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Over the last few decades, transnational elite formation progressed hand in hand with a deterioration in national business elites. Most studies regard this process as progressive and linear. However, we argue that transnational elite formation is subject to a variety of opposing forces, and the assumed progression is not a given fact. As an intriguing case, we analyse the financial business elite with a focus on the financial crisis of 2008. This international event had substantial ramifications, including a possible external shock to transnational elite formation. To study the consequences of the crisis, we collected the board composition data of the 48 largest transnational financial companies for the period 2006-11. Changes in board composition show opposing effects. For example, transnationality increased during the crisis, but reversals appeared when national governments intervened.

AbstractOver the last few decades, transnational elite formation progressed hand in hand with a deterioration in national business elites. Most studies regard this process as progressive and linear. However, we argue that transnational elite formation is subject to a variety of opposing forces, and the assumed progression is not a given fact. As an intriguing case, we analyse the financial business elite with a focus on the financial crisis of 2008. This international event had substantial ramifications, including a possible external shock to transnational elite formation. To study the consequences of the crisis, we collected the board composition data of the 48 largest transnational financial companies for the period 2006–11. Changes in board composition show opposing effects. For example, transnationality increased during the crisis, but reversals appeared when national governments intervened.

ABSTRACTManuscript Type:EmpiricalResearch Question:In this study, the level of nationality diversity of a corporate board is seen as directly dependent on the governance regime of the country of origin of the company. Therefore, to what extent can differences in nationality diversity in corporate boards be explained by structural differences in governance regimes in different countries?Research Findings:A number of hypotheses about the level of nationality diversity in company boards in Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK have been derived. These have been tested and confirmed to a large extent. Governance regime effects are strong, even when controlled for the most relevant company effects.Theoretical Implications:For the first time, the explanation of nationality diversity has been directly connected to the characteristics of a country's governance regime. Additionally, the relative strength of competing country and company forces was discussed and tested.Policy Implications:This study shows how the increase in the diversity of nationalities on corporate boards, as result of global economic forces, are translated through national institutions. On a company level, this implies that the governance regime of a company's country of origin might be either an asset or a liability. It also shows the importance of national‐level institutions when it comes to the ways global economic forces exercise a differentiating effect on the board composition of large multinational enterprises.

Building and reacting on the most influential article on the topic, namely, `Management Fashion' by Abrahamson (Academy of Management Review 21(1), 1996), we propose that management fashions are best conceptualized as `the production and consumption of temporarily intensive management discourse, and the organizational changes induced by and associated with this discourse'. This conceptualization allows us to take account of `interpretative viability', a certain degree of ambiguity about a fashion `s content, and its consequences for the dynamics involved in the ongoing shaping and reshaping of a concept's connotations. Our arguments are illustrated by drawing on a variety of empirical work on Business Process Reengineering in the Netherlands.

There is an error in affiliation 54 for author Adil Samekin. The correct affiliation 54 is: School of Liberal Arts, M. Narikbayev KAZGUU University, Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan.

During the initial phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, U.S. conservative politicians and the media downplayed the risk of both contracting COVID-19 and the effectiveness of recommended health behaviors. Health behavior theories suggest perceived vulnerability to a health threat and perceived effectiveness of recommended health-protective behaviors determine motivation to follow recommendations. Accordingly, we predicted that—as a result of politicization of the pandemic—politically conservative Americans would be less likely to enact recommended health-protective behaviors. In two longitudinal studies of U.S. residents, political conservatism was inversely associated with perceived health risk and adoption of health-protective behaviors over time. The effects of political orientation on health-protective behaviors were mediated by perceived risk of infection, perceived severity of infection, and perceived effectiveness of the health-protective behaviors. In a global cross-national analysis, effects were stronger in the U.S. (N = 10,923) than in an international sample (total N = 51,986), highlighting the increased and overt politicization of health behaviors in the U.S.

The present paper examines longitudinally how subjective perceptions about COVID-19, one's community, and the government predict adherence to public health measures to reduce the spread of the virus. Using an international survey (N = 3040), we test how infection risk perception, trust in the governmental response and communications about COVID-19, conspiracy beliefs, social norms on distancing, tightness of culture, and community punishment predict various containment-related attitudes and behavior. Autoregressive analyses indicate that, at the personal level, personal hygiene behavior was predicted by personal infection risk perception. At social level, social distancing behaviors such as abstaining from face-to-face contact were predicted by perceived social norms. Support for behavioral mandates was predicted by confidence in the government and cultural tightness, whereas support for anti-lockdown protests was predicted by (lower) perceived clarity of communication about the virus. Results are discussed in light of policy implications and creating effective interventions.

During the initial phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, U.S. conservative politicians and the media downplayed the risk of both contracting COVID-19 and the effectiveness of recommended health behaviors. Health behavior theories suggest perceived vulnerability to a health threat and perceived effectiveness of recommended health-protective behaviors determine motivation to follow recommendations. Accordingly, we predicted that-as a result of politicization of the pandemic-politically conservative Americans would be less likely to enact recommended health-protective behaviors. In two longitudinal studies of U.S. residents, political conservatism was inversely associated with perceived health risk and adoption of health-protective behaviors over time. The effects of political orientation on health-protective behaviors were mediated by perceived risk of infection, perceived severity of infection, and perceived effectiveness of the health-protective behaviors. In a global cross-national analysis, effects were stronger in the U.S. (N = 10,923) than in an international sample (total N = 51,986), highlighting the increased and overt politicization of health behaviors in the U.S.