Beleidsuitvoering in gelaagde stelsels. De doorwerking van aanbevelingen van de Stichting van de Arbeid in het CAO-overleg
In: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/30522
This study sets out to describe and explain variation in cross-level policy coherence between central level policy recommendations by the Stichting van de Arbeid (Dutch Labour Foundation) and decentral level Collective Labour Agreements (CLAs) in Dutch labour relations. Cross-level policy coherence can be understood as a problem of policy implementation. However, Dutch labour relations are characterised by a combination of (a) multilevel governance – collective decision-making takes place on both the central and decentral level, and (b) soft policy – Labour Foundation recommendations are not legally binding. These characteristics raise two important questions: (1) to what extent can we expect decentral compliance with central level recommendations, and under what conditions? (2) To what extent are existing theories of policy implementation that assume state centric systems – which are characterised by binding political decisions and institutionally embedded systems of administrative procedures for political control – appropriate for the study of multilevel systems with 'soft' policies? To explain cross-level policy coherence a model-guided approach is applied. The starting point is the standard model of policy implementation. This model is adjusted and supplemented using 'middle range theories' on policy processes in multilevel systems. Cross-level policy coherence is defined as coherence between central level recommendations and the individual (policy positions, concessions in negotiations) and collective outcomes (negotiation agenda, CLA-arrangements) of choices of decentral level CLA-negotiators. Hypotheses are derived, predicting effects on cross-level policy coherence of (1) collective support for recommendations among peak organization administrators, (2) preference loss of individual peak organization administrators in the central level negotiations, and (3) government salience. To test the hypotheses two types of data are analysed: (1) decision-making data on (a) central level recommendations in two ...