Suchergebnisse

ZusammenfassungAls Reaktion auf die Eurokrise brachte die Europäische Union (EU) mehrere Reformpakete und Vorschläge zur Überarbeitung des Governance-Rahmens der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion (WWU) auf den Weg. Diese Studie untersucht den Vorschlag zur Stärkung der Finanzregulierung im Zusammenhang mit der Debatte über Finanztransaktionssteuern (FTS), die sogenannte Robin-Hood-Steuer, und die divergierenden politischen Reaktionen der britischen und deutschen Regierungen. Besonderes Augenmerk wird auf die Auswirkungen der Pluralität der Akteure und die issue salience bei den Prozessen zur Bildung von Präferenzen in diesen Ländern gelegt. Hauptziel ist es festzustellen, wer die Reaktionen dieser Regierungen während der FTS-Debatte bestimmt hat und warum finanzielle und nicht-finanzielle gesellschaftliche Akteure bei der Entscheidungsfindung entweder beachtet oder abgelehnt wurden. Durch die Anwendung des Societal Approach als Theorie endogener Präferenzformation werden drei erklärende Variablen, materielle Interessen, wertgestützte Ideen und nationale Institutionen, die in der Innenpolitik der Länder dominieren, untersucht, um zu berücksichtigen, wann diese von Bedeutung sind, wie sie interagieren und welche bei der Gestaltung der FTS-Positionen dieser Regierungen prägend sind. Diese vergleichende theoriegeleitete empirische Analyse zeigt, dass Gewerkschaften, Wähler*innen und NGOs in Deutschland in der Lage waren, wichtige Interessen der Finanzindustrie bei der Gestaltung der Regierungsposition zur Unterstützung der vorgeschlagenen Reform zu umgehen, während diese Akteure in Großbritannien, einer einheitlichen Finanzindustrie, die sich vehement gegen die Steuer aussprach, nicht erfolgreich entgegenwirkten. Anknüpfend an die aktuelle Literatur zur europäischen Finanzregulierung nach der Krise, die sich mit einem gewissen Dissens zwischen einer Zunahme und einer Abnahme der demokratischen Politikgestaltung in Krisenzeiten befasst, soll diese Untersuchung ein umfassendes Verständnis der Präferenzbildung der Regierungen fördern und eine gewisse verstärkte demokratische Politikgestaltung erkennen.

The Eurozone crisis exposed the incompleteness of the Economic and Monetary Union's governance framework thereby prompting the promotion of a multitude of reform packages and proposals. This simultaneously induced conflict among EU governments on both design and content of such reforms. In case of the financial transaction tax (FTT) proposal, which failed to garner consensus among member governments, it illustrates Ireland's disapproval clashing with favorable German and French stances. While these governments aligned on the necessity to reform, the process of harmonizing EU financial governance proved rather difficult. In analyzing governments' variation of reform support or opposition, the societal approach to governmental preference formation is employed. This is considerably conducive in directing academic attention to the role of two explanatory variables, domestic material interests and value-based ideas, in shaping governments' reform positions. This article encompasses a comprehensive comparative account of domestic preference formation and responsiveness of three EU governments (France, Germany and Ireland), in the case study of the FTT, and demonstrates that the two societal dynamics are prone to have played a role in shaping financial reform controversies. By building on and contributing to Eurozone crisis literature, this approach seems appropriate in analyzing financial governance reform due to the crisis' domestic impact resulting in increased public salience, issue politicization and an advanced role of elected politicians.

The Eurozone crisis exposed the incompleteness of the Economic and Monetary Union's governance framework thereby prompting the promotion of a multitude of reform packages and proposals. This simultaneously induced conflict among EU governments on both design and content of such reforms. In case of the financial transaction tax (FTT) proposal, which failed to garner consensus among member governments, it illustrates Ireland's disapproval clashing with favorable German and French stances. While these governments aligned on the necessity to reform, the process of harmonizing EU financial governance proved rather difficult. In analyzing governments' variation of reform support or opposition, the societal approach to governmental preference formation is employed. This is considerably conducive in directing academic attention to the role of two explanatory variables, domestic material interests and value-based ideas, in shaping governments' reform positions. This article encompasses a comprehensive comparative account of domestic preference formation and responsiveness of three EU governments (France, Germany and Ireland), in the case study of the FTT, and demonstrates that the two societal dynamics are prone to have played a role in shaping financial reform controversies. By building on and contributing to Eurozone crisis literature, this approach seems appropriate in analyzing financial governance reform due to the crisis' domestic impact resulting in increased public salience, issue politicization and an advanced role of elected politicians.

European Union (EU) trade policy is in the spotlight. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations triggered substantial public mobilization which emerged in a surge of literature on trade politicization. Notwithstanding politicization's topicality and significance, it varies considerably over time, across trade agreements negotiations as well as across EU member states. By picking up on the latter, this article examines why, despite similar economic benefits potentially to be gained from trade liberalization, TTIP negotiations revealed striking differences in politicization in Germany and the UK. Understanding this variation is illustrated by highlighting the impact of some of TTIPs' substantial issues mobilizing a range of materially and ideationally motivated stakeholders, who in turn shaped diverging governments' trade positions of the countries under scrutiny. In explaining this selective politicization across two European countries, focus is on three explanatory variables, domestic material interests (business associations and trade unions), societal ideas (voters and non-governmental organizations [NGOs]) dominant in these countries' domestic politics, as well as their interaction with national institutions. For this reason, the societal approach to governmental preference formation is employed which provides a detailed exploration of these three domestic factors, as well as the importance of their interdependence, in shaping the TTIP positions of the UK and German governments.

European Union (EU) trade policy is in the spotlight. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations triggered substantial public mobilization which emerged in a surge of literature on trade politicization. Notwithstanding politicization's topicality and significance, it varies considerably over time, across trade agreements negotiations as well as across EU member states. By picking up on the latter, this article examines why, despite similar economic benefits potentially to be gained from trade liberalization, TTIP negotiations revealed striking differences in politicization in Germany and the UK. Understanding this variation is illustrated by highlighting the impact of some of TTIPs' substantial issues mobilizing a range of materially and ideationally motivated stakeholders, who in turn shaped diverging governments' trade positions of the countries under scrutiny. In explaining this selective politicization across two European countries, focus is on three explanatory variables, domestic material interests (business associations and trade unions), societal ideas (voters and non-governmental organizations [NGOs]) dominant in these countries' domestic politics, as well as their interaction with national institutions. For this reason, the societal approach to governmental preference formation is employed which provides a detailed exploration of these three domestic factors, as well as the importance of their interdependence, in shaping the TTIP positions of the UK and German governments.