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AbstractThis essay conceptualizes radicalization as a collective process that evolves within the context of global, national, or local intergroup tensions. People do not radicalize on their own, but as part of a group in which a collective identity is developed. Some members of the group may take a radical activist route to promote or prevent social change. Their interactions with their opponents intensify, while their ideas and beliefs sharpen. In this essay, I propose an interpretative framework to analyze radicalizing collective identities. The framework departs from the notion that supranational processes shape and mold the micro level of (radicalizing) citizens' demands, the meso level of social movements and political parties, and the macro level of national political systems. The answer to questions such as who radicalizes, why people radicalize, and the forms radical action takes lies in the interaction of supranational processes, national political processes, and the context of political mobilization. It is argued that radicalizing identities are key in this process, no radicalization without identification!

We live in contentious times. Why are people prepared to sacrifice wealth, a pleasant and carefree life, or sometimes even their lives for a common cause? This question brings us to the individual level of analysis, and therefore to political psychology. People live in a perceived world. Indeed, this is what a political psychology of protest is about – trying to understand why people who are seemingly in the same socio-political configuration respond so differently. I will illustrate this point with an overview of state-of-the-art theoretical approaches and up-to-date empirical evidence. Discussed are grievances, efficacy/cynicism, identification, emotions, and social embeddedness. Most recent approaches combine these concepts into one model comprising two routes: An efficacy route steered by social embeddedness and a grievances route steered by cynicism. The working of the model is illustrated by empirical evidence from contemporary events such as migrants, collective action, demonstrating diasporas, and Social Media protests. Each of these illustrations exemplifies how different aspects of the socio-political context as dual identification, group status, and virtual embeddedness affect individuals' protest behavior. As such the paper aims to provide an overview of political psychological work that may contribute to the understanding of our contentious times.

This article sheds light on the debate regarding political trust and protest activity. The debate boils down to the question whether trust in politics is positively or negatively related to protest activity. We exploit a dataset encompassing data on about 9,000 demonstrators spread over seven European countries. These demonstrators' trust in their parliaments varies widely, ranging from trustworthy capable, to corrupt incapable. We examine the diverging sociodemographic profiles and motivational dynamics that turn distrusting and trusting citizens into demonstrators. We hypothesize and show that distrusting demonstrators turn their back to institutionalized politics; for them, demonstrating substitutes the party politics they distrust. For trusting demonstrators, demonstrating supplements party politics. Trusting and distrusting demonstrators also differ considerably in terms of motivation. Distrusting demonstrators are stronger motivated to demonstrate than trusting demonstrators. Moreover, while political cynicism amplifies the motivation of distrusting demonstrators, it suppresses the motivation of trusting demonstrators. We conclude that the question to be answered is not so much whether people who engage in protest activity trust or distrust their political elites, but rather who the trusting and distrusting protesters are and why they protest.

We present data on eighteen demonstrations against austerity politics. A distinction is made between demonstrations against the austerity measures governments are taking (11) and demonstrations against the governments that are taking these measures (7). In total, 3434 demonstrators completed a survey questionnaire inquiring about demographic characteristics, social and political embeddedness, mobilization channels, satisfaction with the way democracy works in their country, identification and motivation. We propose a theoretical framework for the comparison of participants in the two types of demonstrations. Employing anovas, manovas, and logistic regression analyses hypotheses derived from the theoretical framework are tested. With a proportion of correct classifications of 75.6% our model was able to satisfactorily account for the differences between the two types of demonstrations.

This article explores how variation in political embeddedness of social movement organi-zations (SMOs) influences the management of emotions. By variation in the political embed-dedness of SMOs, we mean variation in the strength and the number of ties between SMOs and the political establishment. By management of emotions, we mean the efforts of SMO leaders to evoke particular emotions among SMO members. Using data from protest surveys conducted at demonstrations regarding climate change in Belgium and the Netherlands in 2009, we find that protestors who are members of more politically embedded SMOs are generally less angry than protestors who are members of less politically embedded SMOs. The finding that this pattern is especially strong among SMO members who heard about the dem-onstration through an SMO confirms the assumed role of SMO leaders in the management of emotions.

