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Within many countries, voters not only have to cast a vote for a political party, but also have the option to select (a) candidate(s) within that party, a so-called preferential vote. Recent studies indicate that several factors influence the success of candidates within this intra-party competition, such as ballot list position, political experience, and socio-demographic characteristics. However, it has not yet been investigated whether ideology also matters for intra-party success. This study investigates the role of the ideological position of candidates within their party on the share of preferential votes they obtain. Can candidates win preferential votes by taking ideological niche positions within the party? To investigate this question, the study uses data from a candidate survey conducted during the 2014 Belgian elections in which candidates were asked to position themselves ideologically. The results of this study indicate that ideology does not play a strong role within the intra-party competition.

AbstractPrevious studies have found similarities with presidential candidates or party leaders to be an important factor in explaining voting behaviour. However, with the exception of gender, few studies have structurally studied voter-candidate similarities in intra-party electoral competition. This study investigates the Belgian case and argues that voter-candidate similarities play a role in the decision-making process of citizens when casting preferential votes. Moreover, it investigates whether underrepresented groups, and especially women, are more guided by these voter-candidate similarities than overrepresented groups. To achieve this aim voter and candidate characteristics are modelled simultaneously. This enables an investigation of the decision-making process of voters while taking into account structural inequalities at the supply side. The results demonstrate that citizens are indeed more likely to cast preferential votes for candidates similar to themselves and that these effects are stronger for underrepresented groups. Hence, preferential voting could ultimately pave the way for better descriptive representation.

AbstractThis study investigates to what extent affective polarization, and more specifically hostility towards opposing party supporters, finds its roots in ideological differences. We look into the way out-groups are constructed when there are more than two political parties, and at the role of ideology in this process. Hereby we position ourselves in the discussion between those who argue that affective polarization finds its root more strongly in group attachments vs. those who argue that it is mostly rooted in ideological differences. We conduct our study in the context of the highly fragmented multi-party system of Belgium which enables us to analytically disentangle party label cues from ideological distance. Our findings demonstrate that affective polarization is largely rooted in ideological differences between party electorates in Belgium. Additionally, we find that this particularly holds for citizens who are more ideologically invested, namely those with higher political interest and more extreme ideological views.

Using a survey experiment in Belgium, this study investigates to what extent media criticism voiced by political elites affects citizens' media perceptions. In the experiment, citizens are exposed to tweets in which political parties attack the public broadcast for (1) being ideologically slanted and (2) being inaccurate. The study shows that by attacking a news outlet elites are able to increase citizens' perceptions of partisan bias in that outlet. However, we also find that this does not spill over to their general perception of bias or trust in the traditional media. In addition, we demonstrate that not all types of elite attacks on the media have a similar effect, as we find no evidence of tweets where elites criticize the news for being inaccurate impact citizens' perceptions of the media.

When citizens perceive news coverage as ideologically slanted, their crucial trust in the (traditional) news media decreases. Research on the so-called hostile media phenomenon indeed shows that an alarming number of people consider news coverage as disadvantaging their own political preferences and favoring opposing (partisan) views. However, most of this research is conducted in an experimental setting, and we do not know how this works in the real world, where citizens predominantly consume news from media outlets they trust and perceive as ideologically like-minded. By questioning Belgian citizens about their perceptions of partisan bias in their preferred news outlet, this study shows that the hostile media phenomenon also holds in a least likely context; even content produced by "friendly" news sources is seen as ideologically slanted, potentially contributing to citizens' general distrust in the news media. Moreover, we find that especially right-wing citizens and strong partisans believe their news outlet disadvantages their preferred party.

This paper seeks to explain why party candidates and their party leadership have congruent policy positions or not. Despite its importance as a way through which parties are able to behave as a unitary actor, this congruence has never been studied as a dependent variable. We seek to fill this void in the literature. Our results suggest that leadership-candidate congruence comes about through two mechanisms: selection and learning. With selection, the party leadership aims to get those candidates elected whose policy preferences are congruent with the party line. Learning occurs through the process of socialization in which candidates assume the views of the party they work and candidate for as their own under. This happens under the pressure of cognitive dissonance. If a candidate learns about the position of the leadership and notices that they are incongruent, they may feel discomfort and change their opinion to be congruent with the party.

This paper seeks to explain why party candidates and their party leadership have congruent policy positions or not. Despite its importance as a way through which parties are able to behave as a unitary actor, this congruence has never been studied as a dependent variable. We seek to fill this void in the literature. Our results suggest that leadership-candidate congruence comes about through two mechanisms: selection and learning. With selection, the party leadership aims to get those candidates elected whose policy preferences are congruent with the party line. Learning occurs through the process of socialization in which candidates assume the views of the party they work and candidate for as their own under. This happens under the pressure of cognitive dissonance. If a candidate learns about the position of the leadership and notices that they are incongruent, they may feel discomfort and change their opinion to be congruent with the party.

This paper seeks to explain why party candidates and their party leadership have congruent policy positions or not. Despite its importance as a way through which parties are able to behave as a unitary actor, this congruence has never been studied as a dependent variable. We seek to fill this void in the literature. Our results suggest that leadership-candidate congruence comes about through two mechanisms: selection and learning. With selection, the party leadership aims to get those candidates elected whose policy preferences are congruent with the party line. Learning occurs through the process of socialization in which candidates assume the views of the party they work and candidate for as their own under. This happens under the pressure of cognitive dissonance. If a candidate learns about the position of the leadership and notices that they are incongruent, they may feel discomfort and change their opinion to be congruent with the party.