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China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), labelled as the world's largest infrastructure program, has so far directed investments mainly to energy and transportation networks in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Since its launch, the BRI has changed significantly in terms of scale, stakeholders, and investment sectors and continues to evolve, also in light of the COVID-19 crisis. However, so far, there is no systematic and comprehensive analysis of how it might look like in the medium-term future (2035), even though academic literature on the BRI is burgeoning. We address this research gap and apply a scenario method with a 2 × 2 matrix, building on insights from ∼40 qualitative interviews with representatives from business, non-profit and public sectors from China and BRI countries, complemented by desk research of press and academic articles. We conceptualise the BRI alongside its degree of economic globalisation and multilateralism, which are both impacted by the global pandemic response. We arrive at the four scenarios Asian, Vibrant, Irrelevant, and International BRI. These scenarios show that different development are possible with the BRI's geographical scope, the investment volumes and sectors, the funding structure, and also the orientation towards sustainability. These post-pandemic pathways of the BRI might help decision-makers in business and politics to prepare their responses and strategies. The scenarios can also inform the academic debate around conceptualising the BRI and provide a qualitative basis for future quantitative impact assessments.

How can dangerous interference with the climate system be avoided? Science can help decision-makers answer this political question. Earlier publications have focused on the probability of keeping global mean temperature change below certain thresholds by stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations at particular levels. We compare the results of such "stabilization profiles" with a set of "peaking profiles" that reduce emissions further after stabilization and thus result in a concentration peak. Given the inertia in the climate system, stabilization profiles lead to ongoing warming beyond 2100 until the temperature reaches equilibrium. This warming partly can be prevented for peaking profiles. In this way, these profiles can increase the likelihood of achieving temperature thresholds by 10–20% compared with the likelihood for the associated stabilization profiles. Because the additional mitigation efforts and thus costs for peaking profiles lie mainly beyond 2100, peaking profiles achieving temperature thresholds with the same likelihood as the original stabilization profile, but at considerably lower cost (up to 40%), can be identified. The magnitude of the cost reductions depends on the assumptions on discounting. Peaking profiles and overshoot profiles with a limited overshoot may, in particular, play an important role in making more ambitious climate targets feasible.

Integrated assessment models (IAM) and resulting scenarios have become increasingly institutionalised and relevant in the science-policy interface of climate policy. Despite their analytical strengths to conceive low-carbon futures, their co-evolution with the transnational science-policy interface of climate politics has also led to a focus on a specific set of techno-economic futures that are typically based on a relatively narrow set of assumptions. This deviates attention from alternatives that are hardly studied by IAMs, but might be more desirable from a societal perspective. We argue that research-based models and scenarios should support rather than narrow down deliberations on possible and desirable futures and provide an impetus to enact socially desirable change. Accordingly, we propose three future directions regarding the development and use of IAMs: 1) incorporate a plurality of perspectives on plausibility and desirability through iterative participatory engagement and worldview-based scenario exploration, 2) seek collaboration with the arts and humanities to expand the range of imagined futures beyond the status quo and 3) make projected futures more tangible and experiential so that diverse societal actor groups can understand and genuinely engage with them. By deploying the indisputable analytical strengths of IAMs optimally within these suggestions, we believe they can facilitate broader societal debates about transformative pathways to low-carbon futures.

Integrated assessment models (IAM) and resulting scenarios have become increasingly institutionalised and relevant in the science-policy interface of climate policy. Despite their analytical strengths to conceive low-carbon futures, their co-evolution with the transnational science-policy interface of climate politics has also led to a focus on a specific set of techno-economic futures that are typically based on a relatively narrow set of assumptions. This deviates attention from alternatives that are hardly studied by IAMs, but might be more desirable from a societal perspective. We argue that research-based models and scenarios should support rather than narrow down deliberations on possible and desirable futures and provide an impetus to enact socially desirable change. Accordingly, we propose three future directions regarding the development and use of IAMs: 1) incorporate a plurality of perspectives on plausibility and desirability through iterative participatory engagement and worldview-based scenario exploration, 2) seek collaboration with the arts and humanities to expand the range of imagined futures beyond the status quo and 3) make projected futures more tangible and experiential so that diverse societal actor groups can understand and genuinely engage with them. By deploying the indisputable analytical strengths of IAMs optimally within these suggestions, we believe they can facilitate broader societal debates about transformative pathways to low-carbon futures.

A post-2012 regime aimed at reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions could develop towards a universal or fragmented regime. The fundamental difference between a universal and a fragmented regime is that the first involves a single comprehensive climate regime in which all countries participate, whereas the second involves either multiple treaties or a single treaty in which not all countries participate. This study assesses the literature on a wide range of different model studies concerning the environmental effectiveness and economic consequences of various universal and fragmented climate regimes. The most important conclusions (e.g. relative position of regions in terms of costs) are generally consistent across different studies, despite the differences in methodology. We conclude that stabilising GHG concentrations at low levels is more costly with a fragmented regime than with a universal regime, because reduction targets must be achieved by a smaller number of countries or because fragmented treaties may prevent reducing GHGs where it is cheapest to do so. However, establishing a universal regime will be challenging due to cost differences between regions if emissions are allocated based on specific allocation rules and incentives to free-ride on a universal regime. Even though alternative behaviours such as responsibility, the implementation of transfer schemes or exclusive membership can increase the likelihood of achieving a universal regime, a fragmented regime seems more feasible. Therefore, a transitional fragmented 'coalition of the willing' could be established first, which could provide the basis for a larger, universal regime in the long term. Adapted from the source document.

Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) have gained a prominent role in the climate science-policy interface. The article reconstructs the evolution of IAMs and their changing role in this interface, investigating how and why IAMs have become so prominent. Based on literature analysis, quantitative document analysis and semi-structured interviews, we describe the historic evolution of the interactions between IAMs and policy-making between 1970 and 2015. We identify five historic phases in which IAMs played distinct mediating roles between science and policy, succeeding to adjust their scenario efforts to the continuously changing demands for knowledge from the policy community. In explaining the prominent role of IAMs, we differentiate between background conditions (material and sociological) and more contextual factors, most notably the flexible, hybrid and broad nature of IAMs as well as the pro-active character of the IAM community to enhance their policy relevance. We draw on the notion of institutional work to explain this success. In light of the urgency of responding to the climate crisis, we suggest that the IAM community may expand their scope of anticipated futures and consider engaging a wider range of publics and societal stakeholders beyond the science-policy interface.