Suchergebnisse

While Indonesia's democracy has received much acclaim for institutionalizing fair, free, and peaceful elections, many important challenges still lie ahead. The "politics of reform," which has consumed much of the government's time and energy, are a mixed blessing. Interest collisions – between those who seek change and those who resist it – have caused government paralysis and aversion and, at the same time, sparked promising forms of public participation and resilience. Meanwhile, the Yudhoyono administration has reached a critical juncture that will define political and economic trajectories for upcoming years. Now that two controversies (Bank Century and KPK debacles) have tarnished the government's credentials, the president will need to make continued efforts to sustain support in his cabinet, coalition, and electorate. In order to steer the country toward calmer political waters and higher socio-economic development, President Yudhoyono will be challenged to form flexible policy coalitions and reinstate the momentum for change.

While Indonesia's democracy has received much acclaim for institutionalizing fair, free, & peaceful elections, many important challenges still lie ahead. The "politics of reform," which has consumed much of the government's time & energy, are a mixed blessing. Interest collisions -- between those who seek change & those who resist it -- have caused government paralysis & aversion &, at the same time, sparked promising forms of public participation & resilience. Meanwhile, the Yudhoyono administration has reached a critical juncture that will define political & economic trajectories for upcoming years. Now that two controversies (Bank Century & KPK debacles) have tarnished the government's credentials, the president will need to make continued efforts to sustain support in his cabinet, coalition, & electorate. In order to steer the country toward calmer political waters & higher socio-economic development, President Yudhoyono will be challenged to form flexible policy coalitions & reinstate the momentum for change. Adapted from the source document.

Recent political developments are slowing reforms. The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and the finance ministry find themselves entrapped in legal inquiries and political wrangling that seem intended to weaken their reforming zeal. KPK's effectiveness has been undermined by legislative changes and the arrests of three of its commissioners. Meanwhile, the costly bail-out of a small bank has provided an opportunity for attacks on leading reformers - Vice President Boediono and the Minister of Finance, Sri Mulyani Indrawati. The president's diffident stance in both instances has played into the hands of the opposition and, although key reformers are likely to remain in office, the political imbroglio has nonetheless eroded confidence in the government. Year-on-year GDP growth recovered strongly to 5.4% in the fourth quarter of 2009. Government spending has been the key driver, while household spending slowed and investment remained low. Both exports and imports have returned to modest growth. Although 2009 ended with low inflation, Bank Indonesia (BI) has set its target inflation rate for 2010 at double the rate it achieved in November. BI is likely to bow to populist demands to lower nominal interest rates rather than raising them somewhat to prevent inflation accelerating, even though its real policy rate has been consistent with significant acceleration of GDP growth. The 2009 budget outcomes confirm that the fiscal stimulus in response to the global financial crisis has been less than hoped for. As for 2010, high world oil prices will imply huge subsidies, given that the government is unwilling to increase domestic fuel and electricity prices commensurately. The president announced that virtually all the government's 'first 100 days' program targets have been met. However, half of the 'action plans' amounted to nothing more than issuing or announcing new regulations, plans, blueprints, guidelines, recommendations or policies, or simply preparing drafts of these. No real progress has been made in relation to the most urgent reforms, particularly on energy subsidies and labour market regulation. Realising that the whole population would benefit in net terms, the previous government signed the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) in November 2004. But just when the agreement was to take effect, strong resistance from business and parliamentarians emerged, leading to the government's decision to re-negotiate many tariffs with China. This is disappointing: failing to uphold its commitments under this long-standing agreement makes Indonesia appear unreliable as an economic partner.

Recent political developments are slowing reforms. The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and the finance ministry find themselves entrapped in legal inquiries and political wrangling that seem intended to weaken their reforming zeal. KPK's effectiveness has been undermined by legislative changes and the arrests of three of its commissioners. Meanwhile, the costly bail-out of a small bank has provided an opportunity for attacks on leading reformers - Vice President Boediono and the Minister of Finance, Sri Mulyani Indrawati. The president's diffident stance in both instances has played into the hands of the opposition and, although key reformers are likely to remain in office, the political imbroglio has nonetheless eroded confidence in the government. Year-on-year GDP growth recovered strongly to 5.4% in the fourth quarter of 2009. Government spending has been the key driver, while household spending slowed and investment remained low. Both exports and imports have returned to modest growth. Although 2009 ended with low inflation, Bank Indonesia (BI) has set its target inflation rate for 2010 at double the rate it achieved in November. BI is likely to bow to populist demands to lower nominal interest rates rather than raising them somewhat to prevent inflation accelerating, even though its real policy rate has been consistent with significant acceleration of GDP growth. The 2009 budget outcomes confirm that the fiscal stimulus in response to the global financial crisis has been less than hoped for. As for 2010, high world oil prices will imply huge subsidies, given that the government is unwilling to increase domestic fuel and electricity prices commensurately. The president announced that virtually all the government's 'first 100 days' program targets have been met. However, half of the 'action plans' amounted to nothing more than issuing or announcing new regulations, plans, blueprints, guidelines, recommendations or policies, or simply preparing drafts of these. No real progress has been made in relation to the most urgent reforms, particularly on energy subsidies and labour market regulation. Realising that the whole population would benefit in net terms, the previous government signed the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) in November 2004. But just when the agreement was to take effect, strong resistance from business and parliamentarians emerged, leading to the government's decision to re-negotiate many tariffs with China. This is disappointing: failing to uphold its commitments under this long-standing agreement makes Indonesia appear unreliable as an economic partner.

Much of the existing investment climate literature promotes a rule-based 'good governance'approach, in which less advanced economies are advised to adopt orthodox, OECD-type practices in order to facilitate higher investment and growth. Although credible

ABSTRACTThere is little doubt that protecting property rights, reducing corruption, and improving public services are desirable long-term objectives for all countries. But are such institutional prescriptions sufficient, or even necessary, to achieve investment and growth? By exploring the political economy of the cities of Solo and Manado in Indonesia, this article shows that relationship-based, rather than rule-based, cooperation between government leaders and local firms can provide an effective mechanism to boost investment and improve local investment climates. Our findings challenge the conventional wisdom that impartial rule-based economic governance is a precondition for investment, although it suggests that the creation of such institutions may make growth more sustainable and equitable in the medium and long term.

Much of the existing investment climate literature promotes a rule-based 'good governance'approach, in which less advanced economies are advised to adopt orthodox, OECD-type practices in order to facilitate higher investment and growth. Although credible

ABSTRACTThere is little doubt that protecting property rights, reducing corruption, and improving public services are desirable long-term objectives for all countries. But are such institutional prescriptions sufficient, or even necessary, to achieve investment and growth? By exploring the political economy of the cities of Solo and Manado in Indonesia, this article shows that relationship-based, rather than rule-based, cooperation between government leaders and local firms can provide an effective mechanism to boost investment and improve local investment climates. Our findings challenge the conventional wisdom that impartial rule-based economic governance is a precondition for investment, although it suggests that the creation of such institutions may make growth more sustainable and equitable in the medium and long term.