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Working paper
The Algorithmic Learning Deficit: Artificial Intelligence, Data Protection, and Trade
In: Big Data and Global Trade Law, ed. by Mira Burri, Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming
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Working paper
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Fashion-ID: Introducing a Phase-Oriented Approach to Data Protection?
In: European Law Blog, 2019
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Privacy and Security in the Cloud: Some Realism About Technical Solutions to Transnational Surveillance in the Post-Snowden Era
In: 66 Maine Law Review 488 (2014)
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Scoping Electronic Communication Privacy Rules: Data, Services and Values
In: Joris van Hoboken and Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, Scoping Electronic Communication Privacy Rules: Data, Services and Values, 6 (2015) JIPITEC 198
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Responsibility for Data Protection in a Networked World – On the Question of the Controller, 'Effective and Complete Protection' and Its Application to Data Access Rights in Europe
In: Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and Electronic Commerce Law, 10 (2019) JIPITEC 39 para 1
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Working paper
Social Welfare, Risk Profiling and Fundamental Rights: The Case of SyRI in the Netherlands
In: Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and E-Commerce Law (JIPITEC) 12 (4) 2021
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Obscured by Clouds or How to Address Governmental Access to Cloud Data from Abroad
In: Privacy Law Scholars Conference 2013
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Working paper
Putting the Digital Services Act Into Practice: Enforcement, Access to Justice, and Global Implications
In: Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 13, 2023
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Measurement & economic indicators:Final report
In: Lehdonvirta , V , Rieder , B , Raguseo , E , Jeon , D-S , Graef , I & van Hoboken , J 2021 , Measurement & economic indicators : Final report . European Commission .
Online platforms play an important role in many European industries, from media and advertising to travel and retail. They allow buyers and sellers of goods and services to find each other, trust each other, and trade with each other. They are likely to be significant gateways for many European small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to global markets. Due to their pivotal position, there is a risk that they may in some cases also misuse their gatekeeper position. As in any market, public policies could help maximize the benefits and minimize the harms of the online platform economy. The European Union and its Member States are already engaged in such policy making, in domains ranging from consumer protection and fair trading practices to competition and media law. However, a challenge to policy makers and researchers is that there is a lack of data on many aspects of platform companies' economic role and behaviour. Traditional economic statistics, national accounts, and market data are not geared towards observing intermediaries that may produce no goods and hold no stocks themselves, yet still play a central role determining in how they are allocated. The objective of this report is to identify indicators that could be used to monitor the online platform economy for the purposes of policy making and, where considered necessary, further regulation, and to recommend corrective actions in areas where no indicators are available to ensure such data becomes available in the future. We break down the problem of observation into three broad areas that cut across policy domains. The first area is the economic significance of platforms in the context of the broader economy. Within this area, three topics for measurement are considered: the volume of trade mediated by platforms; platform size and importance; and data on data. We recommend that statistical agencies should be empowered to collect data on trade mediated by platforms, for instance in travel and e-commerce. Platform size and "data on data" are active areas of research, where not just new data sources but also more conceptual development is needed; we offer some suggestions in this regard. The second area of observation is the economic power that platforms have over their users. Within this area, three topics for measurement are considered: business dependence on platforms; platform's share of consumer attention; and acquisitions as competitive strategy. We find that, from a business strategy perspective, business dependence of platforms is conceptually quite well understood, but good data sources and data are lacking. We recommend that both industry associations and statistical agencies invest into collecting suitable data. Platforms' share of consumer attention is still an area for further research. Beside the standard approaches, we are suggesting more alternative ways, such as measurement via "big data" web traffic. Regarding acquisitions as competitive strategy, including "killer acquisitions" designed to pre-empt future competition, we suggest automated market intelligence data feeds such as an additional way to add puzzle to a jigsaw. However, such data is likely incomplete, and we recommend that the EU considers new obligations on major platforms to report M&A activity to the European Commission, for ex-post research and monitoring purposes, in particular when these M&A are not captured by thresholds in the applicable EU and national merger rules and may therefore never be assessed against their compliance with applicable competition rules. We also propose a number of research questions for furthering the understanding of acquisitions in platform competition and policy. The final area of observation covered in this report relates to the considered consequences of platforms' economic power: how to measure platform volatility; platform transparency; and other potentially problematic and thus policy-relevant practices. The topic of platform transparency would benefit from further conceptual research to understand for instance the tradeoffs between a public's need for transparency of powerful actors vs. legitimate private business interests of a platform company. As for other potentially problematic practices, the new EU P2B Regulation that applies as of 12 July 2020 will create new transparency obligations on platforms to disclose data on their internal complaint-handling systems; we recommend that this data be analysed with a view to identifying and assessing any need for further public policy intervention. These initial findings and recommendations were tested in a stakeholder consultation process that helped us to verify the indicators and the overall framework for monitoring the online platform economy for policy and regulation in the future.
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Access to Digital Justice: In Search of an Effective Remedy for Removing Unlawful Online Content
In: To be published as Chapter 14 in X. Kramer et al., Frontiers of Civil Justice (Edward Elgar, forthcoming 2022)
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Measuring the Brussels Effect through Access Requests: Has the European General Data Protection Regulation Influenced the Data Protection Rights of Canadian Citizens?
In: Journal of information policy: JIP, Band 11, S. 301-349
ISSN: 2158-3897
ABSTRACT
We investigate empirically whether the introduction of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) improved compliance with data protection rights of people who are not formally protected under GDPR. By measuring compliance with the right of access for European Union (EU) and Canadian residents, we find that this is indeed the case. We argue this is likely caused by the Brussels Effect, a mechanism whereby policy diffuses primarily through market mechanisms. We suggest that a willingness to back up its rules with strong enforcement, as it did with the introduction of the GDPR, was the primary driver in allowing the EU to unilaterally affect companies' global behavior.
Study of Fundamental Rights Limitations for Online Enforcement through Self-Regulation
The use of self-regulatory or privatized enforcement measures in the online environment can give rise to various legal issues that affect the fundamental rights of internet users. First, privatized enforcement by internet services, without state involvement, can interfere with the effective exercise of fundamental rights by internet users. Such interference may, on occasion, be disproportionate, but there are legal complexities involved in determining the precise circumstances in which this is the case. This is because, for instance, the private entities can themselves claim protection under the fundamental rights framework (e.g. the protection of property and the freedom to conduct business). Second, the role of public authorities in the development of self-regulation in view of certain public policy objectives can become problematic, but has to be carefully assessed. The fundamental rights framework puts limitations on government regulation that interferes with fundamental rights. Essentially, such limitations involve the (negative) obligation for States not to interfere with fundamental rights. Interferences have to be prescribed by law, pursue a legitimate aim and be necessary in a democratic society. At the same time, however, States are also under the (positive) obligation to take active measures in order to ensure the effective exercise of fundamental rights. In other words, States must do more than simply refrain from interference. These positive obligations are of specific interest in the context of private ordering impact on fundamental rights, but tend to be abstract and hard to operationalize in specific legal constellations. This study's central research question is: What legal limitations follow from the fundamental rights framework for self-regulation and privatized enforcement online? It examines the circumstances in which State responsibility can be engaged as a result of selfregulation or privatized enforcement online. Part I of the study provides an overview and analysis of the relevant elements in the European and international fundamental rights framework that place limitations on privatized enforcement. Part II gives an assessment of specific instances of self-regulation or other instances of privatized enforcement in light of these elements.
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To Break Up or Regulate Big Tech? Avenues to Constrain Private Power in the DSA/DMA Package
In: Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 21-25
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