This article explores how variation in political embeddedness of social movement organizations (SMOs) influences the management of emotions. By variation in political embeddedness of SMOs, we mean variation in the strength and the number of ties between SMOs and the political establishment. By management of emotions, we mean efforts of SMO leaders to evoke particular emotions among SMO members. Using data from protest surveys conducted at demonstrations regarding climate change in Belgium and the Netherlands in 2009, we find that protestors who are members of a politically more embedded SMO are generally less angry than protestors who are members of a less politically embedded SMOs. The finding that this pattern is especially strong among SMO members who heard about the demonstration through an SMO, confirms the assumed role of SMO leaders in the management of emotions. Adapted from the source document.

On February 15, 2003, about 20 million people around the world protested against the imminent war in Iraq. In the Netherlands, 70,000 people marched in the streets of Amsterdam. This study focuses on the organization and mobilization processes preceding this event in Amsterdam. We trace how the organizers' attempts to form a coalition and the quarrels that ensued affected mobilization efforts, composition of the demonstration, media attention, and, subsequently, how and when participants were mobilized. We argue that, although infrequently studied, the specific ways that initial mobilization structures are formed are critical factors in the trajectory of mobilization. We use in-depth interviews with the organizers, newspaper content analyses, and survey data from participants to trace these effects.

On February 15, 2003, about 20 million people around the world protested against the imminent war in Iraq. In the Netherlands, 70,000 people marched in the streets of Amsterdam. This study focuses on the organization and mobilization processes preceding this event in Amsterdam. We trace how the organizers' attempts to form a coalition and the quarrels that ensued affected mobilization efforts, composition of the demonstration, media attention, and, subsequently, how and when participants were mobilized. We argue that, although infrequently studied, the specific ways that initial mobilization structures are formed are critical factors in the trajectory of mobilization. We use in-depth interviews with the organizers, newspaper content analyses, and survey data from participants to trace these effects. Adapted from the source document.

Scholars working from the political opportunity approach have upheld the notion that the political context sets the grievances around which activist mobilizes. Inspired by Tarrow and colleagues plea to explain political activism by analyzing how activists are mobilized, this article focuses on the individual protester. The research question in this article reads how are activist's protest emotions shaped by characteristics of the political context, specifically by their political alliances? We focus on the emotional constellation evoked by environmental issues (e.g., climate change and nuclear energy) with Green Parties as movement allies and anti-austerity issues with Social Democratic parties as movement allies. Specifically, the parliamentary position of these allies is linked to the relative stake anger and frustration have within the emotional constellation of demonstrators. Results are based on survey data collected among 6,598 demonstrators, and their emotions dispersed over 28 demonstrations in seven European countries. We conclude that having a politically well-connected friend seems to matter more to demonstrators' emotional constellation than the ideological support provided by that friend.

Using a multilevel dataset of seventy-five European street demonstrations (2009-13), we assess how demonstrators evaluate the interactions between the police and other demonstrators. In doing so, we study demonstrators' perceptions of the protest atmosphere. Understanding these atmosphere assessments is relevant, as demonstrators and other protest actors (e.g., police and the media) widely refer to the atmosphere (i.e., mood or climate) of protest events. To the best of our knowledge, scholars have not yet studied this aspect of protest participation. We start our study with a conceptualization and operationalization of protest atmosphere. Subsequently, we assess how demonstrators perceive atmosphere. Our analyses reveal that four types of protest atmospheres can be distinguished: harmonious, volatile, tense, and chaotic. We describe examples of these atmospheres and study why they are perceived. We find that the perception of atmosphere by demonstrators is influenced by individual characteristics (e.g., age) and demonstration characteristics (e.g., police repression).

Using a multilevel dataset of seventy-five European street demonstrations (2009-13), we assess how demonstrators evaluate the interactions between the police and other demonstrators. In doing so, we study demonstrators' perceptions of the protest atmosphere. Understanding these atmosphere assessments is relevant, as demonstrators and other protest actors (e.g., police and the media) widely refer to the atmosphere (i.e., mood or climate) of protest events. To the best of our knowledge, scholars have not yet studied this aspect of protest participation. We start our study with a conceptualization and operationalization of protest atmosphere. Subsequently, we assess how demonstrators perceive atmosphere. Our analyses reveal that four types of protest atmospheres can be distinguished: harmonious, volatile, tense, and chaotic. We describe examples of these atmospheres and study why they are perceived. We find that the perception of atmosphere by demonstrators is influenced by individual characteristics (e.g., age) and demonstration characteristics (e.g., police repression). Adapted from the source document.