Suchergebnisse

AbstractEuropean financial regulation consistently gives governments privileged access to private investors, reflecting the anchor role assigned to sovereign securities as safe and liquid assets for the financial system. Legislative reforms after the financial crisis of 2008 further expanded the preferential treatment of sovereign securities as zero-risk claims, introduced portfolio requirements in favour of public debt, and constrained market speculation against governments. These sovereign privileges appear counterproductive for fiscal discipline and financial stability: they encourage excessive public debt issuance and make financial institutions holding government bonds - in particular from euro area countries with a variable risk profile - vulnerable to fiscal turbulence. Governments seem to have a conflict of interest. On the one hand, they are prudential regulators of financial risk-taking, on the other hand, they tend to overlook the financial sector's exposure to sovereign risk. This article considers four theories of the state-finance nexus and their solutions to this conflict of interest. The money view, the franchise view, and the modern financial repression view draw on the state's monetary and regulatory powers over finance to confirm sovereign safety. Their positions fundamentally contrast with the neoliberal view, which relies on free markets to enforce sustainable public finances. The article concludes that sovereign privileges present a fundamental dilemma for European financial governance with a neoliberal orientation: they oblige private investors to hold public debt, while weakening the role of markets in promoting fiscal discipline as the very foundation of sovereign safety.

AbstractMarket interest rates have been on a declining trend over the past 35 years in all advanced economies, even reaching negative territory in some European jurisdictions. This article reviews two competing explanations for the occurrence of unnatural low interest rates. The secular stagnation hypothesis of Keynesian origin maintains that persistent non-monetary factors have caused a structural excess of desired savings over planned investments which steadily pushed down the equilibrium real interest rate that is consistent with a balanced economy. Major central banks in turn failed to sufficiently lower their monetary policy rates to revive aggregate demand, leading to anaemic economic recoveries and hysteresis effects. By contrast, the financial repression doctrine argues that central banks pursued low interest rates to ease the government budget constraint and serve political objectives. The Austrian School of Economics states that this monetary easing bias sowed the seeds of repeated boom/bust cycles and created economic distortions that dragged down potential growth and the equilibrium real interest rate. The core of the debate appears to be the long-standing controversy about the desirable role for the state in guiding the economy on a higher potential growth path as opposed to relying on the efficiency of market processes in generating prosperity.

The sharp rise in public debt-to-GDP ratios in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008 posed serious challenges for fiscal policy in euro area countries. This thesis examines whether and to what extent modern financial repression has been applied in Europe to address these challenges. Financial repression is defined as the government's strategy – supported by monetary and financial policies – to gain privileged access to capital markets at preferential credit conditions and divert resources to the state with the aim to secure and, if necessary, enforce public debt sustainability. This study shows that national public debt management, EU financial regulation, EMU crisis management as well as ECB monetary policy have significantly supported euro area governments in dealing with their fiscal predicament. Taken on their own, these public policies were targeted at supporting fiscal, financial and monetary stability in the wake of the euro area crisis. This study argues that the respective authorities have in fact applied the tools of financial repression and thereby contributed to relieving sovereign liquidity and solvency stress.

At the 25th anniversary of the Maastricht Treaty, this paper reviews the merits of introducing a safe sovereign asset for the eurozone. The triple euro area crisis showed the costly consequences of ignoring the "safety trilemma". Keeping a national safe sovereign asset (the German bund) as the cornerstone of the financial system is incompatible with having free capital mobility and maintaining economic and financial stability in a monetary union. The euro area needs a single safe sovereign asset. However, eurobonds are only foreseen after full fiscal integration. To address the safety trilemma member countries must therefore act as the joint sovereign behind the euro and choose from two options. First, they could establish a credible multipolar system of safe national sovereign assets. For this purpose, they could all issue both senior and junior tranches of each national government bond in a proportion such that the expected safety of the senior tranche is the same across countries while the junior tranche would absorb any sovereign default risk. Additional issuance of national GDP-linked bonds could insure governments against a deep recession that might lead to a self-fulfilling default and thereby help to make the junior tranche less risky. The second option is that the member countries together produce a common safe sovereign asset for a truly integrated and stable monetary union by creating synthetic eurobonds comprising both a safe senior claim and a risky junior claim on a diversified portfolio of national government bonds. This appears a more effective solution to the safety trilemma - especially when euro area governments would also issue national GDP-linked bonds - but it requires flanking measures to control for moral hazard.

This paper reviews the debate on the longer-term requirements for safeguarding the euro as a currency beyond the state that is anchored through collective governance instead of a central government. The strengthening of EU economic and financial governance in the wake of the euro area crisis goes a long way towards creating the minimum conditions for a more perfect EMU. At the same time, the current principle of nation states coordinating their sovereignty to 'do whatever is required' to stabilise the euro area as a whole rather than sharing their sovereignty in common institutions to achieve this common objective has its limitations. Challenges in this context relate inter alia to the effectiveness of market discipline and reinforced economic policy surveillance, the requirement of a truly single financial system, the demand for eurobonds and a euro area fiscal capacity, and the transnational democracy that should legitimate EMU decision-making based on common values. To safeguard the euro as a currency beyond the state, euro area countries should consider pooling their national sovereignty over a wider range of EMU-related policy areas, as necessary to achieve more effective risk control and more efficient risk sharing.