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This paper evaluates a job search assistance program for unemployment insurance recipients. The assignment to the program is dynamic. We provide a discussion on dynamic treatment effects and identification conditions. In the empirical analyses we use administrative data from a unique institutional environment. This allows us to compare different microeconometric evaluation estimators. All estimators find that the job search assistance program reduces the exit to work, in particular when provided early during the spell of unemployment. Furthermore, continuous-time (timing-of-events and regression discontinuity) methods are more robust than discrete-time (propensity score and regression discontinuity) methods.

In this paper we provide a description of the labor market in the Netherlands. Compared to other OECD countries labor force participation is high and the unemployment rate is low (also for young workers). Among the unemployed there are, however, relatively many long-term unemployed workers. Labor force participation of older workers is in-creasing but still low and Dutch workers have relatively low working hours. Disability is high, particularly among young individuals. We discuss the relevant labor market in-stitutions in the Netherlands and use recent reforms to assess the importance of the different reforms. Where possible we provide an international comparison. We find that inflow into benefits programs responds to (financial) incentives. The outflow is much more difficult to affect, in particular we could not find any evidence of substantial positive effects of active labor market programs (which are frequently offered in the Netherlands).

Although the primary goals of post war housing policy in The Netherlands have beenaccomplished, the Dutch housing market remains highly regulated. This paper develops a staticpartial equilibrium model to investigate the effects of deregulation on the private marketprices and the allocation of houses among households. We focus on three policy measures:individual rent support, social housing projects and the fiscal rules for owner occupiedhouses.

To increase their transition from welfare to work, benefit recipients in the municipality of Rotterdam were exposed to various financial incentives, including both carrots to sticks. Once their benefit spell exceeded one year, welfare recipients were entitled to a reemployment bonus if they found a job that lasted at least six months. However, they could also be punished for noncompliance with eligibility requirements and face a sanction, i.e. a temporary reducing of their benefits. In this paper we investigate how benefit sanctions and reemployment bonuses affect job finding rates of welfare recipients. We find that benefit sanctions were effective in bringing unemployed from welfare to work more quickly while reemployment bonuses were not.

To increase their transition from welfare to work, benefit recipients in the municipality of Rotterdam were exposed to various financial incentives, including both carrots to sticks. Once their benefit spell exceeded one year, welfare recipients were entitled to a reemployment bonus if they found a job that lasted at least six months. However, they could also be punished for noncompliance with eligibility requirements and face a sanction, i.e. a temporary reducing of their benefits. In this paper we investigate how benefit sanctions and reemployment bonuses affect job finding rates of welfare recipients. We find that benefit sanctions were effective in bringing unemployed from welfare to work more quickly while reemployment bonuses were not.

This paper looks into the search behavior of consumers in the market for health insurance contracts. We consider the recent health insurance reform in The Netherlands, where a private-public mix of insurance provision was replaced by a system based on managed competition. Although all insurers offer the same basic package (determined by the government), there is substantial premium dispersion. We develop a simple consumer search model containing the main features of the Dutch health insurance system. This model provides us with a number of hypotheses, which we test using data from the Dutch Health Care Consumer Panel. The data confirm the standard predictions on consumer choice (i.e. there is adverse selection and a lower premium increases coverage). We also find that consumers with lower search costs are more likely to receive a group contract offer. This generates a situation of price discrimination where individuals without group contracts and higher s! earch costs pay higher premiums and buy lower insurance coverage.

We investigate the effect of counseling and monitoring on the individual transition rate to employment. We theoretically analyze these policies in a job search model with two search channels and endogenous search effort. In the empirical analysis we use unique administrative and survey data concerning a social experiment with full randomization and compliance. The results show that counseling and monitoring do not affect the exit rate to work. Monitoring causes a shift from informal to formal job search. We combine our empirical results to the results from our theoretical analysis and the existing empirical literature, to establish a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of these policies.