Suchergebnisse

Intro -- PLEASURE ANDTHE GOOD LIFE -- CONTENTS -- Preface -- Introduction -- Chapter One. Two Paradigms : Plato and Aristotle -- I. Plato: The 'Replenishment Theory' -- 1. From the Protagoras to the Republic -- 2. The Philebus -- 2.1. The Definition of Pleasure -- 2.2. Plato's Critique of Hedonism -- 3. An Evaluation of Plato's Theory -- 3.1. A Positive Doctrine? -- 3.2. The Physiological Presuppositions of the Definition -- 3.3. The Identity of Pleasure and Replenishment -- 3.4. Plato's Merits -- II. Aristotle: The 'Theory of the Perfect Activity' -- 1. Aristotle's Rejection of the Platonic Definition -- 1.1. The 'Platonic' Definition of Pleasure -- 1.2. Aristotle's Criticism -- 2. A New Model -- 2.1. Aristotle's Definition of Pleasure -- 2.2. Pleasure as a 'Supervenient Element' -- 2.3. The 'Proper Pleasure' -- 3. Consequences of Aristotle's New Model -- 3.1. Pleasure is not a Movement -- 3.2. Pleasure is not Excessive per se -- 3.3. 'Pure' Pleasure -- 4. An Evaluation of the Aristotelian Account -- Chapter Two. The Standard Neoplatonic Theory: Plotinus and Proclus -- I. Plotinus -- 1. Plotinus' Definition of Pleasure -- 2. Plotinus' Refutation of Hedonism -- 3. 'Pleasure' in the Good Life -- 4. Conclusion -- II. Proclus -- 1. Proclus' Definition of Pleasure -- 2. 'Pleasure' in the Good Life -- 3. Conclusion -- Excursus. Epicureans and Stoics -- I. Epicurus -- II. The Stoics -- Chapter Three. A Different View: Damascius' Commentary on the Philebus -- 1. Introduction -- 1.1. Identifying the Author -- 1.2. Method -- 2. The Central Theme (σκoπóς) of the Dialogue -- 2.1. Introduction -- 2.2. Damascius' Own View -- 3. Damascius' Account of the Soul as a Basis of his Theory of Pleasure -- 4. Darnascius' Interpretation of the 'Mixture of Pleasure and Intellect' -- 4.1. Desire and Cognition in Sense-perception and Intellect.