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Which emotions explain why people engage in political action (e.g., voting, protesting)? To answer this question, theory and research in psychology and political science predominantly focused on distinctnegativeemotions such as anger. The current article conceptually explores the motivational potential of distinctpositiveemotions by developing an integrative perspective that specifies which positive emotions can be differentiated (i.e., theirform), whichfunctionthese emotions have, and whichimplicationsthese have for explaining political action. To this end, I analyze, compare, evaluate, and synthesize three approaches to positive emotions (affective intelligence theory, appraisal theories of emotion, and broaden‐and‐build theory). This perspective generates new hypotheses for the field to test, including the role played by distinct positive emotions such as joy, inspiration, interest, hope, and pride in motivating political action. I discuss how this perspective may help restore a balance in research on emotions and political action by focusing on the motivational potential of distinct positive emotions.

Which emotions explain why people engage in political action (e.g., voting, protesting)? To answer this question, theory and research in psychology and political science predominantly focused on distinct negative emotions such as anger. The current article conceptually explores the motivational potential of distinct positive emotions by developing an integrative perspective that specifies which positive emotions can be differentiated (i.e., their form), which function these emotions have, and which implications these have for explaining political action. To this end, I analyze, compare, evaluate, and synthesize three approaches to positive emotions (affective intelligence theory, appraisal theories of emotion, and broaden-and-build theory). This perspective generates new hypotheses for the field to test, including the role played by distinct positive emotions such as joy, inspiration, interest, hope, and pride in motivating political action. I discuss how this perspective may help restore a balance in research on emotions and political action by focusing on the motivational potential of distinct positive emotions.

The political psychology of political action provides the potential for building bridges between scholars from different fields. The main aim of this article is to set some baby steps toward building two conceptual bridges by bringing together a core motivation approach to political action with core features of the social structure that embeds those core motivations. The first conceptual bridge relies on considering a broader motivational model than provided by rational actor or social identity approaches, whereas the second bridge relies on considering core features of the social structure as potentiating these core motivations for political action. More specifically, I first discuss definitions of political action. Second, I identify four converging themes across different literatures on collective action, social movement participation, and voting turnout, resulting in a taxonomy of core motivations for political action (i.e., personal or group‐based identity, efficacy, emotion, and moral motivations). Third, in a more explorative fashion I identify four core features of the social structure (ingroup, outgroup, interpersonal network, and institutional features), which I tentatively connect with the taxonomy of core motivations. Finally, I discuss the theoretical, empirical, and practical implications of this generalist, generative, and integrative perspective on political action.

The political psychology of political action provides the potential for building bridges between scholars from different fields. The main aim of this article is to set some baby steps toward building two conceptual bridges by bringing together a core motivation approach to political action with core features of the social structure that embeds those core motivations. The first conceptual bridge relies on considering a broader motivational model than provided by rational actor or social identity approaches, whereas the second bridge relies on considering core features of the social structure as potentiating these core motivations for political action. More specifically, I first discuss definitions of political action. Second, I identify four converging themes across different literatures on collective action, social movement participation, and voting turnout, resulting in a taxonomy of core motivations for political action (i.e., personal or group-based identity, efficacy, emotion, and moral motivations). Third, in a more explorative fashion I identify four core features of the social structure (ingroup, outgroup, interpersonal network, and institutional features), which I tentatively connect with the taxonomy of core motivations. Finally, I discuss the theoretical, empirical, and practical implications of this generalist, generative, and integrative perspective on political action.

The Polish Round Table offers a rare historical example where negotiations between representatives of opposing political sides achieved major political transformation in a peaceful way. Such an outcome should undoubtedly be labeled a success. However, in our commentary, taking the example of the Polish Round Table, we take a critical look at the interpretation of success of social movements by social scientists. In line with the ethos of social sciences, social scientists value (harmoniously achieved) progressive types of change, such as the change that followed the negotiations of the Polish Round Table. Indeed, when it comes to the Round Table, our definition of success may be blurred by the political evaluation of the changes of 1989 from a liberal perspective. The target articles point out the importance of specific structural conditions (both internal and international) and psychological processes (perceptions of power, efficacy and moral commitment) that led to the successful outcome. We therefore argue that it is pivotal to delineate the conditions of success, if we want to apply them to other contexts without bias. Neither hindsight, nor liberal bias are problematic per se, but they can evoke a form of wishful thinking that, as scientists, we may want to treat with some skepticism. ; peerReviewed ; publishedVersion

This article proposes a classification of motivations for collective action based in three of Tetlock's (2002) metaphors of social functionalism (i.e., people as intuitive economists, politicians, and theologians). We use these metaphors to map individual- and group-based motivations for collective action from the literature onto the distinction between individuals who are strongly or weakly identified with their social group. We conclude that low identifiers can be best understood as intuitive economists (supported by both early and recent work on collective action), whereas high identifiers can be best thought of as intuitive politicians or theologians (as recent work on social identity has started to explore). Interestingly, our classification reveals a remarkable lack of attention for the intuitive theologian's motivation for collective action. We therefore develop new hypotheses for future research, and derive recommendations for policy and practice from our analysis.

