soto -- Introduction -- Identification of a major obstacle to peacebuilding -- Obstacles to peacebuilding revisited -- Organization of the book -- 1. Peacebuilding conceptual framework: From An Agenda for Peace and its supplement to An Agenda for Development -- Peacebuilding: conceptual definition, timing, and sequence -- Preventive diplomacy vs. post-conflict peacebuilding -- An "integrated approach" to human security and to development -- International financing of peacebuilding -- Sovereignty, policy ownership, and peacebuilding -- Other definitions and obstacles to peacebuilding -- Conclusions -- 2. Economic reconstruction amid the multidisciplinary transition to peace -- The security transition -- The political transition -- The social transition -- The economic transition -- Interrelations among the four distinct transitions -- Conclusions -- 3. The economics of war, the economics of conflict resolution, the economics of peace, the economics of development -- Terminology, phases, sequence, challenges, and policies -- Economic reconstruction: the evolving context from the Marshall Plan to the post-Cold War period -- Post-conflict economic reconstruction vs. development -- Conclusions -- 4. Economic reconstruction vs. development: evolving conceptual views -- Contrasting views in the 1990s at the UN and the BWIs -- Evolving views in the 2000s: the World Bank and the IMF -- Conclusions -- 5. Peacebuilding at the UN - from conceptualization to operationalization -- From Boutros-Ghali to Kofi Annan to Ban Ki-moon -- Peacebuilding architecture - world summit outcome (2005) -- The UN peacebuilding architecture 10-year record: an assessment -- It's the Economy, Stupid -- Conclusions

The experience and lessons of the last two decades have shown that ignoring the key differences between the economics of peace and the economics of development has been a major reason why countries relapse into conflict. This paper briefly analyses such differences and their important implications for effective policymaking in war-torn countries, and against this background, it makes recommendations for the creation of reconstruction zones in Liberia. Reconstruction zones would have two distinct but linked areas to ensure synergies between them - an export-oriented reconstruction zone, consisting of any existing agricultural or mining foreign concession, and a local production reconstruction zone focusing on rural development, that would produce agricultural goods, food, light manufacturing and services for the domestic market, including for the concessions. The purposes of reconstruction zones are as follows. First, to create links between the concessions, operating as enclaves, and the domestic economy, particularly with the rural communities in their vicinity that have often been displaced or their livelihoods threatened by them. Second, to focus on rural development to improve food security and decrease dependence on imports. Third, to support business development through the creation of a level playing field in infrastructure and credit for micro and small enterprises, including small farmers. Fourth, to move away from the fragmented aid and investment strategies of the past, to a more integrated and effective aid strategy. Last but not least, to achieve more inclusive growth that could help to consolidate peace and avoid that Liberia relapses into conflict.

This is a highly readable book that provides strong and rigorous arguments to prove a thesis that is intuitive to many but still denied by some—that the United States foreign policy of using military intervention, occupation, and reconstruction to establish liberal democracies across the world is more likely to fail than to succeed.

As an academic and editor of a theoretical journal on Austrian economics it is understandable that Christopher J. Coyne fails to grasp what is at stake on the ground. Like Dambisa Momo, Coyne has a dogmatic and unflinching belief in the markets and naively thinks that poor countries coming out war or chaos can do it on their own.