Suchergebnisse

AbstractManuscript TypeEmpiricalResearch Question/IssueWe examine the effects of firm‐ and country‐level "good" corporate governance prescriptions on firm performance before and during the recent financial crisis, using a large sample of 1,197 firms across 26 European countries.Research Findings/InsightsWe propose a contextualized agency perspective suggesting that firm‐ and country‐level good governance prescriptions designed to assure managerial oversight may not hold in a financial crisis. This is because firms can benefit from broadening managerial discretion so as to facilitate the exercise of initiative and decisive leadership. Overall, our firm‐ and country‐level findings support this argument. In a crisis, CEO duality is associated with better performance. We also find that the use of incentive compensation and the existence of a wedge between ownership and control rights negatively impacts on firm performance in a crisis. Hierarchical linear modeling shows that 25 percent of the heterogeneity in firm performance is among countries, indicating the importance of including country‐level institutions in our analyses. In a crisis, we find that the general quality of the legal system and creditor rights protection are positively related to firm performance, but protection for equity investors is not.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsThe findings challenge the universality of good governance prescriptions and contribute to the growing body of work proposing that the efficacy of governance mechanisms may be contingent upon organizational and environmental circumstances.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsThe study offers insights relevant to policy and practitioner communities, showing that governance mechanisms operate differently in crisis and non‐crisis periods. The tendency to respond to a crisis with more stringent rules may be counterproductive since such measures may compromise executives' ability to respond appropriately to systemic shocks. Practitioners are encouraged to optimize rather than maximize their governance choices.

The field of Chinese management studies has grown tremendously over the past four decades. Management theories originating from the United States have remained dominant in the analysis of Chinese firms, prompting the question of how powerfully these Western lenses explain management practices in non-Western contexts. Through a matched-samples meta-analysis, which integrates matching techniques into meta-analysis, we compare the mean effect sizes for five classic Western management theories—institutional theory, resource dependence theory, the resource-based view, agency theory, and transaction cost theory—on 452 matched samples drawn from 1,028 U.S. and Chinese studies. Surprisingly, as compared to their U.S. counterparts, Chinese firms (a) are less responsive to coercive and mimetic pressures yet more subject to normative pressures, (b) establish fewer business relations when faced with resource dependencies and transaction costs, (c) extract more profit from managing generic strategic resources, and (d) are more sensitive to pay incentives and private blockholders. To understand the specificities of Chinese management practices, we furthermore conduct a focused review of the emerging literature on China-endemic explanations: political institutional imprinting theory, state-driven sustainable development, and China-endemic corporate governance. We conclude that indigenous theories effectively complement Western perspectives when accounting for Chinese management practices.

We argue that state ownership is a crucial policy instrument for alleviating what is perhaps the most important principal–principal (PP) agency problem around the globe: private benefits of control (PBC). Our results illustrate that states reduce PBC in the companies in which they acquire controlling ownership positions. We also examine how legal and political institutions influence the extent to which states accomplish this goal. Antiself?dealing legal regulations make states more effective in their efforts to constrain PBC, while political constraints make them less effective. Regimes with high state capacity appear not to prioritize PBC reduction. We test and corroborate these ideas in a sample of 1,354 control transactions across 54 countries.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine two prominent perspectives on business group functioning, institutional void (IV) and entrenchment/exploitation (EE), that make different predictions about the effect of business group (BG) on the economy. The authors examine the effects of BG prevalence in an economy and its effect on macroeconomic outcomes including foreign direct inward and outward investment, innovation and development of the financial sector.Design/methodology/approachThe authors build a unique database by extracting estimates of BG prevalence for multiple countries between 1978 and 2012 from the existing literature and use this to test conflicting predictions derived from the IV and EE perspectives, respectively.FindingsThe authors find no consistent evidence that BG prevalence diminishes over time with economic development as IVs diminish, which is predicted by the IV perspective. Instead, the long-term persistence of BGs in many countries appears to be more consistent with the EE perspective. However, this study also finds no support for the perspective that high levels of BG prevalence are negatively associated with country-level indicators and determinants of economic development and competitiveness, as suggested by that perspective.Originality/valueThe authors conclude that there is no robust support for either the IV or the EE perspective and highlight the need for more contextualized theorizing about the evolution of BGs.

AbstractManuscript TypeEmpiricalResearch Question/IssueOur study seeks to explain the relationship between publicly listed family‐controlled firms (FCFs) and investor and employee outcomes before and during the global financial crisis. Theoretically, we develop hypotheses suggesting that FCF resilience is beneficial to both investor and employees. Employing a large firm‐level data set of 2,949 firms across 27 European countries, we test the hypotheses that FCFs' long‐term orientation makes them resilient to the effects of economic shocks. In addition, using hierarchical linear modeling we evaluate family firm investor and employee outcomes, and the moderating impact of legal institutions protecting minority investors and employees.Research Findings/InsightsWe find that FCFs financially outperform non‐FCFs during the financial crisis, beginning in 2007 and reaching its lowest point in 2009, but show no significant differences during the stable‐growth period between 2004 and 2006. We evaluate two employee outcomes: downsizing and wage decreases. We find that FCFs are less likely to downsize their workforce or cut wages in both pre‐crisis and crisis conditions. Based upon hypotheses founded in the comparative capitalisms logic, we find significant institutional effects that are contrary to our predictions. Our findings suggest that investors and employees of FCFs achieve more favorable outcomes for their interests when the rules pertaining to investor protection and their enforcement are poorly developed.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsWe contribute to the emerging literature on the institution‐based view of comparative corporate governance by demonstrating that family‐controlled firms' stakeholder outcomes are contingent upon legal protection for employees and investors under contrasting economic circumstances.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsFamily owners, employees and minority investors should consider both firm‐level and country‐level governance institutions when investing in different countries, especially in times of economic crisis as jurisdiction‐level institutions and firm ownership choices produce variable outcomes for different stakeholders in both crisis and non‐crisis conditions.