Surprisingly, hope is under-researched in contemporary social-psychological explanations of collective action and social change. This may be because collective action research typically focuses on "high-hope" contexts in which it is generally assumed that change is possible (the main appraisal of hope), and thus the main question is whether "we" can change the situation through collective action (i.e., group efficacy beliefs). This line of thought implies that such beliefs should only motivate collective action when hope is high. To test this hypothesis, we conducted three experiments in contexts that were not "high-hope". In Study 1, conducted within the "low-hope" context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we found that manipulated group efficacy beliefs did not increase individuals' collective action intentions. Studies 2 and 3 used the contexts of NHS privatization in the United Kingdom and Gun Control Reform in the United States - contexts that were neither "low-hope" nor "high-hope", which enabled us to manipulate hope and group efficacy beliefs together in one design. Consistent with our hypothesis, findings of both experiments revealed that group efficacy beliefs only predicted collective action when hope was high. Replicating Study 1, when hope was low, group efficacy had no effect on collective action intentions. We discuss our findings in light of the idea that only when hope for social change is established, the question of whether "we" can create change through collective action becomes relevant. Without hope, there can be no basis for agency, which informs goal-directed action.

Do cultural norms that allow individuals to choose their social relationships put them at risk for, or protect them from, loneliness? After all, more freedom to choose whom to relate to may promote that individuals can choose higher-quality relationships (which protects from loneliness), but it may also imply a higher risk of social isolation (which puts at risk for loneliness). We propose that the solution to this cultural loneliness paradox of choice is to distinguish whether more individual choice flows from cultural norms that provide more opportunities for new relationships (as implied by higher relational mobility; higher RMn), or from cultural norms that allow to leave established relationships (as implied by lower relational stability; lower RSn). Specifically, we suggest that more individual choice protects from loneliness when emerging from higher RMn (which allows to establish new higher-quality relationships), but puts at risk for loneliness when emerging from lower RSn (which increases the risk of social isolation by undermining the stability of established relationships). Findings from two cross-sectional survey studies in four European countries (Study 1: Finland, N = 237; Portugal, N = 261; Study 2: Poland, N = 242; Austria, N = 2 41) supported this line of thought: Higher RMn was consistently related to lower loneliness across all samples, and lower RSn was related to higher loneliness in two out of four samples (and either non-significantly related to higher loneliness or unrelated to it in the other two samples). We discuss the importance and implications of differentiating RMn and RSn to resolve the cultural loneliness paradox of choice.

Although political action often requires activists to express who they are and what they stand for, little is known about the motivators of such identity expression. This research investigates howgroup identity contentandidentification with this contentpredictidentity-expressive collective actionin the U.S. 2016 presidential elections. We recruited a longitudinal community sample of U.S. party supporters (N= 426) mid-October (T1), beginning November (T2), and mid-November (T3). Participants listed words they associated with party campaigners, and self-reported their identification with this identity content and the politicized group. Supporting H1, politicized group identification longitudinally predicted increasedfrequencyof collective action more strongly than did identification with specific identity content. Supporting H2, identification with specific identity content longitudinally predicted increased desires toexpressthat content through collective action more strongly than politicized group identification. Implications for our understanding of identity expression and identity content in collective action are discussed.

Although political action often requires activists to express who they are and what they stand for, little is known about the motivators of such identity expression. This research investigates how group identity content and identification with this content predict identity-expressive collective action in the U.S. 2016 presidential elections. We recruited a longitudinal community sample of U.S. party supporters (N = 426) mid-October (T1), beginning November (T2), and mid-November (T3). Participants listed words they associated with party campaigners, and self-reported their identification with this identity content and the politicized group. Supporting H1, politicized group identification longitudinally predicted increased frequency of collective action more strongly than did identification with specific identity content. Supporting H2, identification with specific identity content longitudinally predicted increased desires to express that content through collective action more strongly than politicized group identification. Implications for our understanding of identity expression and identity content in collective action are discussed.

We surveyed 351 inhabitants of a part of the Netherlands that suffers from gas-extraction-induced (and thus "human-caused") earthquakes. Based on geological reports, we distinguished between three differently affected subregions. We first tested whether being more strongly, objectively affected also implies a stronger subjective disadvantage. Second, we tested whether objective disadvantage moderates which type of perceived rights violations (i.e., perceived violations of personal/family, or collective rights to safety, health, and financial stability) predict collective action intentions. In line with our hypotheses, the participants living in the objectively most affected area perceived their rights to be violated the most, and their collective action intentions were motivated by perceived violations of personal/family rights. In contrast, the collective action intentions of those in the least affected areas were motivated by perceived violations of collective rights. We discuss the importance of understanding the interplay between objective disadvantage, perceived rights violations, and collective action.