Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Half Title -- Series Information -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of contents -- Contributors -- Chapter 1 The psychology of political polarization: An introduction -- What is political polarization? -- Why study political polarization? -- Political polarization is a paradox -- Political polarization is a problem -- Intolerance -- Motivated reasoning -- Overview of the book -- Note -- References -- Section 1 Underlying processes of political polarization -- Chapter 2 When do psychological differences predict political differences?: Engagement and the psychological bases of political polarization -- The psychological bases of political differences -- How (and when) do psychological differences predict political differences? -- Connecting needs, traits, and motives with belief systems -- Engagement and the psychological bases of partisan and ideological differences -- Engagement and the psychological bases of issue-attitude formation -- Conclusion -- Acknowledgment -- Note -- References -- Chapter 3 The political mindset of supporters of radical and populist parties -- Polarization in psychological literature -- The Catastrophe Model of radicalism and extremism -- Radicalization and issue position polarization -- Populist ideology does not equal populist ideological attitude -- Populism as an ideological attitude: old wine in a new bottle -- The new political alignments in citizens' mind -- Political cynicism on the rescue for democracy? -- Polarization needs to be overcome, indeed -- Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 4 A psychological profile of extreme Trump supporters -- Tribalism -- Prejudice -- Scientific evidence -- Ingroup favoritism -- Scientific evidence -- Bloodlust -- Scientific evidence -- The information bubble -- Scientific evidence -- Material self-interest -- Scientific evidence -- Conclusion.

Why do we universally punish offenders? This book proposes that people possess a moral punish instinct: a hard-wired tendency to aggress against those who violate the norms of their group. This instinct is reflected in how punishment originates from moral emotions, stimulates cooperation, and shapes the social life of human beings.

Abstract. People endorse conspiracy theories particularly when they experience existential threat, that is, feelings of anxiety or uncertainty often because of distressing societal events. At the same time, such feelings also often lead people to support groups frequently implicated in conspiracy theories (e.g., the government). The present contribution aims to resolve this paradox by proposing an Existential Threat Model of Conspiracy Theories, which stipulates under what conditions existential threat does versus does not stimulate conspiracy theories. The model specifically illuminates that feelings of existential threat increase epistemic sense-making processes, which in turn stimulate conspiracy theories only when antagonistic outgroups are salient. Moreover, once formed conspiracy theories are not functional to reduce feelings of existential threat; instead, conspiracy theories can be a source of existential threat in itself, stimulating further conspiracy theorizing and contributing to a generalized conspiracist mindset. In the discussion, I discuss implications of the model, and illuminate how one may base interventions on the model to breaks this cyclical process and reduce conspiracy beliefs.

People can polarize into various ideologies, including tendencies towards political left- and right-wing ex-tremism, and religious fundamentalism. Here we compare polarization in these different ideologies in a USonline sample (N= 424). Building on significance quest theory, we specifically investigate how individualtendencies towards political extremism and religious fundamentalism are associated with grievance andworldview variables within the same study. As grievance variables we measured personal and fraternal depri-vation, and socio-economic fear. As worldview variables we measured belief significance, dogmatic intolerance,and parochial altruism. Results revealed that political extremism and religious fundamentalism were similarlyassociated with the worldview variables but not with the grievance variables. We conclude that independent ofcontent, ideological polarization is associated with a common worldview characterized by the feeling that onesupports a meaningful cause, intolerance of alternative ideologies, and a willingness to make personal sacrificesfor one's ideals.

AbstractWhen individuals in valued relationships are transgressed against, how are they able to protect the relationship while at the same time restore justice for themselves? Study 1 (N = 137) employed a recall design to demonstrate that when victims restore justice, the well‐established association between relationship value and forgiveness can be explained indirectly through a motivation to control future behavior. Studies 2 (N = 122) and 3 (N = 115) replicated this finding using experimental designs, manipulating two distinct facets of valued relationships: the fact that they are continuing and close. There were no indirect effects for two alternative justice motives, just deserts and revenge. We discuss implications for relations between justice and forgiveness in the context of interpersonal relationships.

This research examines how individuals with different affect regulation strategies cope with just-world threats. Our study demonstrated that individuals who poorly downregulate negative affect (a state-oriented style) more avidly attempt to defend a just world after this opportunity is offered via an authority figure when that belief of a just world was threatened than do individuals who successfully downregulate negative affect (an action-oriented style), after a filler task. Sizable differences thus exist in how individuals defend their just-world beliefs as a function of how people deal with their affective states.