We provide an analysis of the costs and benefits of blockholding in Europe, where it is a dominant, but certainly not universal, corporate governance strategy for shareholders of publicly listed firms. We find that the effectiveness of blockholding is conditioned by the specific labor institutions that distinguish European countries from the rest of the world, and that these institutional effects involve both competition and cooperation between blockholders and collective labor interests. We also find that relational blockholders are better able to cope with, or benefit from, these institutional effects than arm's-length blockholders. Empirically, we use advanced meta-analytic methods on a total sample of 748,569 firm-year observations, derived from 162 studies covering 23 European countries.

AbstractManuscript TypeEmpiricalResearch Question/IssueA contentious and prominent research question in the management literature is whether publicly listed family firms (FFs) outperform other types of corporations. Through a research synthesis of all available studies on the performance of US FFs, we address this question directly. We also extend the debate by raising three salient follow‐up questions. First, is the performance differential between FFs and non‐FFs attributable to a unique set of strategic choices? Second, do FF performance effects persist across generational transitions in FF control? Third, are performance differentials across generations attributable to intergenerational shifts in corporate governance and strategy?Research Findings/InsightsWith respect to our primary research question, we find that the balance of evidence indicates that (US) FFs outperform other types of public corporations. We also evaluate competing narratives regarding which strategies are characteristic of FFs, and demonstrate that their diversification, internationalization, and financing strategies mediate the FF‐performance relationship in manners consistent with the narratives advanced by certain leading FF scholars, but not others. Further, we find that the performance of (US) FFs drops dramatically after the first generation and show that this negative performance differential is due to the much more conservative patterns of strategic decision making enacted by successor generations.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsIn addition to providing the most comprehensive evidence to date regarding the performance attributes of FFs, we nuance several theoretical debates concerning the propensity of FFs to diversify, internationalize, and leverage their equity capital.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsWe identify value‐creating strategic choices of FFs related to internationalization, diversification, and capital structure. We also identify strategic choices often made in successor‐led FFs which reduce value. Both sets of findings are relevant to FF executives and consultants. The policy implications of the study are that in advanced liberal market economies high‐quality capital market institutions are likely to contribute to FF outperformance vis‐à‐vis other types of publicly listed firms, but these findings may not hold in other types of national governance systems or in emerging markets.

This paper presents a review and critique of the 20-year-old literature on institutional distance, which has greatly proliferated. We start with a discussion of the three institutional perspectives that have served as a theoretical foundation for this construct: organizational institutionalism, institutional economics, and comparative institutionalism. We use this as an organizing framework to describe the different ways in which institutional distance has been conceptualized and measured, and to analyze the most common organizational outcomes that have been linked to institutional distance, as well as the proposed explanatory mechanisms of those effects. We substantiate our qualitative review with a meta-analysis, which synthesizes the main findings in this area of research. Building on our review and previous critical work, we note key ambiguities in the institutional distance literature related to underlying theoretical perspectives and associated mechanisms, distance versus profile effects, and measurement. We conclude with actionable recommendations for improving institutional distance research.

Purpose
Despite agency theory and resource dependence theory suggesting that – albeit through different mechanisms – board independence positively influences firm internationalization, empirical evidence on this relationship has been mixed and inconclusive. Based on this, the purpose of the present study is twofold: first, to analyze and synthesize the existing empirical literature and, second, to develop new theoretical insights on the effect of board independence on firm internationalization.


Design/methodology/approach
The authors used advanced meta-analytic techniques that allowed them, first, to synthesize the existing empirical literature on the board independence–firm internationalization relationship and, second, to examine the effect of several contingencies on such relationship. This study relies on data from 87 primary studies (published and unpublished) carried out in multiple academic fields in the period 1998–2021 and covering 49 countries.


Findings
The results confirm the established agency and resource-dependence arguments, suggesting that higher board independence is associated with greater firm internationalization. Moreover, the results show that the focal relationship is moderated by home-country formal and informal institutional factors, and in particular, the legal protection of minority shareholders and family business legitimacy. The authors do not find evidence that CEO duality and board size moderate the focal relationship or that board independence has a stronger effect on breadth than on depth of internationalization.


Originality/value
This study lies at the intersection of the literatures on corporate governance and firm internationalization and on comparative corporate governance of the multinational firm, shedding further light on the role played by institutional environments in determining the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms.

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to investigate how concentrated owners add value to Asian firms. While prior research suggests that relational owners (i.e., business groups, top management team, board, government, banks, families, and corporation) may help firms fill institutional voids, this study proposes that it is transactional owners (i.e., foreign and institutional investors) lacking this ability who contribute most to firm performance. As these owners frequently hail from contexts with well-developed corporate governance traditions, they tend to have experience with the design and implementation of such governance practices.Design/methodology/approachThis study involves a meta-analysis covering 276 studies from 17 Asian countries.FindingsThis study shows that transactional owners impose effective governance practices such as separating the chief executive officer (CEO) and Chair roles and assuring board independence. These practices promote decisions benefiting all shareholders, such as preventing diversification and financial over-leveraging.Originality/valueThis study contributes to the comparative corporate governance literature by showing that implementing internal governance practices helps improve firm performance in Asia. It also contributes to the owner identity literature by opening the black box of how transactional and relational owners differentially affect firms' strategic behavior. Overall, this study yields a more nuanced understanding of what transactional owners contribute to Asian firms.