Suchergebnisse

Abstract
Hobbes treats individual property as regulated by stable law, yet dependent on the arbitrary will of the sovereign. In this paper I catalogue the different definitions of property present in his main political and legal works – The Elements of Law (1640), De Cive (1642, 2nd ed. 1647), Leviathan (1651) and A Dialogue between a philosopher and a student (1681) – with the aim of showing how he attempted to square those commitments. I record how the definitions of property affect his views about how sovereigns hold property, the nature of the liability of subjects to having their property confiscated by the sovereign, and the legal conflicts that may arise between subjects and their rulers regarding such confiscations.

Abstract:This paper considers Hobbes' scientific study of the human mind and the method that structures it. I argue that Hobbes approaches the mind – as he approaches the inanimate natural world – in accordance with the method of "physics" as set out in the fourth and last part of

Thomas Hobbes's theory of action seems to give up on the idea that actions are 'up to us'. Thomas Pink has argued that this counter-intuitive stance should be understood as the implication of his radical assault on the scholastic Aristotelian model of action. Hobbes rejects the existence of the immaterial soul. This means that he must also reject the existence of so-called elicited acts of the will, which form the primary locus of human agency. In this paper an alternative interpretation is presented. It is argued that Hobbes's fundamental disagreement with the scholastic tradition is not over the existence of elicited acts of the will but over scope and productiveness of mechanical explanation. Hobbes aims to give an account of human actions as in our control and as 'up to us' while at the same time applying and defending his mechanical mode of analysis. This paper contributes to the contextualisation of Hobbes's views and furthers our understanding of his theory of action. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]

Thomas Hobbes has been frequently criticised for his account of deliberation that purportedly consists merely of, in his own words, an 'alternate succession of appetite and fear' and therefore lacks the judgement and reflection commentators think is essential if he is to provide an adequate treatment of practical rationality. In this paper Hobbes's account of deliberation is analysed in detail and it is argued that it is not vulnerable to this critique. Hobbes takes so-called 'mental discourse' to be partly constitutive of the process of practical deliberation, and this provides the cognitive judgement and reflection that critics have claimed it lacks.

Thomas Hobbes is one of the most important figures in the history of political philosophy. Yet a great deal of his political thought was motivated by the need to address distinctively religious problems. This is the first collection of essays dedicated to the complex and rich intersections between Hobbes's political and religious thought.

It is morally impossible, Locke argued, for individuals to consensually establish absolute rule over themselves. That would be to transfer to rulers a power that is not ours, but God's alone: ownership of our lives. This article analyses the conceptual presuppositions of Locke's argument for the moral impossibility of self-enslavement through a comparison with other classical social contract theorists, including Grotius, Hobbes and Pufendorf. Despite notoriously defending the permissibility of voluntary enslavement of individuals and even entire peoples, Grotius similarly endorsed divine ownership of human life. He could do so coherently, we show, because he denied that despotic power gives rulers rights in the lives of their subjects. Masters do not own slaves in the way we own material things (which we may destroy at will). Reworking received Roman law categories, Grotius maintained that 'perfect slavery' consists in masters having a personal right to the slave's perpetual service; a condition equivalent to what Locke called 'drudgery' and deemed permissible. Our analysis of this unpalatable set of ideas reveals that Locke's argument is premised upon idiosyncratic conceptions of slavery and absolutism, disavowed by prominent defenders of absolutism in the classical social contract tradition. It is hence less powerful than commonly believed.