Suchergebnisse

This paper examines compulsion in active labour market programmes (ALMP). When an unemployed worker has to participate in a programme in order to remain eligible for benefits there are two seperate effects. First, there is the treatment effect, i.e. the programme makes the worker more attractive for a potential employer or makes search more efficient, thus helping the unemployed worker to find a job more quickly. Second, there is the compulsion effect, i.e. because the worker has to attend the programme his value of being unemployed drops and he is stimulated to find a job more quickly. So, both effects induce the worker to find a job more quickly. The difference between the treatment effect and the compulsion effect concerns the quality of the post-unemployment job. The treatment effect improves the quality; the compulsion effect lowers the quality of post-unemployment jobs.

This paper discusses developments in the Netherlands concerning unemployment insurance, unemployment assistance and disability insurance. The emphasis is on how financial incentives for individual workers and firms affect flows of benefit recipients. The main message is that it is indeed helpful to screen workers who want to enter the benefit system, to establish counseling and monitoring of workers that are in the benefit system and to impose sanctions on workers or employers that abuse the system. The Dutch experience in reconstructing social security provides clear lessons for other countries. ; Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Entwicklungen und Reformen der Arbeitslosenversicherung sowie der Renten- bzw. Erwerbsunfähigkeitsversicherung in den Niederlanden. Betrachtet wird vor allem, wie die damit verbundenen Anreize für Arbeitnehmer und Arbeitgeber die Ein- und Austritte in die Versicherungssysteme beeinflussen. Das wesentliche Ergebnis ist, dass es hilfreich ist, die Leistungsbezieher beim Eintritt zu untersuchen, vorhandene Leistungsbezieher laufend zu beraten und zu überprüfen und Missbrauch zu sanktionieren. Insoweit sind die niederländischen Erfahrungen für andere Länder hilfreich.

Recent evaluations of active labor market policies are not very optimistic about their effectiveness to bring unemployed back to work. An important reason is that unemployed get locked-in, that is they reduce their effort to find a regular job. This paper uses an administrative dataset from the Slovak Republic on durations of individual unemployment spells. The focus of the analysis is temporary subsidized jobs. By exploiting the variation in the duration of these jobs it is possible to investigate whether or not the locking-in effect is important. It turns out that it is.

This paper uses an administrative dataset to analyze to what extent active labor market policies in the Slovak Republic have been beneficial for unemployed workers. The focus is on two types of temporary subsidized jobs and on training. Short-term subsidized jobs seem to be the most efficient active labor market policy. Workers that are or have been on a shortterm subsidized job have a higher job finding rate than other unemployed workers have and once they find a job they have a lower job separation rate than workers that have not been on a short-term subsidized job. Long-term subsidized jobs have a negative effect on the job finding rate and no effect on the job separation rate. The positive effect of training on the job finding rate of unemployed workers may have to do with reversed causality: some workers enter a training program only after they are promised a job. Training does not seem to affect the job separation rate.