In this article, we examine psychological features of extreme political ideologies. In what ways are political left- and right-wing extremists similar to one another and different from moderates? We propose and review four interrelated propositions that explain adherence to extreme political ideologies from a psychological perspective. We argue that (a) psychological distress stimulates adopting an extreme ideological outlook; (b) extreme ideologies are characterized by a relatively simplistic, black-and-white perception of the social world; (c) because of such mental simplicity, political extremists are overconfident in their judgments; and (d) political extremists are less tolerant of different groups and opinions than political moderates. In closing, we discuss how these psychological features of political extremists increase the likelihood of conflict among groups in society.

Although an increasing volume of research has identified several negative sociopolitical attitudes as correlates of conspiracy theories, to date it remains unclear whether belief in conspiracy theories is necessarily in conflict with support for democratic governance. In this contribution, we integrate previous findings suggesting inconsistent relationships between belief in conspiracy theories and support for democratic governance. Study 1 (N = 300) shows that belief in conspiracy theories is associated with decreased support for representative democracy but increased support for direct democracy. Study 2 (N = 270) replicated these findings and revealed that these relationships were mediated by political cynicism and feelings of powerlessness. In Study 3 (N = 298), we experimentally show that a system with direct democracy (as compared with representative democracy) empowered participants and therefore decreased belief in conspiracy theories. Contrary to the common notion that conspiracy theories are associated with decreased support for democracy, these findings suggest that conspiracy beliefs are associated with a preference for direct over representative democracy.

The recent rise in controversial politicians has garnered substantial interest in the assessment of their personality. Observer ratings of politicians' personality, however, may suffer from evaluative and value-related biases. Evaluative biases are likely to differentially affect personality ratings of preferred and non-preferred politicians, whereas value-related biases are likely to affect ratings of honesty-humility and openness to experience of preferred politicians in line with the self-based heuristic or assumed similarity effect. In a stratified sample (final N = 203) of the Dutch population, respondents/voters provided self-ratings and observer ratings of the political leaders of the seven largest political parties on the HEXACO Simplified Personality Inventory (HEXACO-SPI). Findings showed evaluative biases on honesty-humility, extraversion, conscientiousness, and openness to experience. Furthermore, observer ratings of politicians were generally lower than self-ratings on honesty-humility and higher on extraversion, suggesting high perceived politicians' narcissism. Findings on the value-related bias showed that assumed similarity was higher for honesty-humility and openness to experience among politicians of a preferred party than among politicians of non-preferred parties. Additionally, assumed similarity effects were also present for emotionality among preferred politicians and for extraversion and conscientiousness among both preferred and non-preferred politicians, suggesting a self-based prototypicality effect.

The 2016 European Union (EU) refugee crisis exposed a fundamental distinction in political attitudes between the political left and right. Previous findings suggest, however, that besides political orientation, ideological strength (i.e., political extremism) is also relevant to understand such distinctive attitudes. Our study reveals that the political right is more anxious, and the political left experiences more self-efficacy, about the refugee crisis. At the same time, the political extremes—at both sides of the spectrum—are more likely than moderates to believe that the solution to this societal problem is simple. Furthermore, both extremes experience more judgmental certainty about their domain-specific knowledge of the refugee crisis, independent of their actual knowledge. Finally, belief in simple solutions mediated the relationship between ideology and judgmental certainty, but only among political extremists. We conclude that both ideological orientation and strength matter to understand citizens' reactions to the refugee crisis.

In the present study, we tested whether Muslim minority members are more susceptible to conspiracy theories than majority members in the Netherlands. We examined conspiracy theories that are relevant (portraying the Muslim community as victim or Jewish people as perpetrators) and irrelevant for participants' Muslim identity (about the 2007 financial crisis, and other theories such as that the moon landings were fake). Results revealed that Muslims believed both identity-relevant and irrelevant conspiracy theories more strongly than non-Muslims. These differences could not be attributed to the contents of Muslim faith: Ethnic minority status exerted similar effects independent of Muslim identity. Instead, evidence suggested that feelings of both personal and group-based deprivation independently contribute to belief in conspiracy theories. We conclude that feelings of deprivation lead marginalized minority members to perceive the social and political system as rigged, stimulating belief in both identity-relevant and irrelevant conspiracy theories.

The anti-vaccination movement has successfully spread its views on social media. This study examined how community building emerges in the messages of Dutch anti-vaccination Telegram groups. Particularly, we investigated the extent to which these groups provide a platform for sharing information, perpetuating a shared identity, and promoting action. As negative emotions are considered a prime driver of collective action, we examined to what extent the messages had a negative valence. We used a mixed-method approach through a quantitative content analysis of 4654 text messages from five Telegram groups, while also examining the nature of the content through a qualitative analysis. The results suggest that most messages contained a form of shared identity (ingroup favoritism and outgroup hostility) or (mis)information, and, to a lesser extent, encouragements for (online) action. Moreover, most content had a negative valence. These findings illustrate how online groups might be sources of (mis)information, polarization, and intergroup hostility.