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It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute crimes committed by government members which, in turn, increases their incentives to commit such crimes. Here, this hypothesis is put to an empirical test focusing on a particular kind of crime, namely corruption. In order to test it, it was necessary to create an indicator measuring de jure as well as de facto independence of the prosecution agencies. The regressions show that de facto independence of prosecution agencies robustly reduces corruption of officials.

ABSTRACT
The future of investment law has in store fundamental shifts, not incremental changes, in three substantive issue areas, which pose immense challenges to the system as it currently stands, namely, climate change, national security, and investor obligations. This article describes those challenges and argues that for these shifts to be accommodated, abolition is not desirable, but reform is necessary and urgent. It suggests procedural ways forward.

Abstract
Insights from experimental psychology and economics have rarely been applied to the study of international law and never to the study of international legal theory. This article applies them to socio-legal international theory that has grosso modo two important background paradigms with several variants: rationalist and constructivist. In both paradigms, the interest in understanding and explaining international law by uncovering causal mechanisms in international cooperation and compliance and in asking how cooperation is sustained in a system as decentralized as international law is paramount. In both, fundamental assumptions regarding the behaviour of actors are made. However, regardless of the theoretical standpoint, both fall short of experimental evidence about their behavioural assumptions. The article uses experimental evidence provided by public good games as a conceptualization of how social order is constructed and upheld in systems without central authority such as international law. It aims to illuminate the behavioural basis of important building blocks of international cooperation and law by discussing the preferences of states and strategic interaction, reciprocity, sanctions, communication and trust as well as consent and legitimacy, reflecting on what the experimental insights teach us on the assumptions of rationalist and constructivist approaches to international legal theory. These experiments are one means to test behavioural assumptions in international legal theory.

AbstractCollective action problems with public good characteristics such as climate change have important implications for international law. This note argues that behavioral insights from laboratory experiments, in which individuals engage in public goods games, can contribute to our understanding of how best to optimize the design of international legal regimes dealing with global public goods and common pool resources. Behavioral economics, to the extent it supplements or displaces rational-choice models in institutional design, may enable deeper and more sustained forms of international cooperation.

AbstractLooming disasters mostly require collective action but international law is traditionally consent based. For a state to be bound by international law, it needs to have ratified a treaty (e.g. concerning climate change) or must be bound by customary international law. This horizontal form of cooperation makes the system sensitive to collective action problems (like free‐riding on global public good, overuse of commons, begging‐thy‐neighbor etc.). I explore the question of whether other forms of cooperation, e.g. cooperation through soft law or international organizations mitigate the problem and under what circumstances this might be so. Furthermore, international law design might need to take into account internal processes within states (breaking up the black box) as well as behavioral economic insights. The paper suggests some mechanisms to help states overcoming the cooperation problem with regard to looming disasters and highlights their limits as well. It submits that international lawyers need to look at all behavioral mechanisms of international law in order to understand how it can be designed and used to prevent looming disasters.

Ever more risky service activities are carried out across borders, creating spillovers and externalities. At the same time, if freedom to provide services is legally enabled, states can cooperate in multiple ways to mitigate the potential risks accruing from crossborder activities. Global Administrative Law Scholarship distinguishes five types of administrative regulation: "administration by formal international organizations; administrations based on collective action by transnational networks of governmental officials; distributed administration conducted by national regulators under treaty regimes, mutual recognition arrangements or cooperative standards; administration by hybrid intergovernmental–private arrangements; and administration by private institutions with regulatory functions. In practice many of these layers overlap or combine […]". In the area of risky cross–border service provision, the EU has moved from a more decentralised version of networks and mutual recognition characterised by coordination and minimum harmonization of rules and standards to a more centralized commandand–control system with European authorities and supervision.